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Abstract 
This thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between financialisation and 
pension reform in Turkey. In the last two decades, more than thirty countries have 
replaced their pay-as-you-go pension schemes with fully-funded schemes. Although 
the increasing significance of financial conduits within pension provision has been 
evident within this reform trend, the corresponding literature has failed to address 
adequately the key role that financialisation has played. Therefore, it is argued here 
that the recent pension reform in Turkey, not least the Individual Pension System, 
cannot be understood without considering financialisation of the Turkish economy. 
Financialisation refers to both the extensive and intensive growth of finance, i.e. 
integration of financial activities into ever more aspects of economic production and 
social reproduction processes as well as the deepening of financial activities in line 
with the proliferation of more sophisticated financial operations/instruments. The 
expansion of finance within pension provision highlights the ability of finance as 
money capital to capitalise different forms of monetary streams. Thus, finance 
transforms the financial and non-financial sectors and is integrated into the everyday 
lives of households while financialisation of pension income is one of the overlooked 
financialisation practices. The private pension scheme in Turkey mostly serves the 
middle- and high-income earners revealing the generally adverse impact of 
financialisation on those in unfavourable labour market positions - women, 
informally employed and unemployed being the most vulnerable. The intensification 
of finance, on the other hand, is evident in the supply and demand side impacts of 
pension funds on capital markets. Accordingly, pension funds transfer massive flows 
to capital markets, thus pushing up asset prices. Moreover, pension funds, as they 
mature, demand more innovative investment instruments to meet their liabilities. In 
the Turkish capital markets’ context, these impacts of pension funds are observable 
despite their recent origins.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
What we call the Turkish pension reform is the sum of series of reforms which have 
altered the pension system in Turkey over the period from 1999 to 2008. These 
reform series have decreased the significance of public pay-as-you-go (PAYG from 
now on) scheme while introducing a private scheme which is funded and invests 
pension contributions in financial markets, namely the Individual Pension System 
(IPS). The reform process is accompanied by a structural transformation in the 
economy strengthening and serving the interests of the financial sector. Moreover, 
international financial institutions, not least the World Bank (WB), has been 
involved in the pension reforms in a way which prioritises financial motives as 
opposed to traditional expectations from pension schemes. In this light, this study 
investigates the relation between financialisation and pension reforms, as well as 
financialised funded pensions’ impacts on financialisation processes.  
This thesis rests on three pillars. The first is Marxist finance theory. Our 
contribution is to argue that Marx’s analysis of money capital (Marx, 1991) 
highlights the current tendency for extensive and intensive growth of finance, 
financialisation (Fine, 2013). More generally, neoliberal policies have played a 
substantial role in the emergence of financialisation in countries like the USA and 
the UK. With erosion of limits to the application of money capital, finance has grown 
both extensively and intensively in a way that increasingly shapes most if not all 
economic and social processes.  
The second pillar of this study aims to locate pensions in relation to the 
generational social reproduction of labour power. Labour power, i.e. the capacity to 
labour, is a special commodity that is partially reproduced (Marx, 1990, 1996) 
through goods and services that are produced within capitalist relations and also 
attached to non-capitalist provision and processes such as state provisioning and 
household labour (Harvey, 1982). In this respect, the value of labour power is 
attached to a material standard of living which is necessary for the social 
reproduction of labourers outside the direct control, if not influence, of production 
relations (Fine, 2009). Thus, pensions are to be conceptualised as a key element in 
the social reproduction of the elderly.  
 13 
The third pillar of the study is the character of financialisation in Turkey in 
particular and how this is reflected in the context of pensions. We build the argument 
that developing countries experience financialisation as a result of political 
imperatives. More specifically, pension reforms in capital-scarce developing 
countries mostly imply development of financial markets (Becker, Jäger, Leubolt, & 
Weissenbacher, 2010). In the era of financialisation, development of financial 
markets in relation to pension funds has significant implications. Hence, while 
pension reforms in Turkey place the elderly income of certain groups under stake, 
corresponding funds play a substantial role in contributing to the financialisation of 
the Turkish economy.  
This argument is developed in five chapters after this introduction. This 
chapter continues with a brief overview of the motivation and background of the 
study. Then, we give an overview of the main arguments with summary of chapters. 
We conclude this introduction with a reading guidance for the rest of the study. 
1.2. Motivation and background  
Our initial motivation in studying financialisation originated from the intention to 
develop an understanding of contemporary finance from a Marxist point of view. 
This curiosity was underpinned by discussions of the 2008 crisis which pointed to 
the role of finance in the emergence of global economic turmoil. While the crisis hit 
the countries with developed financial systems, Turkey and similar developing 
countries were already demonstrating analogy regarding the phenomenal growth of 
finance. Thus, the question of whether or not a similar crisis process was, and is, 
emerging in Turkey has become the primary issue that propelled this study. The 
background research has shown that financialisation is more complicated than being 
a component of the 2008 crisis and it has severe consequences those go beyond the 
developed countries. To this end, developing a theoretical analysis in depth with the 
purpose of conceptualising financialisation was a challenge to confront. Pointing at 
the peculiarities of financialisation in developing countries is important in analysing 
the phenomenon in the global context. Therefore, financialisation in general for a 
theoretical analysis, and financialisation in Turkey for a case study, was chosen as 
the initial focus. 
 As research progressed, it was recognised that financialisation in Turkey is a 
broad and multi-fold process in need of detailed analysis. The housing sector and 
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household debt with corresponding changes in the non-financial sector’s financial 
engagements have been popular topics in this regard. However, through a literature 
review, we recognised that the recently introduced individual-funded pension scheme 
has not been evaluated in terms of financialisation at all. This was a crucial gap 
because the international literature on financialisation has put emphasis on pension 
funds’ role in the emergence of financialisation whereas this aspect of 
financialisation was completely ignored in the context of Turkey. Therefore, we 
decided to shed light on this specific case study, reform of the pension system and 
the new private-funded scheme in order to outline the characteristics of 
financialisation in general and the peculiarities of financialisation in Turkey. 
In the beginning, our focus was on capital markets regarding effects of the 
pension funds. This was a simple and standard approach to pensions and 
financialisation nexus as, within the literature, there are several examples of studies 
focusing on this relation. However, as the research evolved, we decided to enhance 
our analysis addressing the multidimensional relations between financialisation and 
pensions. For this purpose, conceptualising finance and pensions from a Marxist 
point of view was crucial. The basis for studying finance rests on the interest-bearing 
capital (IBC) discussion in the third volume of Capital (Marx, 1991). Therefore, it 
was comparatively easy to choose this as starting point. On the other hand, the 
literature has investigated pensions in different frames, such as social wage, welfare 
state and state/tax discussions (Gough, 1982). However, none of these approaches 
highlights the more abstract situation of pensions.  
In this respect, Fine’s argument on financialisation’s impact on the value of 
labour power as reflecting alterations in the social reproduction processes was 
capturing (Fine, 2009). Moreover, this framework went beyond the simplistic 
analysis of exploitation, which posits pensions as component of the value of labour 
power and sees the abolition of pensions as a deepening in exploitation. Rather, 
combining value of labour power and pensions was crucial for positing pensions in 
relation with broader issues of social reproduction, highlighting the role of 
financialisation in terms of shaping social reproduction processes as well as 
economic production relations (Fine, 2010). Thus, while pension funds’ impacts on 
capital markets and their role in contributing to financialisation of the economy are 
inevitably one side of the story, another side is financialisation’s impact on pensions, 
not least on old-age income of different groups within the population. In this regard, 
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our purpose became to develop an alternative understanding of pension reforms 
which divorces from the cliché arguments on provision of ageing population as 
against budget deficits.  
 Our research questions focus on the three main aspects of financialisation, 
pensions and Turkey, alongside the reciprocal relations between them. We start by 
investigating the relation between finance and financialisation. Our main concern is 
to highlight the contribution of Marxist finance theory in understanding 
financialisation. Relevant issues are the role played by the underlying tendencies of 
capitalist relations in the emergence of financialisation. Moreover, incorporating 
political interferences and historical developments is crucial. After positing pensions 
in relation to the value of labour power, we aim to understand how financialisation 
shapes social reproduction process with special focus on the case of pensions.  
Our research questions regarding our case study start with the peculiarities of 
financialisation in developing countries, more specifically in Turkey. For this 
purpose, we review the macroeconomic policies and developments in the 
financialised era. Then, we try to shed light on the underlying role played by 
financialisation in Turkey in shaping the way in which pensions are reformed. In this 
sense, we review the involvement of international financial institutions (IFIs) and 
investigate the veracity of arguments deriving from pension reform advocates. The 
question is whether or not pension reform arguments meet the needs of the Turkish 
pension system and whether they are underpinned by the motives of increasing 
significance of finance in old-age income provision. Moreover, we aim to analyse the 
impacts of pension reforms on financialisation in Turkey through investigating their 
capital markets-related effects. In other words, both financialisation’s impacts on 
pension reforms, and reformed pension system’s impacts on financialisation in 
Turkey issues are questioned. 
1.3. Summary of the chapters 
This study is formed by five chapters and a conclusion in addition to this 
introduction. The second chapter is a literature review that aims to locate the 
contribution of this study. Almost all PhD theses have literature reviews and also 
there are several alternative ways of writing them. Our work engages with three 
different literatures; pension reforms literature which mainly derives from social 
policy discussions, financialisation literature which is both broad and proliferating in 
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subject matter, and literature on the recent transformation of the Turkish economy of 
which pension reforms are part and parcel of structural reforms advised by the IFIs. 
We only offer briefer reviews of the latter two literatures, with the main review being 
of the social policy literature. The main motivation is to point at the gap within this 
literature regarding the role played by financialisation in terms of pension reforms. 
 The chapter consists of three sections (in addition to its introduction and 
conclusion as in each chapter). Section 2.2 introduces the spread of pension reforms 
which resulted in more than thirty countries replacing or complementing their public 
PAYG pension schemes with private-funded ones. The pension reforms started with 
the experiment held in Chile where Chicago Boys managed to privatise the entirety 
of public pensions. After the success, the WB published the famous Averting the Old 
Age Crisis report (WB, 1994) and spread the reforms to other countries of two 
regions, Latin America and Europe and Central Asia (Madrid, 2003; Muller, 2003).  
According to the report, in order to avoid serious budgetary constraints due to an 
ageing population, i.e. increasing numbers of pensioners as opposed to decreasing 
numbers of active members (contributors to the system), existing pension systems 
were to be reformed. Two different mandatory pillars, one publicly-managed and 
tax-financed, the other privately managed and fully-funded, were to be established 
and supplemented by a voluntary third pillar. The first pillar would alleviate old age 
poverty by using the taxation power of government while the second pillar would 
perform the function of smoothing savings and boosting capital accumulation and 
capital market development. It is claimed in the Report that funded schemes would 
increase long-term saving and contribute to capital market deepening and growth 
(WB, 1994). 
The following section (2.3.) reviews the interpretations of the pension 
reforms in light of their neglect of the role played by financialisation. In order to 
demonstrate this gap within the literature, we start by reviewing the Global Social 
Policy School (2.3.1) which stresses the role of international agencies’ key function 
in pension reforms (Orenstein, 2008). Indeed, international actors, not least the WB, 
have played a fundamental role during the spread of the pension reforms as we show 
in detail in the Turkish context as well. We continue with the New Political 
Economy School (2.3.2) which is significant for pointing to the post-industrial era’s 
characteristics as the main underlying reason for the transformation of pensions. 
Accordingly, the Keynesian period provided necessary conditions for PAYG 
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pensions which rely on high labour force participation and satisfactory wage levels. 
However, with decreasing fertility, low employment levels and stable (or decreasing) 
wages, these pension schemes were deemed to be unsustainable. Therefore, pension 
reforms are seen as a consequence of the new political economy of the neoliberal era 
(Myles & Pierson, 2001). Although rightly pointing to the post-industrial era’s 
characteristics, this approach takes the transition in social provisions for granted 
while there are crucial policy interferences in this process, most importantly by IFIs.  
The Welfare Regimes approach is the most popular strand of thought in the 
comparative analysis of social provisions and we review this approach’s pension 
reform analysis in the subsection 2.3.3. The prominent author of this view is Esping-
Andersen who clusters different welfare states suggesting three typologies of welfare 
regimes, liberal, conservative and social democratic regime (Esping-Andersen, 
1990b). Each regime has different levels of protection against the insecurity that 
comes with the commodity form of labour and relies on family, state and the market 
to varying extents for this purpose. This approach suffers from being mostly 
descriptive in terms of analysing changing welfare practices. In other words, for the 
followers of this strand of thought, a pension reform which increases the significance 
of financial schemes, while shrinking PAYG pensions, is nothing but a convergence 
from social democratic regime to liberal welfare regime. Thus, the processes 
underlying this development, globalisation, neoliberalism or financialisation, are 
neglected.  
We review the arguments and posit the absence of financialisation in the 
literature as the underlying process behind pension reforms in the following 
subsection (2.4) (Fine, 2014). Thus, we briefly explain what we mean by 
financialisation of pensions and prepare the theoretical framework on extensive and 
intensive growth of finance which is presented in the third chapter. Accordingly, it is 
not possible to describe all pension reforms simply as privatisation (Deken, 2013). 
We read this shift as financialisation of pensions rather than privatisation. By 
financialisation, we refer to two issues in the reformed pension systems: first, 
integration of financial institutions in the policymaking process during which they 
attribute financial missions to social provisions such as increasing savings and 
contributing to capital market development. The second point is that, even in 
countries where traditional pension schemes are preserved, rather than being 
replaced entirely by the private scheme, some sort of financial scheme has been 
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introduced. This signifies that public PAYG schemes are not the real target. The 
main purpose of the reforms is to strengthen the (private) financial component of the 
pension schemes. 
The third chapter presents our theoretical framework which consists of three 
sections. The first section (3.2) scrutinises financialisation and neoliberalism in two 
subsections. We start with an abstract understanding of Marxist finance theory 
(3.2.1). Marx defines different forms of capital, and capital in the form of money 
undertakes the functions that we call finance in the modern world. Money capital has 
different appearances which vary in terms of their relations to surplus value 
production and appropriation. For instance, money dealing activities, which can be 
understood as banking and bookkeeping activities for circulating money as the 
means of exchange, are useful for the capitalist relations although not contributing to 
surplus value production directly. On the other hand, money capital in the form of 
interest-bearing capital is crucial for surplus value production for enabling the 
necessary funds for production and exchange of commodities (Marx, 1991). 
Moreover, IBC has a typical character of being fictitious with the capacity to 
capitalise every stream of money capital without a direct price or value relation with 
the underlying asset. This aspect of IBC, thus finance from a Marxist point of view, 
is important for highlighting the capacity of finance to overcome limits of value 
relations in terms of deepening and attaching to every aspect of life in fictitious 
forms (Fine, 2013).  
The following subsection (3.2.2) focuses on the historical aspect of 
financialisation by emphasising the neoliberal era’s certain characteristics that 
underpinned the emergence of financialisation. Without engaging in discussion on 
the definition of neoliberalism, we follow the view that neoliberalism is characterised 
by financialisation which paved the way for further rise in significance of finance 
(Saad-Filho, 2011). We posit shareholder value as the discourse of financialisation 
for prioritising the financial interests over all other motives. Thus, shareholder value 
has changed the way in which non-financial corporations are managed and altered 
capital accumulation by causing tepid economic growth (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 
2000). While shareholder value signifies the financialisation’s influence on the non-
financial sphere, securitisation points to transformation experienced in the financial 
sphere (Lavoie, 2012). Elimination of the rules that constrain the capitalisation of 
every sort of loan, financial actors have become capable of using every aspect of 
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economic and social life as an underlying asset for fictitious capital. Therefore, 
financialisation’s impact on households has reflected itself in the phenomenal 
increase in indebtedness which feed back to the formation of securitised financial 
instruments.   
Section 3.3 builds up the theoretical framework for the relation between 
extensive growth of finance and pensions. For this purpose, we abstract pensions 
from all its varying appearances and argue that pensions’ essential function is related 
to social reproduction of labour power. Labour power is the capacity to labour and it 
is a special commodity (Marx, 1990). The value of labour power is determined by 
the material standards of living in relation with the social reproduction processes 
(Fine, 2002). Pensions are part and parcel of these standards and they are financed by 
the total social product and organised in association with the relations across 
workers, employers and the state (Marx, 1978). The reform of pensions with the 
involvement of financial actors and in line with financial motives, therefore, 
indicates the integration of finance into social reproduction by attaching the value of 
labour power to fictitious capital. Therefore, the state’s role in mediating social 
reproduction by distributing social product through taxes has been undertaken by 
financial conduits. The implications of this development can be seen by observing 
the practices introduced with the pension reforms campaigns. Funded pensions 
signify the transition of pension provision from the non-financial arena of social 
reproduction to the financial sphere. Hence, pension provision has become a profit-
making activity for financial actors as well as a source of income for fictitious capital 
owners. As a consequence, pensions became an individual investment rather than a 
social right over which class struggle was conducted in a collective manner 
(Lazzarato, 2012).  
On this basis, we develop our theoretical framework on the intensification of 
finance and pension funds in section 3.4. We argue that pension funds play role in 
financialisation through three conduits. First, pension funds contribute to 
financialisation via their roles in capital markets as institutional investors influencing 
corporate governance through pursuit of shareholder value (Aglietta, 2000). As 
mentioned, pension funds affect the companies’ investment decisions while pushing 
corporate managers to generate high shareholder returns which direct them to choose 
short-term lucrative financial activities over long-term real investments (Boyer, 
2000). The second conduit is how the pension funds’ supply-side impacts on capital 
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markets by transferring huge amounts of capital inflows at the beginning of their life 
cycle thus pushing up asset prices (Toporowski, 2000). As pension funds mature, i.e. 
their contributors’ ratio over beneficiaries decreases, they become net sellers of the 
financial instruments in a way that contributes to the instability of the capital 
markets. Thirdly, pension funds’ logic of funding, again in relation with their life 
cycle, shifts motivation from minimising risk to maximising returns (Engelen, 2003). 
Therefore, pension funds increasingly demand more sophisticated instruments which 
by-pass investment constraints and bring about lucrative returns. 
Chapter 4 aims to give an overview of the financialisation in Turkey. In this 
regard, we start with background information about the last three decades of the 
Turkish economy. In a nutshell, Turkey liberalised the capital account in 1989 and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the convertibility of the Turkish 
Lira (TL) in 1990 (Kazgan, 2013). Following this, the volume of capital inflows into 
Turkey, in particular in the form of foreign direct investments (FDIs), increased 
rapidly in the 1990s. Seeking to benefit from this favourable environment, the 
Turkish governments of the era implemented a state-driven growth policy which was 
based on high-indebtedness of the public sector. This process was marked by the 
involvement of the banking system in financing government debt through borrowing 
from abroad and lending to government at high interest rates. The lucrative returns 
from these operations and the difficulty of accessing funds resulted in the 
proliferation of banks that were founded by the big Turkish conglomerates (Gultekin 
Karakas, 2009). The first consequence of this development was the 1994 financial 
crisis which was underpinned by lack of liquidity due to sudden capital outflows 
alongside high public debt and inflation (Marois, 2012). As capital mobility due to 
financial account liberalisation induced a chain of reactions in developing countries, 
the instability of the 1990s resulted in subsequent crises in Mexico (1994) and Asia 
(1997) (Ergunes, 2012). In the second half of the 1990s, Turkey was severely 
affected by fears of contagion due to high public external debt, an ill-regulated 
financial sphere and extremely high inflation rate. Therefore, Turkey entered a 
structural transformation period in 1999 which started with a banking system reform 
and continued with disinflation programme signed with the IMF (Bedirhanoglu et al., 
2013). 
In light of these developments, in section 4.2, we argue that the Turkish 
economy was financialised in the post-2001 era as a result of restructuring 
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programmes advised by the IMF and other IFIs under the claim of solving high 
public indebtedness, financial fragility and prolonged inflation. We discuss that the 
decisive policy in terms of financialisation was inflation targeting policy which 
attracted capital inflows. Inflation targeting, first implemented in the New Zealand in 
1990 before spreading around the world, is based on the neoliberal ideology of ‘the 
only goal of the completely independent Central Bank should be sustaining price 
stability’. Increasingly more countries started to implement inflation targeting as the 
main monetary policy (Epstein & Yeldan, 2006, 2010) and financialisation in 
developing countries has been characterised by this policy alongside other pro-
financialisation policies (Becker et al., 2010). Another point we emphasise is that the 
Turkish economy was restructured in line with the putative shift from the 
Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus while the ‘regulatory state’, 
especially in the realm of finance, was created through measures and reforms 
promoted by the IFIs from 1999 onwards (Bakir & Onis, 2010; Erturk, 2003). The 
financial motive underlying these reforms is apparent in the consequences of 
structural reforms, including high unemployment despite accelerating economic 
growth. We also show that financialisation has had a socialised cost as international 
reserve accumulation to sustain capital inflows was added to the package of 
conditionality (Aybar & Dogru, 2013). 
In the section 4.3, we take a close look at the implications of financialisation 
through three conduits of the economy, the financial sector, the non-financial sector 
and households. In 4.3.1, we demonstrate the transformation in the banking system 
which is the central institution for the financialisation process in Turkey. With the 
Banking Sector Restructuring Programme of the transition period, the Turkish 
banking system was reorganised such that the number of banks decreased due to 
insolvency leading them to be taken over by the state. These banks, then, were 
acquired by or merged with foreign banks, which resulted in a substantial increase in 
the significance of foreign banks in the Turkish banking system. Moreover, with the 
Twin Programme, which included fiscal control alongside inflation targeting, public 
indebtedness decreased substantially which caused banks to lose a lucrative source of 
profit, namely government debt securities. Therefore, banks in Turkey experienced a 
shift from purchasing public securities to lending more generally as we demonstrate 
with the data from banking system balance sheets. 
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In this light, we investigate the impact of this development in the banking 
system on the real sector in Turkey (4.3.2). The most remarkable implication of 
economic transformation has been the shift of the external debt from the public to the 
private sector. Across the latter, the non-financial sector has been the main debtor 
with, in particular, almost double of the external debt compared to that of the 
financial sector. However, this balance has changed since 2012 when the financial 
sector’s foreign debt has caught up with the real sector and exceeded it in 2015. This 
development is related to the financial sector’s crucial expansion as we show with 
data that banks are the main undertakers of this debt. Besides being indebted, we 
show that the Turkish real sector, including both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors, borrows mostly for the short term while the significance of 
bank loans decreased as opposed to financial liabilities in the real sector’s balance 
sheet. More specifically, the manufacturing sector, which mostly consists of large-
scale companies, relied on foreign resources for long-term borrowings. Then the 
question becomes, what do they do with the money they borrow? In order to see the 
implications of favourable financial circumstances on production levels, we examine 
fixed capital investment (Demir, 2009b; Ergunes, 2012). After reviewing relevant 
data available by the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT), we draw the 
conclusion that the Turkish big corporations, which are the drivers of the 
manufacturing sector, have not reflected the availability of finance in their 
production levels. When it comes to small and medium enterprises, which comprise 
the majority of the non-manufacturing sector, the result is more disappointing as they 
could not even benefit from the expansion in loans. We bring evidence for this from 
bank loan allocations which show that the share of the small firms’ loans has not 
changed even though loans expanded significantly. Finally, we specify that some of 
the non-manufacturing sector firms have been the winners in this process as is 
evident with the highest share of loans extended by banks to the construction sector, 
corresponding to the growth in the supply of and demand for housing.  
In section 4.3.3, we evaluate the impacts of these developments on 
households. The structural transformations mentioned before has resulted in banks’ 
increasing focus on consumer lending. As we show with data on loans and 
receivables of the banking system, the share of consumer loans has increased 
substantially. Moreover, we discuss that the main reason households seek bank loans 
is to buy a house, in response to the previously mentioned expansion in the 
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construction sector (Karacimen, 2014). What is more interesting is to see that the 
majority of the households that ask for consumer credit consists of those in low 
income groups. This is a challenging finding which needs to be explained. To that 
end, we address the issue of high unemployment and low labour force participation 
characteristic of the Turkish labour market. We refer to those authors who note that 
financialisation has exacerbated the existing problems of low-income households, 
inducing them to apply for bank loans in order to sustain their standards of living 
(Akcay & Gungen, 2014). In other words, we argue that the Turkish households have 
survived financialisation through bank loans.  
Our fifth chapter develops an analysis in depth of Turkish pension reform. 
Here, we show the involvement of the WB which conditioned pension reform in 
return for a loan agreement in 1994 (5.2). Although, pension reforms began to be 
implemented after some time (in 1999), the way in which pensions were shaped was 
a perfect fit with WB advice: decreasing the significance of the PAYG scheme and 
introducing a private individual funded scheme (ILO, 1996). In order to reveal the 
financial motives underlying the pension reforms, we critically scrutinise the 
accuracy of pension reform advocates’ arguments. In five subsections we deal with 
the arguments of ageing population, inadequacy of the pension system in protecting 
against poverty, deficits of the social security system institutions, coverage problems, 
and structural problems of the pension schemes originating from the fragmented 
organisation and technological shortcomings.  
We show on the basis of comparative data that the population projections 
regarding Turkey’s elderly population are exaggerated while the ageing problem is 
far from significant relative to the experience of other OECD countries (5.2.1). The 
argument of protection against poverty is discredited with the observation that social 
security systems have different functions than protecting those in extreme poverty, 
and there are alternative ways of addressing poverty than through social security 
schemes (5.3.2) (Guzel, 2005). We continue with the argument on the deficits of the 
social security system (5.2.3) which stem from previous policy implementations such 
as contribution breaks, misuse of pension schemes’ surpluses, and last but not least, 
early retirement. We stress that the blueprint advice of increasing the retirement age 
would simply not solve this problem in Turkey. We provide further evidence in the 
form of the characteristics of the Turkish labour market pointing to the weight of the 
many young, educated unemployed as opposed to exhausted, uneducated elderly 
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workers (Turcan Ozsuca, 2006). In addition, we examine the so-called generosity of 
the Turkish pension system by comparing it with other OECD countries and illustrate 
that other OECD countries spend much more on old-age income than Turkey, and 
average income of the pensioner is much lower in Turkey (OECD, 2013).  
Coverage of the Turkish social security system is a rightly observed issue as 
there are many elderly who are not covered by any kind of protection scheme (5.2.4). 
We show that the Turkish labour market’s characteristics, such as high informality 
and low labour force participation, are what underpin the coverage problem. 
Moreover, due to very low social expenditure levels in Turkey, the social protection 
schemes’ coverage falls behind the OECD average. Finally, we review the arguments 
regarding the structural problems of the Turkish social security system. These 
originated from the fragmented organisation of the three institutions providing 
pensions on the basis of different norms. In addition, the inadequate technical 
infrastructure available exacerbated the organisational problems of delivery within 
the system (5.2.5). Thus, we draw the conclusion that the Turkish social security 
system’s problems have not been properly addressed by the advocates of reform and 
nor can they be resolved through the ways advised by the IFIs. 
This fact did not stop the Turkish policymakers from implementing WB 
advice. They first changed the eligibility rules for entitlement to a pension in 1999. 
Then, they introduced the individual, private, funded scheme, namely the Individual 
Pension System (IPS) in 2001. Finally, they united all three social security 
institutions under one roof and further tightened the eligibility conditions for the 
public scheme. Thus, as of 2008, the Turkish pension system consisted of one pillar 
of the public PAYG scheme (with tightened eligibility conditions) and one pillar of 
financial scheme on the voluntary participation principle. After reviewing all the 
reform processes in detail in section 5.3, we demonstrate the impacts of the pension 
reforms in relation to the characteristics of the Turkish labour market. We argue that 
those unemployed, the informally employed and women in Turkey were worse off 
after the reforms. Accordingly, the increasing number of contribution days and 
higher eligibility ages for retirement contributed to the unemployment problem of the 
Turkish labour market as well as making it almost impossible to retire for those who 
were unemployed or informally employed casually. We also emphasise that women 
in Turkey, with their extremely low labour force participation and interrupted 
careers, were rendered even more disadvantaged after the reform process.  
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In section 5.4, we present our position on financialisation of pensions through 
the analysis of the IPS. Here we deal with two different arguments. First, we show 
that, despite the discrete process of the IPS and economic role attributed to it, it is 
part and parcel of the pension reform advised by the WB and consists of the motive 
of financialisation of pensions in relation to two other social security system reforms. 
This is so because those reforms decreased the significance of the public PAYG 
pensions while the IPS is presented as an implicit compensation mechanism for 
possible old-age income loss. The second argument, on the other hand, regards the 
capacity of the IPS in terms of providing solutions for the problems of the Turkish 
pension system. On the basis of data from the social security system and the IPS, we 
argue that the IPS mainly appeals to middle- and high-income earners. Therefore, it 
does not contribute to coverage of the social security system except from the self-
employed which opted out from the public scheme and joined the IPS as expected by 
reform advocates. Moreover, we revisit the characteristic problems of the Turkish 
labour market and draw the same conclusion: the IPS does not solve unemployed or 
informally employed workers’ pension problem as these people cannot contribute to 
the system to allow for reasonable old-age income. As a final point, we stress the 
disadvantaged position of the women as the kinship-pensions are decreased with the 
social security reforms and funded schemes lack any redistributive character. 
As obvious from the literature and pension reform advocates’ arguments, 
there is nothing new about saying pension funds contribute to capital markets’ 
enhancement. In effect, the WB has suggested pension reforms to countries with 
undeveloped capital markets with the explicit promise of a more developed financial 
sphere. Not surprisingly, this promise held in the example of Chile whereas other 
advantages of pension reforms, regarding adequate pension income for instance, did 
not hold at all. Therefore, in our sixth chapter we state the obvious in a critical way, 
pension funds in Turkey have played a significant role in the development of capital 
markets. Nevertheless, our perspective can be regarded as novel for relating pension 
funds with the intensification of financialisation. We start by introducing general 
characteristics of pension funds in Turkey (6.2). We show that the Turkish pension 
funds were established in a cautious way with a lot of constraints on investment 
decisions and through rules to reassure participants in terms of transparency. This 
aspect of pension funds’ regulation is understandable considering the novelty of this 
kind of investment for the Turkish population and suspicion originating from lack of 
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familiarity. What is surprising, on the other hand, is recent deregulation which has 
loosened the investment criteria with the promise of opening more space for interest-
free IPS.  
We continue by pointing to the growth of the pension funds’ assets through 
quantitative data (6.2). The IPS funds’ net asset value has shown rapid growth, not 
least after 2012, with the provision of lucrative state incentive. According to the 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB from now on) data, with TL37billions in 
value, the pension funds became the most important capital markets player in Turkey 
in 2014 by exceeding the mutual funds. Although Turkish pension funds represent 
one of the smallest pension funds across OECD countries, they are noted to be the 
fastest-growing pension funds in 2012. In this regard, it is not surprising to see the 
positive impacts of this rapid growth on capital markets in Turkey. Even so, Turkish 
capital markets have not experienced remarkable growth since the IPS was founded. 
Indeed, compared to G20 countries, Turkey exhibits the second lowest market 
capitalisation value (WB). We read this indicating that the IPS funds have 
contributed to capital market growth in a way that is more qualitative than 
quantitative. In order to support this argument, we move to the demand-side impacts 
of pension funds on capital markets in Turkey. 
In 6.3, we demonstrate the transformation within the Turkish capital markets 
through data regarding the increasing significance of the private sector as opposed to 
the shrinking public sector securities. This development does not come as a surprise, 
in particular considering the overall restructuring of the financial system in Turkey 
which has decreased the weight of public sector in this regard. However, what is 
interesting is to see the change within the private sector financial instruments which 
signifies a shift from conventional financial instruments to those which can be 
deemed to be innovative instruments for Turkish capital markets. These instruments 
are bank bills, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, real estate certificates and 
commercial papers.  
In 6.3.1, we investigate the bank bills and corporate bonds in terms of what 
they represent for financialisation of the Turkish economy. We emphasise the point 
that increasing significance of bank bills as new instruments within the Turkish 
capital markets is in parallel with the significance of the banking system within the 
Turkish economy in general, and financialisation processes in particular. We provide 
evidence for this argument from the remarkable weight of the banking sector within 
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the most important base index of the Turkish capital markets, namely the top thirty 
companies of the Borsa Istanbul (BIST), i.e. BIST30. This point is important because 
pension funds in Turkey mostly invest in stocks that are listed in the BIST30 index. 
Thus, we highlight the internal feed-back mechanisms of financialisation through 
which pension funds provide funds for the expansion of the banking system which 
contributes to financialisation in an indirect manner. In the case of corporate bonds, 
on the other hand, the important point is to demonstrate that corporates started to 
issue bonds as sources of financing because they rely on the institutional investors, 
not least, pension funds in terms of serving its demands.  
In section 6.3.2, we turn the coin and look at the pension funds’ portfolio 
allocation in order to see the innovative instruments’ rising significance in their 
investments. Unfortunately, the data on a detailed allocation of these sorts of 
instruments are not readily available. Rather, we only show that conventional 
instruments, such as government bonds, lose weight within the pension funds’ 
portfolios while they consist of increasingly more innovative instruments (CMB, 
2015a). However, we cannot fully see the allocation of these instruments in detail as 
they are all gathered under the label of ‘others’. For this reason, we choose a 
different way. We take a specific instrument, lease certificates, and show how this 
instrument has become a remarkable component of pension funds’ portfolios. Lease 
certificates are important because they in effect represent a major step towards 
securitisation in the Turkish capital markets. They work on the same principles with 
special purpose entities although in Turkey they are established in the form of joint-
stock companies. What is dramatic in this context is that lease certificates are shaped 
with Islamic influences and marketed as interest-free pension funds as put by the 
Pension Monitoring Centre (PMC). Therefore, the intensification of finance through 
pension funds’ demand for innovative instruments is experienced within an Islamic-
finance context in Turkey. As we show, participation funds and alternative state 
contribution funds, which invest mainly in these instruments, are pushed by recent 
regulations with reference to interest-free pension income. 
In the concluding chapter, we review the main arguments of each chapter and 
discuss the contribution of this study to the relevant literature. Moreover, we posit 
the limitations of the thesis in terms of unavailable data and arguments to be 
discussed in detail and enhanced further. We also recommend future research which 
can draw on the basis of the findings and framework of this study. Finally, we posit 
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the policy implications of the private-funded schemes especially the case they 
become mandatory. This point is important because at the time this introductory 
chapter is being written, legal arrangements to render the IPS mandatory for all 
workers are being accelerated (Boyacioglu, 2016). 
1.4. Concluding Remarks 
In this introductory chapter, we have given an overview of the thesis. There are a few 
more points in this regard. First of all, this thesis develops a macroeconomic analysis 
based on secondary data on economic indicators and sectoral developments. In this 
regard, there is no microanalysis drawing upon primary data at the firm level or 
individual interviews. Rather, we use the publicly available data from the 
government databases and Individual Pension System websites and reports in order 
to figure out the general tendencies regarding financialisation and its interaction with 
pension provision. Moreover, we also benefit from newspaper articles, not least those 
revealing the expectations of the capital market players and the intentions of 
government authorities. As mentioned before, there are five chapters apart from the 
conclusion (and this introductory chapter) and all these chapters have introduction 
and conclusion sections. Within the thesis, bold characters are used to emphasise the 
important points from direct quotations. On the other hand, italics are mainly used 
for the purpose of highlighting terms which are in common use or from a strand of 
thought or specific author (if it is a direct reference, the page number is provided). 
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2. A Gap in the Literature on Pension Reforms: Financialisation 
2.1. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed a contagion in pension reform which has 
resulted in the increasing significance of individually funded schemes. These 
accumulate pension contributions through funds then invest in financial markets. 
Therefore, returns on financial investments of funded schemes determine the old age 
income of participants. Moreover, these schemes gather a huge amount of capital 
under pension funds which are of paramount importance in terms of financial 
markets. On the basis of this reasoning, in this chapter, we associate the pension 
reform trend with the current economic phenomenon of financialisation that shapes 
economies in a way which prioritises finance. Analysing pension reforms in the 
context of financialisation is important because it points to the penetration of finance 
into pension provision in a way which reveals the extensive and intensive growth of 
finance (Fine, 2013). By extensive growth, we posit the influence of international 
financial institutions which shape pension provision according to the financial 
interests. By intensive growth, on the other hand, we refer to the influence of pension 
funds, which are founded in relation to the pension reforms, on financial markets 
through stimulating deepening of financial activities. Thus, we contribute to the 
literature on pension reforms by pointing to the key role financialisation plays in the 
transformation of the social provision, not least through pensions. 
  We develop our argument in three sections. In the next section, we cover 
pension reforms in several countries since the 1990s. The campaign for pension 
reform has been run by the World Bank (WB) with publications, foremost with the 
report called Averting the Old Age Crisis (WB, 1994), advisory relations and 
funding. The main argument of the reform campaigners has been the ‘ageing’ 
population. On the basis of this argument, the traditional national pension schemes 
are deemed to fail to cope with sustainability problems brought forward by 
demographic transition. As a result of the campaign, many countries in the Latin 
America and Europe and Central Asia have introduced new pension schemes where 
the individual savings accounts have become either the main provider of the pensions 
or complementary to the existing schemes. Most of these countries had young 
populations but they were experiencing similar economic problems, such as 
transition to the market economy (for post-socialist countries), capital scarcity and 
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fiscal deficits (Muller, 2003). Therefore, ageing-related arguments do not explain the 
reasons underlying pension reforms. This made it necessary to review other 
interpretations of transformation in social provision. 
  In the following section, we review the literature on pension reforms in three 
subsections with a focus on three main approaches: the Global Social Policy School, 
the New Political Economy approach and the Welfare Regimes Approach. The 
Global Social Policy School deals with global factors shaping national social 
policies, and it has the advantage of addressing the international actors conducting 
the pension reform campaign (as we show in 2.3.1). Adherents of this view do 
appropriately point to the key role of the WB in pension reforms (Orenstein, 2008). 
However, they fail to reveal the underlying agenda of promoting finance. Thus, this 
approach defines pension reforms as ‘pension privatisation’ which we challenge by 
putting forward the idea of ‘financialisation of pensions’ which emphasises the 
increasing significance of finance within provision of old age income. The New 
Political Economy approach (reviewed in the subsection 2.3.2), on the other hand, 
stresses the national factors regarding the production relations in a country which 
influence the way in which pensions are provided. This view places attention on the 
post-industrial structures in the developed countries which challenge the welfare 
services organised during industrialisation. On the basis of this idea, pension reforms 
are discussed as a matter of sustainability of pension schemes which are 
incompatible with the demographic transition. Consequently, this view analyses 
pension reforms in a way that is limited to the arguments of the campaigners for 
reform although their arguments are incapable of explaining the reforms in countries 
with young populations.  
The last school we review is the Welfare Regimes Approach (in the 
subsection 2.3.3) which is a comparative analysis that clusters welfare regimes in 
different countries according to their commonalities (Esping-Andersen, 1990a, 
1990b). Despite the dominance of this approach within the welfare state literature, it 
shows a complete failure in terms of describing the transformation of the welfare 
regimes (Fine, 2014). While the neoliberal era is characterised by alterations in 
welfare services, this view focuses on increasing or decreasing similarities across 
welfare regimes rather than revealing the underlying factors, financialisation in 
particular. Since this approach mostly analyses the welfare services as a totality 
rather than focusing on specific social provision, pension reforms have not been 
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subject to considerable attention. In the few analyses where pension reforms are 
investigated through welfare regimes, the argument does not go beyond analysis of 
the convergence (or divergence) of provision. 
In the fourth section, on the basis of the gap within the literature on pension 
reforms, we analyse pension reforms in the context of financialisation. Here, we 
point, as mentioned, to the dual integration of finance with pensions. The first is 
related to the extensive growth of finance which refers to the expansion of the 
financial sphere in a way that involves non-financial elements being incorporated 
into the domain of finance. As a result, old age income has been provided through 
financial mechanisms and has become attached to financial market performance. 
Moreover, after reforms, pension systems have started to be evaluated on the basis of 
their contribution to capital market development. We argue that the financial mission 
attributed to the pension systems is a reflection of financialisation which shapes 
pension schemes in a way that favours financial markets. 
 The second aspect of the financialisation and pension relation is the impact 
of reformed pension schemes on financial markets’ depth. In a nutshell, the WB 
prescribes a pension model which consists of a funded scheme as the substantial 
provider of old age income. Funded pension schemes accumulate savings of 
participants and invest them in financial markets through pension funds. Pension 
funds stimulate the supply of, and demand for, hybrid and more speculative financial 
instruments in a way which contributes to financialisation. Supply of financial 
instruments is increased by gathering huge amounts of capital inflows for application 
to financial markets (Toporowski, 2000). On the other hand, demand for 
sophisticated financial instruments is created as a result of the logic of funding which 
necessitates more liquid investments as funds mature (Engelen, 2003). This aspect of 
pension income providing funds is related to the intensive growth of finance which 
signifies ever increasing depth of financial activities (Fine, 2013). 
By pointing to financialisation in the context of pension reforms, we 
contribute to the literature by carrying the discussion to a further level than the 
commonplace arguments regarding ageing. Indeed, we show that most of the 
countries that have reformed their pension systems have young populations. 
Moreover, when the only argument is related to the demographic transition, the 
funding method cannot be justified since financialised pension funds are not immune 
to ageing related problems. 
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Finally, we review recent publications on pension systems after reforms. Two 
issues deserve attention in the recent publications of the international financial 
institutions: the advocates of the pension reforms are still consistent with their 
previous position while they slightly modify their policy advice according to recent 
financial developments, not least the economic crisis (Whitehouse, Pallares-Miralles, 
& Romero, 2012). In addition, the reformed pension schemes are successful in terms 
of promoting financialisation in those countries but these schemes fail to meet 
projections in terms of adequacy of pension benefits. 
We conclude by situating this chapter within the overall study in order to 
introduce both the theoretical and empirical aspects of our thesis. Theoretically, 
financialisation is applied to the understanding of pension reforms. Empirically, 
other country experiences provide grounds for the analysis of the Turkish pension 
reforms in its relation with financialisation. This enables us to show that 
financialisation underpins pension reforms in Turkey while pension funds contribute 
to the financialisation of the Turkish economy through their impact on financial 
markets. 
2.2. Pension reforms 
Pension reforms go back to the early 1980s when the WB advised Chile to replace 
public pension schemes with private schemes. Pension policy advice was a part of a 
series of economic reforms put forward for Pinochet’s government after the coup that 
elected leader Salvador Allende was overthrown. These economic reforms, including 
pension reforms, were advocated by the neoliberal economists, the so-called 
“Chicago boys” who were a group of young Chilean economists graduated from US 
universities. The reforms represented a neoliberal attack against social provision in 
Chile which became a laboratory for subsequent reforms (Orenstein, 2008). 
In the 1990s, pension reforms spread around the world with more than thirty 
countries altering their pension systems. The WB ran the campaign advocating 
pension reforms. In this regard, the most important turning point was the publication 
of “Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth” 
(WB, 1994). The Report has become the flagship of a pension reform campaign run 
under the leadership of the WB with other international organisations including the 
IMF, the OECD, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) (Beland & Orenstein, 2013).  
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The Report starts with a disaster scenario about old age income schemes and 
called upon developed and developing countries to take urgent measure against the 
approaching ‘ageing crisis’:  
“Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing strain 
throughout the world. Rapid demographic transitions caused by rising life 
expectancy and declining fertility mean that the proportion of old people in 
the general population is growing rapidly. Extended families and other 
traditional ways of supporting the old are weakening. Meanwhile, formal 
systems, such as government-backed pensions, have proved both 
unsustainable and very difficult to reform. In some developing countries, 
these systems are nearing collapse. In others, governments preparing to 
establish formal systems risk repeating expensive mistakes. The result is a 
looming old age crisis that threatens not only the old but also their children 
and grandchildren, who must shoulder, directly or indirectly, much of the 
increasingly heavy burden of providing for the aged.” (WB, 1994, p. 13) 
This claim was pursued with projections on ageing: the number of people of 60 years 
old or more was half billion in 1990 and was going to triple by 2030. Further, a 
significant part of ageing would be seen in developing countries, such as China, 
which have comparatively young populations for now. 
“Because of the broad diffusion of medical knowledge and declining fertility, 
developing countries are aging much faster than the industrial countries did. 
In Belgium, it took more than 100 years for the share of the population over 
60 to double from 9 to 18 percent. In China the same transition will take only 
34 years and in Venezuela 22 years” (WB, 1994, p. 1)  
One might ask, what is the problem with this? In effect, longevity must be 
celebrated since it is associated with the improvements made in human life. 
However, according to the WB this is a crisis for several reasons. First of all, across 
the world, the most dominant pension provision type is based on PAYG financing 
which means that current retirees are paid for by the contributions of current 
participants of the system. The benefits are earnings-related and they are financed 
through the payroll tax earmarked from current contributors’ taxable earnings. 
Therefore, if the number of retirees is high (due to ageing), current participants have 
to pay proportionately more to the system. The Report argues that the number of new 
entrants to the system is incompatible with the rise in the number of pensioners. This 
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would result in unsustainable fiscal deficits of the social security systems all around 
the world. From this point of view, increasing payroll taxes, which is the usual way 
of collecting contributions to the PAYG pension schemes, aggravates the problem by 
inducing informality within the labour market. In a similar vein, subsidising pension 
systems through government spending exacerbates problems of countries with low 
growth rates.  
“High payroll taxes distort labor markets and reduce growth. In Hungary, 
where more than one-quarter of the population are pensioners, the average 
effective retirement age has fallen to 54 and the payroll tax needed to pay the 
pensions is 33 percent, cutting the demand for labor, the supply of 
experienced labor, and national output. High government spending on old age 
security crowds out other important public goods and services. In 1989 
Austria's pension fund cost 15 percent of GDP (gross domestic product), and 
old age benefits absorbed 40 percent of public spending. Without reform 
these already high percentages will increase further as the population ages.” 
(WB, 1994, p. 2) 
On the basis of this reasoning, the WB asserts in the Report that pension 
systems have three functions, namely saving, redistribution and insurance which 
should be separated from each other through a multi-pillar pension system. The 
saving function of a pension refers to the ‘income smoothing over a person’s 
lifetime’ since people consume more during old age by spending less when they are 
young. On the other hand, pension systems also have a redistribution function which 
means that they transfer income between or within generations in order to prevent 
old age poverty. Finally, the insurance function protects the person against the risks 
related to old age. The report suggests that all these three functions should not be 
covered by a public PAYG scheme; rather three pillars should be founded in order 
to meet each function.  
In more detail, the first pillar, which is publicly managed, prevents old age 
poverty and provides insurance against risks in this regard. Clearly, this pillar 
performs the redistribution function in order to alleviate poverty and can take three 
different forms: a means-tested programme, minimum pension guarantee to a 
mandatory saving pillar and, finally, it can be a flat rate benefit which is provided 
either universally or on an employment-related basis. 
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“But it should be modest in size, to allow ample room for other pillars, and 
pay-as-you- go, to avoid the problems frequently associated with public 
management of national provident funds. Having an unambiguous and 
limited objective for the public pillar should reduce the required tax rate 
substantially-and therefore evasion and misallocated labor-as well as 
pressures for overspending and perverse intra- and intergenerational transfers.” 
(WB, 1994, p. 16)   
The second mandatory pillar suggested in the Report should be fully funded and 
privately managed as opposed to the first pillar (which would be a public PAYG 
scheme). There is a main difference between funded and PAYG schemes. 
Accordingly, funded schemes accumulate funds on the basis of savings, and those 
savings with returns on investments of funds determine retirement benefits. 
However, PAYG schemes work on the basis of intergenerational transfers which 
means that current participants pay in to finance current retirees’ benefits with the 
expectation that future participants will finance their retirement too. Thus, the second 
pillar functions for income-smoothing and saving; and it can take the forms of 
personal saving accounts or occupational plans. Finally, the voluntary personal 
savings account would constitute the third pillar and might take the form of 
occupational plans. Expectation from this pillar is to provide additional old age 
income and insurance. All three pillars provide insurance function whereas 
redistribution and saving functions are provided by the first and second pillars, 
respectively. Pension reforms advised by the WB refer to a decreased role of the 
state and inter-generational income transfer through the diminishing significance of 
public PAYG schemes. New expectations from PAYG scheme become providing a 
basic, modest income for the elderly in order to prevent poverty. Thus, the WB 
addresses the individual responsibility in order to ensure welfare during old age. This 
signifies a neoliberal paradigm shift within the pension provision from state to 
market and from social to individual.  
In addition to these pillars, the Report recommends some parametric 
measures such as replacing defined benefit principle with defined contribution 
schemes, higher eligibility age for retirement with longer contribution periods, and 
introducing or altering indexation methods for pension benefits. In defined benefit 
schemes, which are traditional ways of calculating pension benefits, the latter are 
determined by a formula which consists of the years of contribution and the salary of 
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the employee. Therefore, the employee has an expectation of the approximate level 
of benefits she is going to be paid during retirement. However, in defined 
contribution schemes, only the contribution rate is fixed while the pensioner 
shoulders the risk of having lower benefits. The implication of higher retirement age 
and more contribution days is obvious: being eligible for a pension becomes more 
difficult. Last but not least, the indexation rules, although being suggested in order to 
protect the pensioner against the risk of inflation, targets less generous pension 
benefits which are required for lower replacement rates as advised by the WB. All 
these parametric measures strengthen the paradigmatic shift by diminishing the 
pension benefits paid by the public PAYG schemes while retirement becomes more 
difficult. Thus, the necessity of having a private funded saving pension plan 
increases.  
After the publication of the Report in 1994, pension reforms have spread 
around the world. Two regions were significant in this regard, Latin America and 
Europe and Central Asia. Before the reform wave, pension systems in these regions 
were mostly public pension schemes with monolithic structures while private saving 
accounts were rare. After the reforms, however, almost all countries downsized or 
closed the public scheme and introduced private old age systems either on the basis 
of mandatory or voluntary participation principles (Madrid, 2003; Muller, 2003; 
Orenstein, 2008). In Latin America, following the Chilean example, Bolivia, Mexico 
and El Salvador also closed their public PAYG schemes either immediately or 
gradually after the reform (this means the existing PAYG scheme is closed to new 
entrants but valid for existing participants who prefer to stay in them). On the other 
hand, in Peru and Colombia, the public PAYG schemes were reserved as alternatives 
to the mandatory private scheme (second pillar). In Argentina, Uruguay and Costa 
Rica, the traditional PAYG schemes have been kept while private second pillars 
provide complementary pension income. Although the degree of applying private 
schemes varies across the countries, individual fully funded schemes have been 
founded in all of them (Muller, 2003, p. 20). 
Another region spreading pension reforms is Europe and Central Asia. In this 
region, among 30 countries, 12 countries reformed their pension systems in the last 
two decades and introduced private saving accounts. Kazakhstan and Kosovo are two 
countries which have shifted their pension system to large funded pillars while they 
have downsized their public scheme to means-tested basic pension providers. In 
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Hungary, new entrants to the pension system are required to join the reformed 
scheme while the existing contributors of the system choose to opt out or not. In 
Poland, participants who are less than 30 years old have to join the private funded 
pension scheme. Latvia and Bulgaria have complemented their public pension 
schemes with small mandatory funded pillars to which workers need to contribute a 
2 per cent of payroll tax. In a similar vein, in Lithuania the private pillar is small and 
percentage is a 2.5 of payroll tax. Croatia and Estonia introduced the private funded 
pillars and workers need to contribute, respectively, 5 and 6 per cent as a payroll tax. 
Slovakia, Macedonia and Romania are other countries in the region with private 
funded pillars. Russia started to accumulate funds for the private funded pension 
scheme in 2002 (Whitehouse et al., 2012). 
China, Hong Kong, Uzbekistan, Taiwan, Nigeria, Sweden are countries from 
different regions which have introduced pension reforms. Moreover, Brazil, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Panama and Turkey adopted pension reforms which are consistent with the 
WB advice but they did not introduce mandatory saving accounts (Orenstein, 2008). 
Turkey has received the largest loan from the WB for reforming pension system 
among Europe and Central Asia countries without establishing a mandatory funded 
pillar ($197.7 millions in three loans) (Andrews, 2006, p. 67)  
  To sum up, the WB started a pension campaign in 1994 with the publication 
of Averting the Old Age Crisis which “synthesized a neoliberal critique of existing 
welfare state arrangements” (Orenstein, 2008, p. 77). As a result of this campaign, 
several countries across the world have reformed their pension systems. In the next 
section, we discuss how reforms in pension systems are interpreted by the literature.  
2.3. Is it the usual suspects or usual approaches? 
In order to explain all factors underlying the erosion of social protection, Schwartz 
(Schwartz, 2001) names his article as “Round up the Usual Suspects”. Here he 
highlights a wide range of global and national factors to address who killed the 
growth of the welfare state. However, within all those factors, one cannot find any 
hint of financialisation.
1
  Indeed, this is a representative example of the general 
feature of the literature on the transformation of social provision. The literature is 
                                                 
1
 After more than a decade that is characterised by financialisation, it is appropriate to point to the lack 
of financialisation within the literature. However, we are referring to Schwartz rather for illustrative 
purposes since he wrote his article in 2001 around when financialisation was just recognised (Engelen 
2001). 
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very busy with focusing on the so-called usual suspects, novel factors like 
financialisation are notable for their absence. Therefore, we suggest a new approach, 
i.e. financialisation for the analysis of pension reforms. Financialisation is not 
independent from other factors that shape social policy such as neoliberalism, 
globalisation and post-industrialisation. Thus, it is useful to review the approaches on 
these factors with the purpose of revealing the absence and peculiarity of 
financialisation. Here, we review three main strands of thought regarding pension 
reforms: the Global Social Policy School, the New Political Economy School and the 
Welfare Regimes Approach.  
2.3.1. Global Social Policy School 
With no doubt, the Global Social Policy School is the approach which puts most 
emphasis on pension reforms. The reason behind this is that the approach seeks 
international actors’ practices within global social policy; and, pension reform is an 
excellent case study to reveal these actors’ involvement in national policymaking. In 
more detail, this view posits that supranational organisations shape national social 
policies.
2
 Therefore, social policy should be analysed in the context of globalisation 
(Yeates & Holden, 2009). As welfare states in mature economies have been 
undergoing a transformation process, globalisation is responsible in this regard as 
well as the neo-liberal drift (Ellison, 2006). On the basis of this reasoning, this strand 
of thought suggests a global social policy approach which considers the influence of 
supranational factors on national social policy. 
“The collapse of the cold war, the consequent proliferation of little states, and 
the consequential increase in the importance of supranational, regional and 
global economic and political processes lead now to the need for social policy 
analysis to change gear from a focus solely on national and comparative 
social policy to a focus that gives equal weight to supranational and global 
social policy.” (Deacon, Hulse, & Stubbs, 2009, pp. 9–10) 
The global social policy approach was developed in the late 1990s and, since 
then, its content and scope have diversified according to the strength attributed to 
supra-national factors influencing national policymaking. Adherents of the strong 
globalisation thesis argue that international institutions interfere in policymaking of 
                                                 
2
 The adherents of the Global Social Policy approach use different concepts to refer to global actors 
such as supra-national, transnational and international actors etc. Here, we use all these concepts inter-
changeably although they might not have exactly the same meanings in the original texts.  
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national countries through direct or indirect mechanisms, and shift social policy 
trends. Moreover, growing global economic pressures related to trade openness and 
capital mobility put paramount pressure on national economies. Therefore, 
globalisation underlies neoliberal social policy. On the other hand, the weak 
globalisation thesis’ adherents also point to the decisive role of national economic 
factors, such as unemployment, low growth rates and ageing population (these may 
or may not be related to globalisation). For weak globalizers, the impact of 
globalisation on welfare state services is unsurprisingly less than the impact argued 
by advocates of the strong thesis. Strength attributed to global factors and actors in 
determination of social policies at national levels differs widely between these two 
extreme positions (Ellison, 2006).  
In this regard, neoliberal economic policy prescriptions advanced by 
Washington DC-based institutions, namely the IMF, the World Bank and the US 
Treasury have paramount importance (Orenstein, 2009). These policy prescriptions 
advocate ‘free’ trade, market liberalisation and deregulation, privatisation, and 
residual social provision. Hence, neoliberalism represents the ideology of these 
institutions.  
“The primary archetypal indicators of a distinctively neo-liberal orientation 
are taken to be: a strong commitment to the primacy and superiority of 
systems for the organisation and coordination of productive activity based on 
principles of the “free market”; advocacy of the minimisation of the state’s 
involvement in market-based productive activity in general, and of the 
operation of all aspects of the functioning of labour markets in particular; 
support for personal investment and entrepreneurship, and the cultural values 
of acquisitive individualism; the presumptions that individuals are key 
sources of enterprise, act in rational and self-interested ways and hold 
primary responsibility for their own conduct and their economic survival and 
well-being; and a consequential commitment to minimal residual state 
intervention in the provision of welfare for people whose individual conducts 
and abilities limit their capacities for rational, self-interested and responsible 
behaviour, economically and socially.” (Fergusson & Yeates, 2013, p. 67) 
On the basis of this theoretical background, Orenstein investigates the 
pension reform trends with a focus on the WB’s role (Beland & Orenstein, 2013; 
Orenstein, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2011). Orenstein explains that the spread of the pension 
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reform trend between 1981 and 2004 is a result of the campaign run by transnational 
actors, led by the WB, as a part of the broader neo-liberal agenda for global social 
policy (Orenstein, 2005).  
“Transnational actors, including international organizations, transnational 
non-governmental organization (NGOs), expert networks, and individual 
policy entrepreneurs, have become leading sources of policy norms and ideas 
in countries worldwide in areas that often exceed their original mandate.” 
(Orenstein, 2009, p. 59) 
The USAID, IMF, and regional development banks (such as ADB) have assisted the 
WB during the pension reform campaign. Moreover, these institutions funded the 
process through loans while in some cases pension reform was put forward as the 
condition for further loans. Finally, it should be noted that transnational actors are 
not only institutions but also policy advisors including individuals. For instance, Jose 
Pinera was individually involved within the pension reform campaign after his 
functioning as one of the Chicago Boys during the Chilean pension reform 
(Orenstein, 2008).  In a similar vein, the manager of the largest insurance company 
in Bolivia contacted Jose Pinera to prepare a reform proposal for pension system 
(Muller, 2003). 
All countries have had varying processes underlying pension reforms ranging 
from war’s impact (Croatia) to economic crisis (Bulgaria) or high external debt 
(Hungary). All these different factors led governments to search for loans, to give 
signals of their commitment to a market economy and to endeavour to gain access to 
international capital markets (Muller, 2003). In other words, most of the middle-
income developing countries accepted pension reforms on the ground of different 
economic and political factors such as capital scarcity where the pension reform 
signalled commitment to a free-market system (Brooks, 2005). Thus, it is obvious 
that transnational actors have played a significant role in pension reforms; however, 
every country applied the pension reforms on the basis of different processes. 
Focusing on agencies at the expense of processes results in neglecting factors such as 
financialisation. 
Further, the scope of pension reform has varied across countries; thus it is 
mistaken to call all these reforms as pension privatisation. When reform regions are 
compared, we see that the size of private funded schemes in the post-socialist 
countries is much less than the size of private saving accounts in Latin America. 
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 “When we review the pension reforms in the post-socialist countries, we see 
a slightly different trend. In the era of Central and Eastern Europe, only 
Kazakhstan closed down the traditional PAYG scheme while Hungary and 
Estonia did not alter their public PAYG schemes. Poland and Latvia founded 
a notional defined contribution scheme and Bulgaria and Croatia preferred 
PAYG scheme with pension points. In all these countries, except Kazakhstan, 
private tier has remained as complementary to public PAYG scheme.” 
(Muller, 2003, p. 68)  
Moreover, the structures of the reformed pension systems differ significantly even 
within the region. For instance, in Latin America, it is argued that there are three 
different pension reform types. 
“Second-pillar reforms can be classified into three categories. The first is the 
“Chilean model,” which made private accounts mandatory for all new 
workers; Bolivia, El Salvador, and Mexico also adopted this model. The 
second is what might be called the “Peruvian model,” which Colombia also 
adopted. Under this model, new workers are given a choice between a 
downsized pay-as-you-go pension and a private account. Under the third 
approach, which can be termed the “Argentine model,” new workers have a 
pay-as-you-go tier combined with a private account tier; Costa Rica and 
Uruguay also adopted this model.” (Gill, et al., 2008, p. 64) 
To sum up, neoliberalism is taken as the central ideology of international 
institutions in social policy by the Global Social Policy literature. Yet, the financial 
agenda of these institutions and its impact on the way in which pension systems are 
restructured is not discussed in detail. This approach defines new pension systems, 
which are established on the basis of advice from the WB, as private pensions. In this 
sense, financialisation is the main aspect of neoliberalism and this strand of thought 
misses its implication by its narrow conceptualisation as privatisation.  
2.3.2. New Political Economy School 
The second strand of thought analysing social provision reforms is the New Political 
Economy School which focuses on the post-industrial changes that put budget 
pressures on welfare states and result in shift in social provision (Pierson, 2001). 
Accordingly, a reform trend in social provision originates from the inconsistency 
between the political economy of the past (when that social provision was designed 
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initially) and the contemporary policy environment (Myles & Pierson, 2001). In this 
regard, the main reason behind the spread of pension reform is that the PAYG 
schemes were organised under high rates of wage growth, fertility and labour force 
participation. When these rates have decreased, it has become necessary to replace 
the PAYG schemes with funded ones: 
“The implicit ‘rate of return’ in schemes financed by payroll taxes is the 
annual percentage growth in total real wages (returns to labour). Total wages 
are the product of the average wage multiplies by the number of wage earners. 
The latter term is a function of population growth and the rate of labour force 
participation. Quite simply then, the financial soundness of old age pension 
financed from payroll taxes depends on high wage growth, high fertility, and 
high rates of labour force participation. The current wave of pension reform, 
then, is essentially a matter of adapting pension regimes designed for an ‘old’ 
political economy to one compatible with a new policy environment.”(Myles 
& Pierson, 2001) (Myles & Pierson, 2001, p. 311) 
This strand of thought shows us that the pension reform trend needs to be 
analysed in the context of the bigger picture that covers the structural transformation 
of economies during the neoliberal era. Since the late 1970s, social provision 
practices have changed and more individualistic and private social provisions have 
replaced the social public schemes across the world. This trend of policy originated 
from the UK and the USA (with Thatcher and Reagan, respectively), then spread 
around the periphery (Walker & Foster, 2006).  
“The neo-conservative position, which was gaining increasing strength in the 
core zone at this time, was hostile to taxation in general, in particular for 
welfare-state expenses. What was known as ‘welfare backlash’ had its 
earliest (and perhaps strongest) manifestations in the USA. In Europe, the 
political reaction varied. Just as Great Britain had set welfare-statism in 
Europe after 1945, Thatcher set the pace for its dismantling.” (Pelizzon & 
Casparis, 1998, p. 135) 
Interpretations have differed considerably; some authors have called this the 
‘transformation of the welfare state’, others preferred the term ‘welfare 
retrenchment’. Moreover, this shift is not only associated with post-industrialisation, 
but also with competition between countries brought about with globalisation. In this 
context, the term ‘race to the bottom’ indicates that as all countries try to reduce 
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costs of labour by decreasing social spending, every nation state would arrive at 
lower life standards as well as lower-qualified workforces. However, the ‘race to the 
bottom’ thesis is subject to many criticisms: 
 “‘The race to the bottom’ is a crisis myth rather than a crisis in reality. 
Despite cutbacks in a number of countries, our analysis demonstrates 
unequivocally that OECD average levels of social expenditure, whether 
measured as percentages of GDP as generosity ratios, or in real terms, either 
increased or remained constant between 1980 and 1998. Indeed, given that, 
during this period, social expenditure was increasing as a percentage of GDP 
and that non-social expenditure were declining, expenditure for welfare 
purposes was becoming appreciably more salient with the passing of time.” 
(Castles, 2006, p. 242) 
Theoretically, the race to the bottom idea belongs to what is called 
convergence analysis within the literature. In this view, economic openness, which 
expanded dramatically from the 1980s, has compelled governments to cut social 
spending for competition purposes. Therefore, developing and industrialised nations 
have implemented welfare reforms which converge on a single, market-oriented 
social policy model (Brooks, 2005). On the other hand, the path-dependence view 
suggests that welfare states create expectations and dependency amongst the public. 
This prevents governments from reforming welfare systems without taking into 
account the electoral consequences (Achterberg & Yerkes, 2009).
3
 However, when 
we review the example of the pension reforms, we see that electoral concerns have 
not been central to discussions at all. Rather, the agenda shift was swift on many 
occasions, and negotiations took place between international institutions and 
policymakers rather than national political parties (Muller 2003). Therefore, 
convergence analysis points at an important aspect of the pension reform in terms of 
increasing similarity in social provision practices of different countries. 
                                                 
3
 There is also the path-convergence view which claims that more generous universal welfare states 
have adopted policies of retrenchment and neo-liberalisation, whereas, in the meantime, liberal 
welfare states have moved in the opposite direction and expanded their social expenditures. Therefore, 
two extremes converge at the ‘middle of the road’ which should be interpreted to be evidence of the 
idea that ‘welfare states are not necessarily converging towards the most liberal end of the welfare 
spectrum’. This stream of thought argues that despite social democratic countries demonstrating less 
support for neoliberal policy, a trend towards neoliberal ideology is evident. However, in liberal 
welfare regimes where neoliberal policy is traditionally established, the support for neoliberal policy 
decreases. Thus, the convergence point appears to be in the middle, not at the neoliberal extreme 
(Achterberg & Yerkes, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, the reason provided by the convergence theorists, global competition, 
is not adequate. Rather, there is a fundamental economic phenomenon, 
financialisation, which shapes the economies in general and social provision in 
particular. Yet, in order to see the impact and significance of financialisation in this 
regard, it is not enough to look only at empirical data on government spending on 
social provision. This is because the quantitative data on public expenditure might 
not explain real trends in welfare standards (Castles, 2006).  
“Today, governments of countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) typically spend 30-40% of their Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) on welfare programmes and this level of 
expenditure has remained stable over the past 30 years or so. But this fact 
belies the transformations that have occurred within the welfare systems over 
that period. To begin with, mature welfare systems spend far more on 
pensions and healthcare than they have in the past. They have also become 
more restrictive, more commodifying and more market-orientated.” 
(Farnsworth & Irving, 2011, p. 4) [Emphases added] 
  To sum up, this school posits pension reforms and other market-oriented 
policies in relation with the broader transformation of the post-industrial era. Indeed, 
productivity, employment levels and political inclination towards welfare services 
are completely different than the circumstances at which pension systems were 
established in the post-war era. To point at these factors is crucial because 
financialisation as a phenomenon emerged in relation with them as well as shaping 
these trends as the underlying process associated with neoliberalism. 
2.3.3. Welfare Regimes Approach 
The third approach we discuss is the Welfare Regimes Approach, which is the most 
influential comparative analysis within the social policy literature. Titmuss was the 
first author who classified welfare systems (Blakemore & Griggs, 2007). His 
distinction between ‘residual’, ‘industrial’ and ‘institutional’ welfare models of 
social policy posited a difference between countries according to the relations across 
the state, market and family in terms of providing social goods and services. The 
major breakthrough in comparative empirical analysis of welfare systems has been 
Esping-Andersen’s Welfare Regimes Approach (Esping-Andersen, 1990a, 1990b). 
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By drawing upon Titmuss’ typology mentioned above, Esping-Andersen identifies 
three welfare regimes: liberal, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes.  
“Welfare states vary considerably with respect to their principles of rights 
and stratification. This results in qualitatively different arrangements among 
state, market, and the family. The welfare state variation we find are therefore 
not linearly distributed, but clustered by regime types.”(Esping-Andersen, 
1990a, p. 111)  
The liberal welfare regime cluster is characterised by means-tested assistance, 
insignificant universal transfers and low replacement rates within state insurance 
mechanisms. As in this system the dependency on the market is high, the welfare 
state effect of the de-commodification of labour-power is minimal.
4
 The archetypical 
examples of this model, accordingly, are seen in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. By contrast, in the second regime type, a corporatist and statist structure of 
welfare provision is dominant and it is formed under traditional conservative 
institutions, such as the church. Therefore, under the conservative welfare regime 
cluster label we see countries such as France, Germany, and Italy. Lastly, under the 
social democratic welfare regimes, emancipation of the individual is exercised both 
from the market and the traditional family form. Under this regime, the costs of 
familial reproduction are socialised and in this way capacity of individual 
independence is generated. In this cluster we come across the Scandinavian 
countries, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland as exemplified by Esping-
Andersen (1990b).  
Esping-Andersen has had a heavy influence on the social policy literature. 
While the need and utility of typologies for the comparative analysis of welfare state 
have recently started to be discussed, until now a considerable amount of intellectual 
effort has been invested in developing, testing, adjusting, expanding, and criticising 
the welfare regime typology (Van Kersbergen, 2013, p. 139). Following Esping-
Andersen, several further typologies have been offered that can be gathered under 
three categories: approaches that claim three welfare regimes are not enough; 
attempts to reposition countries under different categories; and studies developing 
                                                 
4
The author develops the concept of de-commodification on the ground of Marxist view that posits 
labour-power as a commodity. De-commodification, therefore, refers to worker’s diminishing 
commodity status through institutional arrangements those enable one to live without selling labour-
power. In this context, services provided by the welfare state induce de-commodification by 
maintaining livelihood without relying on market (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
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alternative classificatory systems based on Esping-Andersen’s theoretical approach 
(Ellison, 2006).
5
  
After Esping-Andersen, comparative empirical analysis has become the 
dominant type of analysis in the social policy literature. Various typologies have 
emerged, such as the ‘families of nations’ approach by Castles (Castles, 1993) which 
examines similarities of different countries’ public policies with reference to 
common cultural, historical and geographical features. On the other hand, the 
varieties of capitalism view, suggested by Hall and Soskice (Hall & Soskice, 2001), 
attempts to classify different welfare practices on the basis of a functionalist view 
rather than power resources approach which was initially applied by Esping-
Andersen (Myles & Quadagno, 2002).
6
 From this point of view, every social 
provision has a function within the economic structure, and differences across 
economies create certain welfare typologies (Hall & Soskice, 2001). For instance, a 
social democratic welfare state has a coordinated market economy which creates 
demand for active policies on childcare and education because these services support 
the specialisation and knowledge-based structure in those economies (Jensen, 2011, 
p. 127). On the basis of the varieties of capitalism approach, Huber and Stephens 
(Huber & Stephens, 2001) posited the production regimes approach as the 
institutionalized interaction between government, labour and employers. Thus, they 
link the study of welfare state regimes systematically to the study of production 
regimes.
7
 
                                                 
5
 For a detailed review of the typologies suggested after Esping-Andersen see (Arts & Gelissen, 
2006). 
6
 The heterodox literature on the welfare state is divided into three main lines. First is ‘the logic of 
industrialisation approach’, which is also called the structural-functionalist school, and argues that the 
welfare states develop due to the underlying logic of industrialism. Therefore the key determinant is 
the changing forces of production. The second is the capitalist development approach which is also 
named as the neo-Marxist school, and the adherents of this school claim social policies to be the 
responses of state to the social reproduction requirements of capitalism. According to this, welfare 
state policies were imposed by the contradictory imperatives of the capitalist mode of production 
which, on the one hand, creates conditions for capital accumulation on the other hand, provides the 
social legitimation. Lastly, the democratisation approach, which is known as  ‘power-resource theory’, 
emphasises the role of distribution in capitalist democracies. The adherents of this view see social 
policies as being driven and shaped by representative structures and electoral processes under the 
influence of social parties. 
7 “In the case of production regimes, the relevant institutions are private and public enterprises 
(industrial and financial), associations of capital interests (business associations and employers’ 
organization) and of labour, labour market institutions, and governmental agencies involved in 
economic policy making, as well as the patterns of interaction among all of them; the relevant policies 
are labour market policy, macroeconomic policy, trade policy, industrial policy, and financial 
regulation.” (Huber & Stephens, 2001, p. 108)  
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To sum up, comparative welfare regimes analyses claim that treating 
different regime types as broad, ideal, and typical systems allows grouping general 
institutional characteristics which enable researchers to see how countries within 
different clusters behave similarly under circumstances determined by global 
economic and institutional forces. At this point, the following question begs the 
answer: has the comparative analysis based on ideal types of welfare regimes been 
helpful in understanding the shift in social policy under neoliberal circumstances? 
The answer seems to be negative. 
“[T]his paper examines critically what has been one of the most successful 
intellectual contributions to the neoliberal period, Esping-Andersen’s Welfare 
Regimes Approach (WRA) to comparative social policy. The paper shows 
that the WRA has deep roots within the conditions of the post-war boom and, 
as a consequence, was already well past its “use by date” when it emerged in 
the 1990s, let alone over the subsequent two decades of neoliberalism that 
have been underpinned by financialization. A close examination of the 
literature on the WRA shows how it has suffered from being unable to 
account for the differences between countries and programmes and has 
neglected both the changing conditions associated with neoliberalism and the 
causal factors underpinning it, and the closer determination of social policies 
themselves.” (Fine, 2014, p. 3) 
Indeed, when the welfare regimes literature is reviewed with the aim of 
finding any analyses of pension reforms, the result is disappointing. Since, this 
approach focuses on the welfare state as a totality of different social provisions, 
pension provision as one aspect of it has not attracted much attention. Further, when 
pension reforms are analysed from this point of view, the factors underlying pension 
schemes, such as financialisation, neoliberalism or global actors, have been 
overlooked if not completely ignored. Rather, the attention was drawn on how 
transformations within the pension schemes fit into the typology of the welfare 
regime. Therefore, the welfare regime framework, while analysing reforms in social 
provisions under the neoliberal era, delivers two possible outcomes: either referring 
to reforms as developments which reinforce the position of the specific country 
within the typology to which it belongs; or situating transformation of the social 
provisions as a way of resembling a certain typology in which the country did not 
 48 
belong prior to reforms. In other words, for this strand of thought, reforms are a 
matter of converging or diverging to certain ideal types of welfare regimes.  
Aysan and Beaujot (Aysan & Beaujot, 2009), suggest in the context of 
pension reforms that every welfare regime produces its own way of struggling 
against the ageing problem - thus there is no single path for reforms. Interestingly 
enough, this approach does not discuss the necessity of pension reforms. Rather, 
pension campaigners’ well-known arguments on ‘ageing’ are taken for granted 
without further analysis of whether or not these arguments are valid for different 
countries. Pension reforms’ main policies, which are privatisation, decrease in 
pension spending, and tightening eligibility criteria for retirement, are conceptualised 
by this approach as re-commodification, cost containment and recalibration (cited in 
(Pierson, 2001) by (Aysan & Beaujot, 2009)).
8
  
According to this analysis, privatisation and decreasing pension spending 
within pension systems in the Liberal welfare states are consistent with institutional 
structure of this regime. Moreover, pension reforms in the Scandinavian countries 
“are more concerned about cost containment, with moderate recalibration and little 
re-commodification” (p.713). The conservative welfare regime countries apply cost 
containment and recalibration of welfare policies in order to decrease the costs of 
ageing populations. Finally, the authors investigate the Southern European regime 
and draw the conclusion that recalibration is particularly significant in these 
countries because their welfare regimes are not fully developed and, thus, require 
adjustments to achieve welfare targets (Aysan & Beaujot, 2009).  
Increasing sustainability of pension systems, decreasing pension spending, or 
tightening eligibility criteria in order to cope with ageing are familiar arguments 
from the pension reform campaigners. However, neither of them explains why the 
                                                 
8
 “[W]e propose that cost containment has been more central to the retirement policies of Social 
Democratic countries and Continental Europe, while Liberal welfare states focus mainly on increasing 
the role of the individual in the market (re-commodification), and Southern European welfare states 
focus on changing regulations (recalibration).” (Aysan & Beaujot, 2009, p. 70) 
Re-commodification can be understood as the reverse process of de-commodification suggested by 
Esping-Anderson. Thus, individuals become more vulnerable to the market as a result of policies 
bring e-commodification. Cost containment, on the other hand, can be thought of as the totality of the 
policy responses to budgetary concerns of governments. Thus, every decrease in expenditure on social 
provision can be gathered under this concept. Finally, recalibration, refers to reforms which are 
implemented to achieve certain welfare targets as well as adaptation to the changing economic and 
social structure.  
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pension reforms have started around the same time in several countries nor the 
increasing similarity of other regimes to Liberal countries. 
“While the WRA [welfare regimes approach] has allowed an enormous 
amount of informative empirical work to be undertaken, it has led to 
increasingly serious deficiencies. It has been denuded of any explanatory or 
theoretical content. It is incapable of explaining change—if a regime is 
classified as a model of one sort, how does it become another? WRA fails to 
explain why different social policies should have the characteristics of 
different regimes within the same country, not least because it necessarily 
imposes undue homogeneity across … or by country.” (Fine, 2014, p. 3) 
To recap, the inadequacy of the approach in this regard is unfortunate 
especially when we consider that the welfare regimes approach is the dominant view 
within the social policy literature. Fine’s (2014) critique rightly suggests that rather 
than focusing on similarities within countries’ social policies, a theoretical approach 
should define varying structural features of each country, as well as agencies, 
processes, institutions and relations which make them peculiar. Indeed, only through 
this way, can one identify the production and reproduction relations underlying the 
social provisions within a country. Thus, it would be possible to explain the role of 
processes, like financialisation, in creating specific types of pension reform in more 
than thirty countries in a very short time interval. In effect, this is the most important 
gap within the pension reforms literature: the role of financialisation (Fine, 2014). 
We discuss this in detail in the next section. 
2.4. What they missed: financialisation 
Pension reform trends in the last two decades are underpinned by financialisation; 
and the current picture of reformed pension systems point to the financialisation of 
pensions. In this regard, financial components within pension provision have 
increased remarkably through funded, individual, savings accounts which invest in 
financial markets. Our position here is a contribution to the literature on social policy 
in general and pension reforms in particular because the absence of financialisation is 
crucial within the social policy literature as shown in the previous section. 
“This absence of financialization is a devastating weakness both in terms of 
how it underpins other absences and in how it constrains understanding of 
what I have taken to be the key conundrum in addressing social policy: the 
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diversity of outcomes across countries and sectors despite common 
underlying determinants of which, of course, financialization is but one. 
Further, the absence of financialization from the social policy literature is 
indicative of weakness in understanding the relationship between it and 
globalization.” (Fine, 2014, p. 24) 
Financialisation will be defined and discussed in detail in the next chapter. Before 
that in order to explain the key role it played in terms of pension reforms, we briefly 
introduce the concept and its relationship to pensions. 
In a nutshell, financialisation stands for the extensive and intensive growth of 
finance. By extensive growth is meant that finance has engaged with activities and 
areas of social and economic life which were isolated from financial relations before 
the neoliberal era. By intensive growth, on the other hand, we refer to the 
proliferation of financial assets and hybrid forms which constitute financial 
operations at a deeper level while enabling higher financial returns (Fine, 2013). In 
this regard, the relationship between financialisation and pension reforms is a causal 
one in which the former results in the spread of the latter through three conduits. The 
first conduit is structural as financialisation alters the production and reproduction 
processes on which pension systems are established. The next chapter covers the 
theoretical discussion, through a detailed review of the accumulation of interest-
bearing capital, on why and how this structural transformation has occurred. Thus, 
with the transformation of economic and social life under neoliberalism, finance has 
shaped the way in which pensions are provided alongside other aspects of extensive 
accumulation, as mentioned in the context of discussion on post-industrialism. 
However, this is not to say that pension reforms have been automatic in content for 
they are implemented by policymakers and could have taken various forms. 
Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the relations and actors as well as processes 
behind the abrupt trend in the spread of pension reform.  
Actors responsible for financialisation of pension systems are discussed in the 
context of the WB as the main runner of the pension reform campaign, as rightly 
addressed by the Global Social Policy School. Not surprisingly, with neoliberalism, 
the WB, with other IFIs, has become more influential in terms of national and global 
policymaking processes through publications, advisory relations and even loan-
agreement conditionalities. This explains how, during a standby agreement 
negotiation, the IMF puts forward the condition of pension reform that has been 
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promoted by the WB. This sort of an experience is exemplified in the context of 
Turkey where the IMF conditioned pension reform as part of a loan agreement 
although the pension reform advice was given by the WB, as further discussed in the 
5
th
 chapter in the context of Turkey’s experience). 
The third causal relation of financialisation with pension reforms is through 
the financial motives which shape old-age income provision in a way that creates 
profitmaking arenas or lucrative investment opportunities for financial market 
agencies. As mentioned in the context of welfare regimes, pension schemes have 
varying forms, functions and backgrounds in different countries which change 
according to those countries’ peculiar economic, social and historical features. 
However, with the pension reform advocates’ motivation of extending financial 
aspect of pension systems, the main, essential and fundamental missions attributed to 
pension schemes became contributing to economic growth through enabling capital 
market development as cited below from the famous Averting Report of the WB. 
“Full funding should boost capital accumulation and financial market 
development. The economic growth this induces should make it easier to 
finance the public pillar.” (WB, 1994, P.16) 
Hence, pension systems become an instrument to be used for the sake of 
financial profitability for the capitalist class while pension appears as a long-run 
investment for other classes. In other words, the ways in which pensions are 
understood, defined and discussed are configured with financial evaluations to the 
fore.  On the basis of this definition, financialisation’s engagement with pension 
systems through reforms has a twofold significance. The first is that, under 
financialisation, international institutions, like the WB, involve themselves in 
pension policymaking and attribute financial missions to the pension schemes.  
“A dominant pay-as-you-go public pillar also misses an opportunity for 
capital market development. When the first old generations get pensions 
that exceed their savings, national consumption may rise and savings may 
decline. The next few cohorts pay their social security tax instead of saving 
for their own old age (since they now expect to get a pension from the 
government), so this loss in savings may never be made up. In contrast, the 
alternative, a mandatory funded plan, could increase capital accumulation-an 
important advantage in capital scarce countries. A mandatory saving plan that 
increases long-term saving beyond the voluntary point and requires it to flow 
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through financial institutions stimulates a demand for (and eventually supply 
of) long-term financial instruments-a boom to development.” (WB, 1994, p. 
13) [Emphases added] 
This signifies the expansion of finance into pension provision in a way which results 
in pension income being provided through financial mechanisms. Funded schemes 
provide benefits on the basis of returns to financial investments they make. 
Therefore, financialisation shapes the pension systems in a way which creates 
profitmaking opportunities for the financial market players. 
“‘Financialization’ refers to the increasing importance of financial markets, 
financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operations 
of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and 
international levels” (Epstein, 2002, p. 2) 
The second significance of this development is that the funded pension 
schemes play a substantial role in terms of financial market deepening in a way 
which enables the intensive growth of finance. Pension funds, which are established 
to control, manage and organise the investment of pension contributions in financial 
markets, engage with financial markets through two channels. The first channel is 
pension funds’ supply-side impact on capital markets. In a nutshell, pension funds 
gather a substantial amount of capital inflows and direct them to the capital markets. 
This impact creates asset inflation and financial instability within the capital markets 
(Toporowski, 2000). On the other hand, the second channel is pension funds’ 
demand-side influence on capital markets. This refers to the demand of pension 
funds for sophisticated financial instruments since when funds mature they need 
liquid assets to meet increasing liabilities (Engelen, 2003). As a totality of these 
effects, pension funds are involved in speculative activity which is one of the 
appearances of intensive growth of finance.  
“[F]inancialization is closely associated with the formulation and 
implementation of social policy more directly. This is most obvious in terms 
of the pursuit of privatization in general and of pensions in particular, as well 
as in the broader ways in which finance has inserted itself into public forms 
of economic and social provision.” (Fine, 2014)  
Pointing to the role of financialisation in pension reforms contributes to the 
literature through several ways. First of all, by revealing financialisation as an 
underlying factor, we move beyond the cliché arguments on pension reforms, such as 
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demographic transition, i.e. ageing. This is important because when we review the 
pension reforms in different countries, as mentioned before, we see that most of the 
countries which reformed their pension schemes have not confronted a crucial ageing 
problem. Rather, these were middle- and low-income countries which have had 
serious economic and fiscal problems other than ageing. Prior to pension reforms, the 
Latin American and Europe and Central Asian countries that reformed their pension 
schemes were struggling with economic problems such as crisis, fiscal deficit or 
external debt (Muller, 2003). 
“[P]ension privatization has not been adopted by countries with oldest 
populations not by those countries with the largest pension burden as a 
proportion of GDP. Instead, pension privatization has been adopted by a wide 
range of countries with very different economic circumstances, some with 
large pension systems that pose a major burden on national budgets, some 
with relatively young populations.” (Orenstein, 2008, p. 28) 
Countries with scarce capital, although having young populations, accepted reform 
of their pension schemes with the expectation of capital funds which would be 
available after reforms (Brooks, 2005). Moreover, the WB projections on ageing are 
based on certain assumptions about productivity, wage levels, and employment rates. 
These assumptions might hold for developed countries whereas they are not 
consistent with the circumstances in middle- and low-income countries (Engelen, 
2003).  
The second issue about ageing is that, although this aspect of pension reforms 
is not discussed very often, there is no general agreement that funded schemes are 
immune to ageing problem. In fact, in the Averting Report, the possible problems 
that a funded scheme would have under ageing population are indicated. 
“In mandatory saving schemes, workers assume the investment, longevity, 
and inflation risks of their retirement funds. Retirement income will be lower 
if investment performance is poor. And if people live longer than expected, 
they may outlast their retirement savings. Some schemes require workers to 
purchase annuities when they retire-to insure against unexpected longevity. 
Investment risk is particularly high when accumulated assets are used to 
purchase the lifetime annuity, and the market interest rate on the date the 
annuity is purchased is critical.” (WB, 1994, p. 207) 
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In addition to the fact that funded pension schemes are not immune to demographic 
transition related problems, these schemes are liable to become involved in 
speculative activity when they fail to cope with ageing related issues. In a nutshell, 
there is a strong connection between ageing, maturation of pension funds and 
financialisation. This is so because in a funded scheme, pension benefits are 
dependent on the contributions to the pension fund as well as returns on financial 
investments made by the fund. And, when a pension fund is first established, the 
number of contributors to the system is higher than the number of retirees. Therefore, 
funds do not invest in high risky assets since the incoming capital flow is enough to 
confront the pay outs. However, when pension funds mature, the amount of capital 
outflows from the fund exceeds the inflows. For this reason, pension funds start 
investing in more risky, liquid and speculative assets (Engelen, 2003). Therefore, 
positing financialisation as the main process underlying pension reforms gives us the 
advantage of explaining the motives behind pension reforms.  
Another contribution we make here in this study is to point to the 
financialised nature of pension schemes which is mostly missed by the literature 
which defines the reformed pension schemes as privatised. By all means, identifying 
the process as privatisation is not wrong. However, it is not enough for several 
reasons. First and foremost, despite the pension reform campaign, across 176 
mandatory national schemes, the majority (82%) is still managed by the state while 
more than half of these schemes are financed on the basis of PAYG.  
“About two thirds of pension schemes worldwide may be considered to be 
primarily defined benefit in their structure. About half of all the systems 
operate on an unfunded (or PAYG) basis with the other half about equally 
divided between partially and fully funded. The vast majority of systems are 
publically managed with less than one in four classified as primarily privately 
managed” (Whitehouse et al., 2012, p. 35) 
However, this does not mean that pension reforms have not been influential in terms 
of spreading private schemes. They caused a dramatic increase in the number of 
mandatory privately managed defined contribution schemes from one in the 1980s to 
thirty in the 1990s. The argument we put forward is different: in most of the 
countries that reformed their pension schemes, PAYG schemes are protected to 
varying extents. They either remained as the main providers of pension provision, or 
they are kept with the purpose of providing basic income for the old age in order to 
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alleviate old age poverty (WB 1994). This means privatisation of the PAYG schemes 
is preferred but not necessarily essential for the advocates of reform. However, when 
it comes to establishing a financial component, none of the reformer countries could 
reject the advice (Andrews, 2006). Therefore, pension privatization does not explain 
the reforms in depth whereas financialisation of pensions accurately refers to the 
spread of individually funded schemes.  
Last but not least, with this analysis of financialisation od pensions, we point 
to the class character of pension reforms which favour capitalists in general, and 
financial capitalists in particular. After the reforms, in most countries, employers do 
not contribute to funded pension schemes, not even to the mandatory ones (Muller, 
2003). This means that the responsibility of the employer in terms of pension 
provision has been abolished through reforms. 
“The private pension system lacks solidarity, eliminates income redistribution 
between generations and insured persons, and transfers the functions of 
solidarity and redistribution to the State, which therefore has to fund non-
contributory and minimum pensions. Furthermore, the private system also 
incorporates a number of features that exacerbate inequalities in regard to 
funding, namely: (a) It abolished the employer's contribution and transferred 
it to the worker, who must pay 10 per cent of his/her wages or income; this 
fails to comply with the ILO's minimum standard that the worker's 
contribution should not amount to more than half of the total contribution” 
(Mesa-Lago, 2008, p. 301) 
This argument goes beyond the literature which analyses pension reforms in the 
context of destruction of collective rights and their replacement by individual 
responsibilities.
9
 Here, what is destroyed is the responsibility of the employer in 
terms of reproduction of labour. In our theoretical framework, in the next chapter, we 
show that this changing responsibility of employers originates from class struggle (as 
well as development of production relations). Thus, the capitalist class restores its 
class power under neoliberalism (Harvey, 2006). This aspect of pension reforms is 
consistent with the function of financialisation as a prominent feature of 
neoliberalism (Fine, 2013). 
                                                 
9
 For a discussion on solidarity-decline thesis see (Trampusch, 2009). 
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 On the basis of this analysis, when we look at the more recent publications 
evaluating pension reforms, we see two main points. The first is that the reform 
campaigners, led by the WB, have not changed their position on pension reforms. 
This finding contradicts the idea that the WB management has changed and the Bank 
has stopped advocating pension reforms (Beland & Orenstein, 2013). When we 
review recent publications from the Bank, however, we see that the Bank continues 
to advise pension reforms since reforms are consistent with the overall process of 
financialisation. Yet, it is true that the terminology on pensions used by the WB has 
slightly changed since 2005. The WB now recommends five pillars. The ‘zero pillar’ 
provides social pensions, i.e. non-contributory basic income for elderly. The first 
pillar is mandatory and earnings related while the second pillar is mandatory too but 
it is based on savings. The third pillar functions as complementary voluntary saving 
account, and the fourth pillar consists of other sources of old age income such as 
non-financial assets like home ownership as well as income from other social 
programmes (health and housing) (Whitehouse et al., 2012).  
Moreover, the global financial crisis of 2008 has undermined the reliance on 
financial markets in particular due to significant losses of pension funds. As Cerami 
(Cerami, 2011) mentions, in 2008, the OECD countries’ private pension funds 
registered 20% losses worth approximately $4.5 trillion (p.339). 
“The recent global financial crisis has made the shortcomings of the current 
approach to ageing more clearly visible, highlighting not only the weaknesses 
of private pension funds but also of the excessive individualization of risks 
pursued in previous years.” (Cerami 2011, 339) 
Thus, after the long-lasting economic crisis and financial turmoil, the WB modified 
its reform advice but without altering it in a way that challenges financial interests. 
Another point on recent discussions of pensions reforms that deserves 
attention is the recognition of low performance of pension systems after the reforms. 
Coverage is one of the most important performance indicators.
10
 When we look at 
the evaluation report by the WB, we see that reforms have not increased coverage at 
all. 
                                                 
10
 Performance indicators of the pension systems includes coverage of both mandatory and voluntary 
pension schemes covering: adequacy of retirement benefits; financial sustainability and affordability 
of pensions (in terms of payroll taxes paid by participants of the mandatory pension systems); pension 
systems’ impact on labour market (informality); efficiency of administration (low costs); and 
insurance (secured benefits against crisis and other financial uncertainties). 
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“Bank-supported reforms have often contributed to fiscal sustainability. But, 
despite expectations, in many countries with multi-pillar systems, funded 
pensions remain poorly diversified and pension coverage has not increased. 
Also, the secondary objectives of funded pillars—to increase savings, 
develop capital markets, and improve labor flexibility—remain largely 
unrealized.” (Andrews, 2006, p.5) 
We need to note that from our point of view this outcome cannot be regarded as a 
failure of the WB. Rather, in effect, decreasing adequacy of pensions should be read 
as the success of the IFIs which achieved to open more space for funded pension 
provision by necessitating individual savings accounts for old age income. 
“The role of funded private pensions in the financing of retirement income 
may increase in the future as a result of reforms implemented in public 
pension systems…There is room in some countries to strengthen the role of 
private pensions in order to decrease the proportion of people that may have 
insufficient pension income.” (OECD, 2014, p. 86)  
 To recap, financialisation as an underlying phenomenon shapes the national 
economies by changing production and reproduction relations. Pension systems are 
tightly connected to these relations in constituting social reproduction and being 
attached to financialised economic production. Therefore, pension systems are 
influenced by financialisation as are other social provisions. With the reforms, 
pension contributions are invested in financial markets by pension funds. Thus, 
return on investments, i.e. financial market performance, determines old age income. 
Recent publications on pensions support our argument on financialisation of old age 
income since pensions are increasingly obtained through financial conduits after 
pension reforms.  
2.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we introduce the idea of analysing recent pension reforms in the 
context of financialisation. Thus, we situate the change in pension systems within the 
bigger picture of transformation of economies under financialisation. We develop 
our analysis in three sections. First, we outline general characteristics of pension 
reforms since 1994. Here, we do not give too much technical detail on the way in 
which pension systems work. Rather, our main purpose is to ensure that reader has 
an accurate view on the direction of pension reforms which is from publicly 
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managed PAYG schemes to private, individual and funded schemes. Another issue 
observed in the first section concerns the role of the WB in these pension reforms. 
We emphasise this in order to reveal the function of international financial agents in 
pension reforms and to associate this function with the impact of financialisation that 
spreads around the world. Yet, this does not mean that there are countries which have 
reformed their pension systems without involvement of the WB. Further, we 
acknowledge that there are some countries which negotiated with the WB but have 
not reformed their pension schemes in accordance with the Bank’s advice (Andrews, 
2006). Thus, we are aware of varying influence of the WB in the pension reform 
trend. Nevertheless, the WB represents the connection between financialisation and 
agencies which defend and promote finance’s interests during the policymaking of 
pension restructuring. 
In this chapter, we focus on pension reforms in middle-income developing 
countries and, therefore, we do not give an overview of the transition of pension 
systems in developed countries. On the other hand, there is also a fundamental 
reform trend in high-income countries where pension systems already consist of a 
financial component. In the EU countries, for instance, financialisation reveals its 
impacts on policymaking through shifting calculation methods from defined benefit 
to defined contribution. As mentioned before, defined benefit schemes provide a 
certain level of secure old age income for participants of the pension scheme whereas 
defined contribution schemes only fix the contribution rate. Thus, this development 
is consistent with financialisation and neoliberalism for placing the financial risk of 
pension loss on the shoulders of participants in a way that renders individuals to be 
subject to financial risks (Saritas, 2014). 
We continued by reviewing the interpretations of pension reforms across the 
literature. We had two motivations here: the first is to point to the gap within the 
literature on the role of financialisation as the underlying factor in pension reforms. 
Our second motivation is to point to other elements of pension reforms besides 
financialisation. These are globalisation, post-industrialisation and peculiarities of 
welfare arrangements in each country. Thus, we carry the discussion on pension 
reforms to a further point than demographic arguments provided by the reform 
advocators. We should note that it is impossible to deny ageing as a modern 
phenomenon. However, what we try to emphasise is that ageing is not necessarily a 
‘crisis’. “Living longer than ever before is of course an enormous achievement” 
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(European Commission, 2010, p. 4). The reason that the WB and OECD postulate 
ageing as a crisis is to justify the necessity of transforming pension systems into 
financial saving mechanisms. The strength of this rhetoric is more visible in 
countries where other policy options, such as increasing the fertility rate, opening 
border to migration and parametric measures to already existing schemes, are 
completely overlooked (Engelen, 2003).
11
 
Challenging the ageing related arguments in terms of pension reform 
discussion is significant because most analysts take these and other popular 
arguments of pension reformers for granted. However, the idea that the ‘best way of 
solving demographic problems of pension systems is to entirely replace them with 
funded schemes’ is far from convincing. Moreover, the positive impacts of funded 
schemes on saving and development levels remain unproven macroeconomic 
arguments (Cesaratto, 2006). One might object to our position here by bringing 
forward different works falsifying us. Yet, what we are trying to do here is not 
pursuing a detailed macroeconomic analysis on funded pension schemes’ impacts on 
saving or development. Rather, we underline that the WB has persuaded many 
countries to introduce individual financial accounts with some mythical arguments 
which were later challenged by the World Bank’s own Chief Economist Stiglitz 
himself (Orszag & Stiglitz, 1999, 2001).
12
 
 After introducing pension reforms and discussing varying interpretations on 
them, we posit our own view on analysing pension reforms in the context of 
financialisation. We open the discussion on the nexus between financialisation and 
pensions from two perspectives. The first is to address financialisation’s role as the 
underlying process behind transformation of economies and pension reforms. The 
second perspective we introduce is to define reformed pension schemes as 
financialised pension provision since pension income is increasingly provided 
through financial(ised) conduits. Thus, pension provision, which traditionally used to 
be apart from the financial sphere, has been integrated into the domain of finance. 
This might not be surprising for those who are familiar with the financialisation 
literature which points to the increasing influence of finance on ever more aspects of 
social provisions. However, the peculiarity of pension reforms originates from them 
                                                 
11
 Recently the EU countries have confronted a migration flow from Syria and other countries with 
civil wars. While this flow is discussed in varying contexts, the possible positive effect of migrants on 
the pension schemes in the ageing EU countries is ignored. 
12
 Joseph Stiglitz served as the Chief Economist of the WB between 1997-2000. 
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creating pension funds which accelerate the financialisation of the economy through 
their impact on capital markets. This impact aggravates the speculation in the capital 
markets by creating demand for, and enabling supply of, sophisticated financial 
instruments. Therefore, we show the penetration of finance into pension provision 
(extensive growth of finance) and the deepening of financial relations through hybrid 
forms created as a result of the reformed pension schemes (intensive growth of 
finance), i.e. financialisation of pension provision (Fine, 2013).  
Our analysis regarding pension reforms and financialisation can be found 
limited in the sense that it does not cover many implications of this shift in terms of 
poverty, redistribution, inequality and gender dimension. Although these aspects of 
financialisation of pensions are of paramount importance, we prefer to investigate 
them in the context of our case study on Turkey. Pension systems are diverse in 
structure, form and level of benefits. And, effects of reforms vary according to the 
economic, social and political environment within a country. For these reasons, the 
experience of Turkey in these regards is scrutinised in the fifth chapter. Thus, this 
chapter is linked to the rest of this study both theoretically and empirically in 
preparing the ground for investigating pension reforms and financialisation in 
Turkey. 
Turkey is in particular an interesting case study for the investigation of 
financialisation in relation to pension reforms because it has entered a certain level of 
development at which transformation of pensions has come on the agenda but in a 
financialised way due to the increasing dominance of financial during the post-2001 
era. In a nutshell, Turkey has never had a welfare state in a conventional way that is 
common in developed countries. The absence of class-based struggle (and/or 
demands for social rights) has enabled populist policies to destroy sustainability 
mechanisms of the pension system (through measures such as decreasing the 
retirement age as part of election promises). Thus, a substantial restructuring of the 
social security system, and pension provision as the major component of the former, 
became essential in the late 1990s. However, within this historical trajectory, this 
necessity of transformation coincided with the era of the IFIs financially-motivated 
imperatives that were preconditions for substantial support for those seeking and 
deploying economic and political power. Therefore, Turkey has become a perfect 
case study to illustrate how finance has penetrated into different policymaking 
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processes and created financialised structures which favour financial actors at the 
expense of social interests.
13
 
As a final word, recently Argentina, Bolivia and Hungary have closed their 
privatised saving accounts for pensions (Whitehouse et al., 2012). These reversals 
from funded pension schemes show the limitations of blueprint pension reforms. 
And, this is not only because they are designed on the basis of high technical 
knowledge with little attention to the idiosyncratic features of each country but also 
because changing international economic circumstances force governments to adapt 
their pension systems to new conditions. Since the financial swing of 2008 crisis, 
countries in most regions, in the EU for instance, have shifted their reform structure 
from establishing financial schemes to rearranging parametric rules of existing 
PAYG schemes (European Commission, 2015). Financialisation, with other 
contemporary constraints such as development and climate change, has been 
effective in the formulation of social policy (Gough & Therborn, 2010). For this 
reason, financialisation should be scrutinized in order to analyse current trends in 
social provision in general and pensions in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 As a further note, the most self-evident data on financialisation in Turkey can be collected on the 
housing boom as briefly shown in the fourth chapter of this thesis. In spite of this, the pension system 
is selected as the main case study of this work because the housing boom has already been discussed 
by several authors in different studies ranging from a PhD thesis (Karacimen 2013) to detailed 
country reports (Bedirhanoglu (2013). 
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3. A Theoretical Framework for Financialisation and Pensions 
3.1.Introduction  
The seeds for financialisation were planted during the neoliberal era beginning in the 
1980s with continuing institutional transformations marking the 1990s. By the early 
2000s, it was impossible to overlook the implications of financialisation. Pension 
reforms which began in the mid-1990s can only be analysed in light of 
financialisation for two reasons. First, financialisation has influenced economic 
production of which pension systems are a part. Second, financialisation directly 
intervenes in the formation of pension systems. Therefore, in this chapter, we 
elaborate an understanding of financialisation. 
A theoretical framework on financialisation should first clarify what is meant 
by finance and how financialisation is distinctive from it. Then, the main factors 
underlying the emergence of financialisation need to be clarified in order to 
contextualise it historically. Once the common features and origins of 
financialisation process are highlighted, a framework can be applied to different 
financialised areas of economic and social life. To this end, we start with Marx’s 
finance theory in the next section. We argue that, in his analysis, finance is the 
sphere where money capital circulates in relation with activities of money dealing 
and funding (Marx, 1991). Money capital has the underlying tendency of 
accumulating as ‘capital in general’. Moreover, money capital has the capability of 
expanding into different economic and social activities by attaching any revenue 
stream to finance through capitalisation. In addition, there is a strict relationship 
across accumulation of money capital, development of capitalist relations and more 
advanced forms of financial activity. 
In this regard, our reference term is interest-bearing capital (IBC) through 
which Marx explains how financial relations are peculiar under capitalism, serving as 
the facilitator of surplus value production and exchange. Further, IBC also has a 
fictitious character to the extent that the stream of the surplus value (and not just 
revenue) to which it is attached can be capitalised and sold as a financial asset 
(Evans, 2004). On the basis of this theory, we draw on Fine’s (Fine, 2013) approach 
and define financialisation as the phenomenal extension and intensification of IBC. 
By extensive growth of IBC is meant the diffusion of financial relations to areas to 
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which it did not previously apply. On the other hand, by the intensive growth, we 
refer to IBC accumulating in existing areas of application.  
The second section addresses the historical developments and institutional 
transformations which underpin the emergence of financialisation. Investigating such 
historical specificity offers the opportunity to distinguish the nature of finance from 
financialisation. In this context, we point to neoliberalism as the mode of 
contemporary capitalism that incorporates elements providing the basis for 
financialisation (Saad-Filho, 2011). In this regard, market-oriented policies 
implemented since the 1980s have been reviewed in relation to financialisation 
(Dumenil & Levy, 2001). Instead of detailed analysis of the concept of neoliberalism 
and discussions evolving the term, we focus on the organic relations between 
financialisation and neoliberalism as characteristic of the current era (Fine, 2013). 
Indeed, when we look at economic transformations under neoliberalism, we 
see market-oriented policies such as privatisation creating more space for financial 
actors, while equally paving the way for financial discourses in the sphere of 
scholarship, such as shareholder value (Erturk, Froud, Sukhdev, Leaver, & Williams, 
2008; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Moreover, financialisation can influence the 
structure of the economy by shifting corporate governance and priorities of non-
financial firms from long-term investment to short-term strategies which slow down 
capital accumulation (Orhangazi, 2008; Stockhammer, 2004). Another structural 
change occurs within the financial sector where banks engage with financial markets 
in pursuit of lucrative returns through securitisation (Lapavitsas, 2013; Lavoie, 
2012). Such structural shifts have varying impacts on different groups of households. 
For those which have middle or high incomes, financialisation and asset market 
inflation can result in wealth effects through pensions and other stockholdings 
(Boyer, 2000). On the other hand, low-income earners, subject to deteriorating wages 
and distortion in income inequality due to neoliberal policies, can experience 
increasing indebtedness (Harvey, 2006; Lapavitsas, 2013; Palley, 2007).  
On this basis, in the third section, we develop a framework on the 
financialisation of pensions as extensive growth of finance, altering their levels and 
forms. To do so, we refer to Marx’s concept of labour power and argue that pensions 
are crucial for social reproduction during old age (Marx, 1990). The value of labour 
power refers to workers’ standards of living and pensions are deductions from the 
total social product. In this regard, pensions have been associated with 
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decommodification of labour power in terms of enabling generational reproduction 
without complete dependence on (labour) market relations. This allows for pensions 
to be located in terms of a (capital-labour) class context (Esping-Andersen, 1990b). 
A fraction of the total social product is appropriated by the state and distributed in 
the form of social insurance. Thus, the structure of pensions, although to varying 
extents, depends on the three parties of the employers, workers and the state (Gough, 
1975; O’Connor, 1973). In this context, pensions appear in the form of a social right 
in the reproduction of labour power during retirement. This form derives from a 
collective logic, not least because pensions emerge in relation to the collective action 
of the working class (Blackburn, 2002, 2006).  
We proceed the third section by showing that with financialisation pensions 
have been redefined in terms of individual savings and deemed to have the role of 
contributing to economic growth. This has been part of a campaign prioritising 
financial motives (WB, 1994). The structure of pensions has changed with the 
processes of social reproduction attached to IBC and financial markets serving as 
conduits for pension funds. This has created a new structure whereby the mechanism 
for social reproduction has become finance as opposed to, or at least alongside, the 
state. Privatisation, which preceded financialisation, of pensions, and increasing 
engagement of households with finance through stockholdings in the form of pension 
savings are other aspects of the financialised structure of pensions (Deken, 2013; 
Erturk, Froud, Johal, Leaver, & Williams, 2007). Finally, the form of pensions has 
changed with financialisation - from that of social right to individualised financial 
security (Lazzarato, 2012). Therefore, financialisation detaches pensions from 
collective provision and introduces self-responsibility (Frericks, 2014). 
In the fourth section, we concentrate on the intensive accumulation of finance 
in relation to pension funds’ key role in this regard. Thus, we review the literature on 
pension funds and their roles in financialisation. The Regulation school, which 
locates pension funds at a central position in their understanding of ‘finance-led 
accumulation regime’, provides insights in terms of pension funds’ function in 
emergence of shareholder value and corporate governance approaches (Aglietta, 
1998, 2000; Boyer, 2000; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). On the other hand, these 
approaches are criticised because of their roots in orthodox finance literature (Erturk, 
Froud, Johal, & Williams, 2004) and for failure in seeing the bigger picture of 
financialisation (Erturk, 2003). Then, we discuss the Ponzi finance nature of pension 
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funds which results in asset market inflation and unstable financial markets 
(Toporowski, 2000). Accordingly, large capital inflows brought by pension funds 
into capital markets induce supply-side effects on financial markets. In other words, 
pension funds create additional flows of capital which constitute a great potential 
source for financial instruments. In addition, we review Engelen’s (Engelen, 2003) 
logic of funding approach which casts light on pension funds’ demand-side impacts 
on financial markets for enhanced financial instruments. As pension funds mature, 
there is increased demand for speculative assets with higher returns to cover 
maturity-related deficits. Moreover, pension funds’ portfolio managers, who are 
capable of dealing with sophisticated investment instruments, stimulate securitisation 
and proliferation of derivatives.  
In the conclusion, we summarise the three sections’ main points and 
contextualise this chapter in relation to the following empirical chapters. In this 
regard, the most significant aspect of this theoretical framework stems from each 
section’s direct relation to a subsequent corresponding empirical chapter on 
financialisation and pensions in Turkey. The section on financialisation and 
neoliberalism  (3.2.) provides the analytical basis for the review of economic and 
social processes which are shaped by financialisation and in turn underpin the 
financialisation of pensions in Turkey (chapter 4). Moreover, the extensive growth of 
finance (3.3.) is exemplified by the pension reforms in Turkey which have created 
funded schemes and financialised pension income (chapter 5). Finally, the intensive 
accumulation of finance (3.4.) reveals itself in the context of new pension funds’ 
impacts on Turkish capital markets (chapter 6). In this way, we develop a theoretical 
framework that analytically supports the empirical investigation of financialisation 
and pensions in Turkey as developed in the rest of this study. 
3.2. Financialisation and neoliberalism  
3.2.1. From Marx’s finance theory to financialisation 
Finance can be broadly defined as the activity of money management and providing 
and accessing necessary funds for multiple purposes. In Marx’s analysis, at heart, 
finance is the sphere where money capital circulates. Since money capital is only one 
of the forms of capital in general, Marx does not deal with money capital until the 
second volume of Capital which includes an investigation of the circuit of money 
capital as one moment in the circuit of industrial capital (Marx, 1992). During its 
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circular movement, industrial capital passes through three stages and takes three 
different forms: as money capital, productive capital and commodity capital. Money 
capital is the stage in which the capitalist appears as buyer of means of production 
and labour power. Hence, money is transformed into commodities (M-C). The 
second stage is the productive consumption of the purchased goods and labour power 
through production of commodities where capital becomes productive capital. 
Finally, initiating the commodity capital circuit, the capitalist becomes seller of 
produced commodities which transforms them (and embodied surplus value) into 
money (and profit) in the circulation process (C’-M’). The formula for the circuit of 
money capital is: M-C…P…C’-M’. Here dots indicate that the process of circulation 
is interrupted by production, and C’ and M’ stand for C and M increased by surplus 
value.  
Marx deals with more developed forms of money capital in the sixteenth 
chapter of the third volume of Capital (Marx, 1991). With the development of the 
capitalist mode of production and as a result of the division of labour amongst 
capitalists, a certain fraction of capitalists starts to specialise in the circulation of 
commodities and money capital. This is called merchant’s capital and it consists in 
part of money-dealing capital. Money-dealing activities are technical functions such 
as collection of payments, bookkeeping and the settling of accounts. At this point, 
the analysis of money capital is confined to managing money as such. 
But the most important aspect of finance for Marx is to be found in the 
analysis of interest-bearing capital (IBC), covered in the fifth part of the third volume 
of Capital (Marx, 1991). IBC is a specific form of money capital which as a 
commodity of a special kind through being borrowed by functioning industrial 
capitalists and lent by moneyed capitalists. IBC has the use-value of capital as self-
expanding value, as a consequence of its use value as money as such with the context 
of capitalist relations of production.
14
 The capital function of IBC brings a return, i.e. 
interest, which is a part of the surplus value produced. The movement of interest-
bearing capital appears as M-M-C-M’-M’ (Marx, 1991, p. 461). Thus, IBC 
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 “On the basis of capitalist production, money can be transformed into capital, and through this 
transformation it is turned from a given, fixed value into a self-valorizing value capable if increasing 
itself. It produces profit, i.e., it enables the capitalist to extract and appropriate for himself a certain 
quantity of unpaid labour, surplus product and surplus-value. In this way the money receives, besides 
the use-value which it possesses as money, an additional use-value, namely the ability to function as 
capital. Its use-value here consists precisely in the profit that it produces when transformed into 
capital” (Marx, 1991, p. 459) 
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represents four important characteristics of borrowing and lending relations in 
capitalism as put by Fine (1985) as follows: 
“(i) The use of borrowing and lending (i.e., credit relations) specifically for 
the purpose of advancing money capital for the appropriation of surplus value, 
(ii) The division of surplus value into profit of enterprise and interest in 
which the latter represents a rate of return over and above the normal rate of 
profit, (iii) The division of the capitalist class into two fractions, (iv) The 
power of IBC is derived from its centralizing the individualized hoards of 
money and making them available through the credit system as a powerful 
mechanism of competition (Fine, 1985, pp. 402–403). 
As a result of the circulation of these different forms of money capital, credit 
relations emerge. According to Marx, credit relations under capitalism emerge from 
two different types of credit: the first type is the credit which is based on circulation 
of money capital and money-dealing activities, i.e. money-dealing capital (MDC). 
This commercial credit simply originates from the function of money as a means of 
payment. With the development of commerce and capitalist relations, the credit 
system is generalised, improved and commodities are sold for a written promise to 
pay on certain terms. Marx puts all the promissory notes under the general title of 
bills of exchange which themselves can circulate as means of payment.  
 The second type of credit, on the other hand, is a result of IBC’s 
development. This type of credit originates from money’s function as capital (Fine, 
1985). The first type of credit relations, money as means of payment, exists in all 
historical periods of commodity exchange whereas credit relations attached to 
interest-bearing activities are characteristic of capitalist accumulation. Marx shows 
that credit relations which originate from money-dealing activities have the function 
of smoothing capitalist production by facilitating circulation of industrial capital and 
managing monetary relations. Credit relations that develop from interest-bearing 
activities, on the other hand, have the function of enabling expansion of capitalist 
production by providing necessary funds for accumulation. Hence, the difference 
between IBC and other financial activities have crucial importance in terms of 
whether creating surplus value or not.  
Money-dealing activities contribute to capitalist accumulation through 
gathering reserve funds and idle money of all classes. Thus, with the development of 
capitalist relations, accumulation of funds and division of labour among capitalists, 
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credit relations form bank capital. Banks concentrate large amounts of loanable 
capital and confront borrowers as representative moneylenders. Bank capital consists 
of two parts: cash money and securities. The latter include commercial paper (or bills 
of exchange) and public securities, namely, government bonds, treasury notes and 
stocks of all kinds. Marx notes that these papers are interest-bearing papers and they 
are substantially different from bills of exchange.
15
 
The most important feature of bank capital is in being fictitious and 
consisting of claims (bills of exchange), government securities (spent capital) and 
stocks (drafts on future revenue). There are three characteristics of Marx’s analysis 
of fictitious capital. First, interest-bearing papers have a fictitious character because 
their prices are regulated separately from the value of the real capital they represent.  
“It should not be forgotten here that this capital’s money value, as 
represented by these papers in the banker’s safe, is completely fictitious even 
in so far as they are drafts on certain assured revenues (as with government 
securities) or ownership titles to real capital (as with shares), their money 
value being determined differently from the value of actual capital that they 
at least partially represent: or, where they represent only a claim to revenue 
and not capital at all, the claim to the same revenue is expressed in a 
constantly changing fictitious money capital.”(Marx, 1991, p. 600) 
[Emphases added]  
Second, Marx associates the increasing amount of fictitious forms of capital 
with the development of capitalist relations and the accumulation of huge amounts of 
IBC in particular. And the third characteristic of fictitious capital is that the return 
from these interest-bearing papers might not originate from surplus value. For 
instance, in the context of government bonds, Marx explains that interest paid for 
these do not derive directly from the production of surplus value. The key point here 
is that the amount loaned to the state no longer exists, as it is spent capital, and the 
intention behind loaning it has not been to expand it as capital.  
“The basis of this [fictitious capital] is that, once the credit system has 
established a rate of interest, it is possible to look upon any stream of income 
as the return upon a notional amount of capital. The value of this notional 
                                                 
15
 Banks’ money creating function is deliberately not included as Marx’s money theory is another 
vivid debate topic. We prefer to stay focused in this study by focusing on money as capital rather than 
money as means of payment as the main reference point of the financial relations.  
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capital will be the amount that, at the going rate of interest, would generate a 
return equal to the stream of income. Marx considers two forms of financial 
assets of this type. One is the shares of joint stock companies; the other is 
bonds issued by the government. In the case of shares, a sum of capital is 
advanced to a company and, in return, the former owner of the capital 
becomes entitled to receive a share of the profit subsequently produced. In 
such a situation, the company has acquired a productive asset, and the former 
owner of the money capital holds a financial instrument entitling them to a 
part of the future profits.” (Evans, 2004, p. 65)  
To sum up, first, finance is a form of capital, i.e. money capital. Second, as opposed 
to other forms of (commodity and productive) capitals, money capital has the 
potential advantage of penetrating every aspect of economic and social life through 
capitalising different revenue streams in a fictitious way. Third, this framework 
shows the inherent tendency of accumulation of money capital as a result of 
capitalist development. For the current phenomenon of financialisation viewed 
through the lens of this framework, we see that financialisation involves the 
extensive and intensive accumulation of IBC at the heart of economic and social 
reproduction as a whole.  
“More generally, it is apparent that any stream of potential revenue is not 
only open to being (fictitiously) capitalized as an asset but can then serve as 
the basis for further exchange as IBC. In this way, the reign of IBC can be 
expanded not just intensively in speculative booms … It can also expand 
extensively, attaching itself to new activities from which it was previously 
absent or even absented by virtue of regulation or a form of provision (e.g., 
where income streams are not generated, as in social housing as opposed to 
mortgaged owner occupation). In this light, this author would define 
financialization as the intensive and extensive accumulation of fictitious 
capital or, in other words, the increasing scope and prevalence of IBC in the 
accumulation of capital.” (Fine, 2013, p. 55) [Emphases added] 
Under financialisation, extensive accumulation of IBC is evident in the 
spread of financial relations to ever more aspects of economic and social life. The 
most important aspect of this development is the difference between finance before 
financialisation and under financialisation. We see that extensive growth of finance 
has the unique feature of differing from mere credit expansion by straddling the 
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borders between different forms of credit and IBC through capitalising them 
fictitiously under financialisation (Fine, 2013). Thus, finance expands the sphere of 
money management, funding activities in a way that integrates more aspects of 
economic and social life through financial conduits. Therefore, finance prioritises 
financial motives in these areas and transforms non-financial structures into profit-
making arenas for financial actors. Hence, IBC expands and financial relations also 
become more sophisticated in depth, scope and complexity. None of this, however, is 
automatic in scale but is contingent upon historical developments that advantage the 
position of money capital and extend its structural boundaries (although finance 
ultimately depends upon the production and circulation of surplus value). This aspect 
of financialisation is elaborated through its relationship with neoliberalism. 
3.2.2. From neoliberalism to financialisation 
Financialisation is associated with national and international neoliberal policies 
implemented since the 1980s. Thus, financialisation did not directly emerge from 
logical tendencies as such (IBC’s extensive and intensive accumulation). Rather, 
financialisation is underpinned by historical, political and institutional factors in 
association with neoliberalism. Moreover, neoliberalism has had its distinctive 
character as a period of capitalism thanks to financialisation in general, not least 
IBC’s fictitious character. Hence, the relation between financialisation and 
neoliberalism is key to contextualise contemporary forms of financial relations. 
Neoliberalism is itself a fruitful subject enjoying several definitions with 
different emphases (Dumenil & Levy, 2001; Harvey, 2006; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 
2005). Redefining the concept or reviewing relevant discussions, in particular in the 
context of financial crisis (McNally, 2009; Panitch & Gindin, 2011), is beyond the 
limits of this study. Therefore, we here only focus on aspects of neoliberalism that 
are closely related to the emergence of financialisation and the associated power of 
finance (although many see financialisation as an effect or parallel feature of 
neoliberalism as opposed to its defining characteristic – with concerted assault on the 
working class, possibly under the ideology of market forces, often taken as its 
preferred specification). 
More specifically, neoliberal policies in relation to institutional 
transformations have contributed to the advantaged position of finance by releasing it 
from its boundaries and facilitating it to shape economic and social life. Neoliberal 
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ideas, which rise on the ground of free market adherents’ frameworks of eliminating 
all boundaries to capital, have underpinned the emergence of financialisation.  
“First, financialisation underpins neoliberalism analytically, economically, 
politically and ideologically, and it has been one of the main drivers of the 
restructuring of the global economy since the 1970s; financialisation is, then, 
the defining feature of accumulation today. Second, financialisation has been 
buttressed by institutional transformations expanding and intensifying the 
influence of finance over the economy, ideology, politics and the state. Third, 
contemporary financialisation derives both from the post-war boom and from 
its collapse into the stagflation of the 1970s. Fourth, financialisation has been 
closely associated with the increasing role of speculative finance in economic 
and social reproduction...” (Fine, Saad-Filho, Bayliss, & Robertson, 2015, pp. 
14–16) 
Thus, the development of financialisation is historically embedded within 
neoliberalism. While state power has been used to smooth capital accumulation 
under neoliberalism, finance has become the main instrument to overcome national 
and international limits to capital (Saad-Filho, 2011). Therefore, finance has 
facilitated global investment, production and commercial activities while allowing 
hedging and spreading of risks. In this regard, the fictitious character of IBC has 
played a key role which is evident in the context of derivative markets. These 
markets have been essential for insurance purposes and facilitated 
internationalisation of capital through trade and foreign direct investments (Panitch 
& Gindin, 2011). Thus, financialisation is the “defining and or underlying aspect” 
(Fine, 2014, p. 25) of neoliberalism. 
The relation between neoliberal monetary policies and the emergence of 
financialisation deserves close attention. In this regard, it can be argued that the 
turning point for the emergence of finance’s power was the US Federal Reserve’s 
drastic policy moves for decreasing inflation in 1979. Under Volcker, the FED 
increased interest rates suddenly generating large flows of interest-income to lenders 
(Dumenil & Levy, 2001, 2012). Thus, the FED behaved like a global central bank 
with the main state motivation of defeating inflation in the US and continuing the 
dollar’s dominant global position (Panitch & Gindin, 2011). Lower inflation was 
functional for financial markets in protecting lenders (Dumenil & Levy, 2002). 
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However, what is more important in terms of financialisation is the replacement of 
price inflation with asset inflation in capital markets after the Volcker policy.  
“With more funds flowing into the US, this increased the competition among 
domestic lenders and tended to lower interest rates and financial profitability. 
In response, financial companies looked for new markets but also loaned 
more relative to their deposits and capital base. This in fact amounted to a 
vast increase in credit and the effective money supply, which however – 
given the defeat of labour, the low cost of imports, and the increased 
corporate ability to fund investments with internal funds – now produced 
asset inflation rather than price inflation.” (Panitch & Gindin, 2011, p. 
11)[Emphasis added] 
The asset inflation in financial markets accompanied by neoliberal policies 
contributed to the rising power of finance, equally creating a new discourse, i.e. of 
shareholder value. In a similar vein, the privatisation policies of the neoliberal era 
contributed to shareholder value becoming influential, going beyond corporate to 
individual financial arrangements:  
“In this regard, the 1980s witnessed a highly successful neo-liberal 
governmental programme that featured the promotion of direct stock 
ownership: privatization. Framed by notions of ‘shareholder society’ and 
‘popular capitalism’, the privatization programmes of the Thatcher and 
Reagan governments which de-nationalized a wide range of industries, 
services, and utilities created many first-time shareholders” (Langley, 2008, p. 
55) 
Shareholder value became the discourse of financialisation and popular in the 
US from the 1980s, suggesting that the main purpose of corporate governance to be 
creating the shareholder value, i.e. high returns for external investors. Under its 
influence, firms shifted their investment strategies from long-term investment to 
short-term strategies in order to increase their market value while distributing higher 
dividends (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Thus, shareholder value affected 
corporate governance in a way that prioritised the interest of institutional investors 
such as pension funds and mutual funds. Therefore, shareholder value influenced 
“the volume, direction and mode of financing investment” (Boyer, 2000, p. 118). 
With the sophistication in financial markets, new financial instruments have emerged 
which have enabled hostile take-overs. Meanwhile, pay structures of managers have 
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been changed in a way that performance-related pay schemes and stock options are 
introduced. Thus, managers’ income is tightly linked to the capital market value of 
their companies, i.e. shareholder returns (Lavoie, 2012).
16
 
Financialisation, through pursuit of shareholder value, is also deemed to have 
slowed down capital accumulation by changing non-financial firms’ investment 
strategies (Stockhammer, 2004). This aspect of financialisation explains tepid 
economic growth during the neoliberal era (Palley, 2007). It is important to note that 
the interrelation between financialisation and investment decisions of non-financial 
firms is twofold. While shareholder value requires high pay-outs, which results in 
less funds available for real investment, non-financial firms also prefer engaging 
with financial market activities over long-term investments with lower returns. In 
other words, lucrative financial returns result in more financial activity of non-
financial companies in a way that crowds out real investment. However, this is very 
much related to the size of the firm considering the small and middle-size enterprises 
do not generally run financial market operations (Orhangazi, 2008).   
Financialisation, in relation with shareholder value, has witnessed a structural 
transformation in the financial sphere as well as the non-financial sector. Asset 
market inflation has caused disintermediation which means firms prefer capital 
markets instead of banks for borrowing (Toporowski, 2000). Thus, banks have 
focused on different income sources such as households, investment bank operations 
and sophisticated capital market operations through securitisation. 
Securitisation is the process of issuing financial securities on the basis of 
flows of revenue, not least repayment of debts, such as mortgage, consumption or 
commercial loans (Lavoie, 2012). Since the mid-1980s, securitisation has taken a 
new form which enabled banks to remove mortgage loans out of their balance sheets 
in a way that decreases their liabilities. The most significant example of 
securitisation is no doubt with the mortgage loans which have been pooled and 
securitised as mortgage-backed securities since the 1970s in the USA. These 
securities were turned into collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), consisting of 
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 “This was superseded by the idea that any manager should achieve at the minimum a 15 percent 
rate of return on equity (ROE)—the famous 15 percent ROE norm, notwithstanding the fact that such 
a norm was impossible to achieve consistently at a macroeconomic level under the usual conditions in 
developed economies. Second, this apparent shareholder revolution was steered by agency theory, 
based on the principal and agent problem—here, the shareholders and the corporate bureaucrats.” 
(Lavoie, 2012, p. 222) 
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different tranches according groupings of income streams from mortgage 
repayments. Moreover, with the invention of CDOs in the 1990s, mortgage loans at 
different risk levels (low, middle and high-subprime) were mixed under tranches 
alongside different forms of debt. According to this, the risk of default characterises 
each tranche where the lowest absorbs possible defaults while the highest tranche is 
perceived as almost risk-free (Foster, 2008).  
The structural shift in the financial sphere has had two main impacts on 
households. The first is known as the ‘wealth effect’ and the other as ‘indebtedness’. 
In more detail, US households with high- or middle-income have benefited from 
financial gains in the 1990s during capital market valuation through wealth effects 
which originated from increasing value of household’s financial assets in the form of 
pension and other savings (Aglietta, 1998, 2000; Boyer, 2000). Although Boyer 
(2000) argues that these wealth effects might induce finance-led growth, these effects 
cannot be generalised since wages are depressed during the neoliberal era, and most 
of the population is still heavily dependent on income from wages and salaries 
(Froud, Johal, & Williams, 2002). In effect, when we consider the exacerbating 
income inequality under the neoliberal era, wealth effects might be considered to 
contribute to the widening gap between high and low income groups (Harvey, 2006).  
Indeed, the other impact of financialisation on households has been rising 
debt levels since 1979, not least in the form of mortgage loans (Palley, 2007). Due to 
neoliberal attacks against the working class, wage levels have been suppressed while 
income inequality has increased. Thus, while banks have enjoyed expanded capacity 
for issuing loans, with limitation of liability through securitisation, households have 
demanded these loans for reasons related to stagnant wage levels: 
“First, non-financial enterprises have become broadly involved in the realm 
of finance, often undertaking financial transactions independently. 
Financialization represents the opening of more space between non-financial 
enterprises and banks, with a lessening of mutual dependence among the two. 
Second, banks have directed their activities toward trading in open financial 
markets and dealing with households. Third, individual and households have 
become heavily implicated in finance in terms of both borrowing (such as for 
housing and general consumption) and holding assets (such as for pensions 
and insurance).” (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 15) 
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To sum up, financialisation’s impacts on the economy at the macro level 
during the neoliberal era can be theorised across three different dimensions. The first 
is the influence of finance on capital accumulation through institutional 
transformation achieved by the pursuit of shareholder value that alters priorities of 
non-financial corporations in favour of financial activity. The second effect is the 
intensification and sophistication of financial activities through securitisation. The 
third effect is the shift in households’ engagement with financial activities through 
holding financial assets and increasing indebtedness. In the next section, we 
elaborate the expansion of finance in the context of financialisation of pensions. 
3.3. Extensive accumulation of IBC: financialisation of pensions 
Pensions have varying functions from generating social security during old age to 
preventing poverty amongst elderly as an aspect of social policy. These different 
understandings of pensions are accompanied by several management structures and 
ways of financing. Pension schemes can be financed by funding or intergenerational 
transfers (PAYG) (or a mixture of these two methods). Therefore, pensions are often 
discussed in the context of savings and taxation. Moreover, pension income appears 
in diverse forms as in the returns from individual or occupational savings or taxes 
earmarked from payrolls. In each case, although to varying extents, pensions are 
determined by factors associated with wages. However, pensions are dependent on 
elements which go far beyond wages as such. For pensions are situated in broader 
social reproduction processes that support certain standards of living (Fine, 2014).  
Moreover, pensions are not enjoyed by all retirees as the same level of living 
standards. Rather, they vary across the population according to certain groups’ 
positions within labour markets. For instance, in the case of a funded scheme, 
monthly contributions below a certain level might give insignificant financial returns 
which render low-income groups vulnerable in terms of pension income. Another 
example is the PAYG schemes which distribute pensions not only intra-
generationally, but also inter-generationally. Therefore, pension levels vary across 
different income groups within a generation, as well as between different cohorts 
with changing economic and social factors, such as baby booms, and high or low 
productivity and employment. Further, future or current pension income can be 
altered with changing calculation of benefits and indexation methods. In a similar 
vein, under different schemes, pensions change according to the wage level, as well 
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as the contribution of employers, workers and the state. Thus, pensions differ on the 
basis of pension benefits’ conditions in face of inflation and other monetary and real 
factors that change the standards of living irrespective of the wage level. And the 
impact of a pension, as an income stream supporting life in old age, is embedded 
within other aspects of social and economic reproduction such as provision for health 
and housing.  
So, what is a pension in essence when we take account of, or strip away, all 
of these different considerations? Pensions are an element in the living standards of 
workers that are necessary to enable generational reproduction of labour power. 
Therefore, a pension is part and parcel of the value of labour power, the main form of 
social reproduction during retirement. The concept of labour power is introduced by 
Marx in order to distinguish between labour and the capacity to labour. In this 
regard, labour power is the special commodity that is sold by the worker and bought 
by the capitalist (Marx, 1990, 1996). The peculiarity of labour power originates from 
its being the source of surplus value, and with a dual structure of value: its use value 
is to produce (surplus) value which is separate from its (exchange) value which is the 
value of necessary goods and services for its reproduction (Fine, 2012). Therefore, 
capitalists can increase surplus value by reducing the value of labour power. Hence, 
the value of labour power is a concept which reveals the degree of exploitation under 
capitalism while allowing an understanding of the social reproduction processes 
(Harvey, 1982).  
“Therefore the labour-time necessary for the production of labour-power is 
the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its 
owner. However, labour-power becomes a reality only by being expressed; it 
is activated only through labour. But in the course of this activity, i.e. labour, 
a definite quantity of human muscle, nerve, brain, etc. is expended, and these 
things have to be replaced. Since more is expended, more must be received. If 
the owner of labour-power works today, tomorrow he must again be able to 
repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and strength. 
His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his 
normal state as a working individual.” (Marx, 1990, pp. 274–275) 
Marx posits that the value of labour power is determined, as in the case of 
other commodities, by the labour time necessary for its reproduction. Marx refers to 
two different ways to determine value of labour power: labour time necessary for 
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production of a given quantum of means of subsistence (so-called historical and 
moral elements) and a quantum of value as such without reference to the use values 
for which it provides. This dualism between use values and value has substantial 
significance in terms of highlighting the position of goods and services which are not 
produced through capitalist relations such as family/household labour, as well as 
state provisioning (which would enter as use values but not as values for the 
reproduction of labour power) (Harvey, 1982). For instance, in the case of pensions, 
neither the necessary labour time nor is the sum of values approach sufficient. This is 
because a pension is neither a commodity nor a service that designates itself as 
labour time or value. Rather, a pension is the old-age income that is necessary for the 
reproduction of the worker during retirement which, of course, like other elements in 
the value of labour power can vary across time and individuals. Thus, the question is 
how to understand the value of labour power in a way that incorporates in general 
use values that are not values, and this for pensions in particular.  
In this regard, we follow Fine’s (Fine, 2008, 2009) approach: the value of 
labour power as a ‘material standard of living’ which consists of goods and services 
that are produced through capitalist relations as well as this being attached to use 
values not provided as (exchange) value. Thus, means of social reproduction 
produced outside capitalist relations, within the household and by the state, are part 
and parcel of what makes for workers social reproduction and condition the value of 
labour power but are not part of the value of labour power itself.
17
 In effect, Marx 
paves the way for this kind of interpretation of the value of labour power by pointing 
to the moral and historical element that is crucial in the formation of the value of 
labour power (Rosdolsky, 1977).
18
 Thus, the value of labour power is determined as 
a result of historical development of capitalist relations (Harvey, 1982) and in 
                                                 
17
 Although neo-Ricardian approaches tend to see the social and monetary wage as simply 
substitutable for one another. This is wrong both from the perspective of value relations as such, not 
least in provisioning being under capitalist relations of production or not. See below and debate 
between Gough (Gough, 1975) and Fine and Harris (Fine & Harris, 1976). 
18
 “His natural needs, such as food, clothing, fuel and housing vary according to the climatic and other 
physical peculiarities of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so-called 
necessary requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are themselves products of 
history, and depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilization attained by a country; in 
particular they depend on the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations 
with which, the class of free workers has been formed. In contrast, therefore, with the case of other 
commodities, the determination of the value of labour-power contains a historical and moral element. 
Nevertheless, in a given country at a given period, the average amount of the means of subsistence 
necessary for the worker is a known datum.” (Marx, 1990, p. 275) 
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relation to the class struggle for higher wages (Lebowitz, 1992) and for broader 
issues of social reproduction (Fine, 2009). 
“The value of labour-power has most often been conceived of as a quantity, 
bundle or vector of goods for which a given amount of labour-time is 
required to produce them- with surplus labour left over to make up the profit 
and other revenues attached to exploitation. Such primarily economic 
analysis needs to be complemented by a second aspect of the value of labour-
power: the notion that the consumption bundle so provided suffices for social 
reproduction of the work-force. The work-force does not depend solely 
upon a wage but is engaged in activity outside the place of employment, 
thereby involving the state, the household and other social relations, 
structures and processes more generally.” (Fine, 2002, pp. 8–9) [Emphases 
added]  
Marx mentions that the reproduction of labour power includes a generational 
element with reference to future generations (children of workers to replace them) 
but not the previous workers (Marx, 1990). Nevertheless, there is one occasion 
where Marx mentions insurance in a way that can be associated with understanding 
of contemporary old-age pensions: in the Critique of the Gotha Programme (Marx, 
1978) (Motta e Albuquerque, 2014). According to Marx, the total social product, 
which stems from the collective efforts of labour, can only be fairly distributed after 
deductions such as replacement of spent means of production, additional component 
for expanding production and, last but not least, “reserve or insurance funds to 
provide against accidents, dislocations caused by natural calamities, etc.” (Marx, 
1978, p. 15). These funds are related to economic reproduction. On the other hand, 
the part of the total product which is used for means of consumption is related to the 
social reproduction. 
“First, the general costs of administration not belonging to production. This 
part will, from the outset, be very considerably restricted in comparison with 
present-day society, and it diminishes in proportion as the new society 
develops. Secondly, that which is intended for the common satisfaction of 
needs, such as schools, health services, etc. From the outset, this part grows 
considerably in comparison with present-day society, and it grows in 
proportion as the new society develops. Thirdly, funds for those unable to 
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work, etc., in short, for what is included under so-called official poor relief 
today.” (Marx, 1978, p. 15) 
In other words, pensions for those who are not able to work are part of means 
of consumption that is provided in order to sustain social reproduction during 
retirement. This relation between social reproduction and pensions is conceptualised 
by Esping-Andersen as decommodification which occurs “when a service is rendered 
as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on 
the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1990b, p. 22). Thus, he suggests pensions in part 
enable workers to live without this being contingent upon selling labour power, thus 
its being commodified. However, this understanding of pensions is more 
individualistic rather than positing pensions as a deduction from the total social 
product for reproduction during the old age, a collective expense of the capitalist that 
must be funded out of surplus value much like any other expenditure of the state. In 
this way, pensions are contextualised in terms of class analysis which acknowledges 
the levels and forms of exploitation and its situation within economic and social 
reproduction. 
In relation to social reproduction and capitalist relations, pensions’ structures 
involve labour, capital and the state. As mentioned before, pensions are not related 
simply to individual wage levels. Rather they are deductions from the total social 
product. From a Marxist point of view, surplus value produced by workers is 
appropriated by capitalists, and the state appropriates some of this surplus value in 
order to fulfil services like pensions (O’Connor, 1973). This has been conceptualised 
as the ‘social wage’, a deferred payment made by the state on the behalf of 
capitalists. From this point of view, social services, including pensions, are viewed as 
an integral part of wages by the labour movement and defended in order to increase 
them similarly to wages (Gough, 1975, 1982). However, this concept of ‘social 
wage’ is criticised for implying the rejection of the law of value. Since values are 
exchanged as equivalents, pensions or other transfers or services cannot be posited as 
an integral part of the value of labour power (Fine & Harris, 1976). Again, here the 
problem arises in part from the perception of the value of labour power as an 
‘individual’ concept rather than reflecting an abstract category related to workers’ 
standard of livings (as well as treating all use values as embodying more or less 
commensurable values even though some, such as state or household provision are 
not produced as values). This challenge can be overcome through referring to the 
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‘total social product’ understanding of Marx which indicates that the state serves to 
socialise the costs of reproduction of labour power for capitalists through taxes 
which are deductions from the total surplus value that is to be distributed as profit 
(Fine & Harris, 1976). Thus, due to class struggle for better standards of living and 
the development of the welfare state, pensions are formed as a social right 
(Townsend, 2007). Their greater or lesser attachment to differentiated wages and 
labour conditions can, however, create the appearance that pensions should be 
treated as part of the value of labour power as such, however conceived, whereas 
they are deeply embedded in a much more complex and concrete set of relations. 
In this light, financialisation can be seen to have altered pensions through 
diffusion of finance into the old-age processes attached to social reproduction. 
During pension reform campaigns, countries with PAYG pension schemes have 
confronted advice to have funded pension schemes in order to contribute to the 
extent and depth of capital markets, saving levels and economic growth (WB, 1994). 
Hence, finance has penetrated pension systems, with the reproduction of labour 
power attached to IBC. Moreover, workers have been involved in financial market 
operations through holding pension assets. Finally, the role of the state is taken over 
by financial markets through privatisation preceding financialisation of pension 
systems. Thus, the structure of pension systems which consists of employers, 
workers and the state has been transformed into an individual saving and investment 
operation where financial markets are more involved in mediating social 
reproduction processes. 
 Pension reform campaigns have shifted the ground of pension provision 
from the non-financial to the financial sphere. With financialisation in addition, 
pension contributions are accumulated in pension funds and invested in financial 
markets. Thus, pension income becomes a source of money capital for financial 
operations. Indeed, financialisation of pensions and pension funds have played a 
substantial role in the financialisation process as a whole through their functioning 
for institutional investors within capital markets as discussed in detail in the next 
section (Deken, 2013; Engelen, 2003; Toporowski, 2000) – although the role of 
pensions as a source of finance long precedes the era of financialised neoliberalism. 
While financial actors’ integration into pension systems constitutes one part of the 
story, another part is households’ engagement with financial markets through their 
asset holdings within funded schemes (Erturk et al., 2008). The increasing 
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stockholdings of households in the form of pensions have been presented as the 
‘democratisation’ of finance while the promised outcomes of financial democracy 
have been far from fulfilling (Erturk et al., 2007).  
As a result of privatization preceding financialisation, the state’s role in 
socialising the costs of the reproduction of labour power in old age is increasingly 
attached to (private) financial markets. Privatisation of pensions can be accomplished 
in different ways and to different extents. For instance, in some cases, the state 
completely withdraws from provision of pensions and either individual or 
occupational forms are established. In other cases, the administration and 
management of pension system is reformatted in a way that becomes more market-
based and competitive (Deken, 2013). In this regard, privatisation of pensions refers 
to individualisation of old-age income which significantly alters the role and 
responsibility of the state while raising self-responsibility. This aspect of 
financialisation of pensions becomes more relevant in the context of increasing 
flexibility within labour markets for which pension contributions are extremely 
variable. Thus, while pensions are reorganised in a way that individual responsibility 
and career aspects are strengthened, pension entitlement becomes reduced if not 
absented for others (Frericks, 2014).  
This transformation is not confined to shift from PAYG to funded schemes, it is also 
valid for the trend in the US and UK pre-funded pension systems that is the closure 
of defined-benefit schemes on the basis of the so-called ‘final salary crisis’ (Langley, 
2004). 
“This shift from defined benefit to defined contribution public policy 
approaches – terms that come from the world of pensions which indicate the 
shift from a guaranteed annual income at retirement (which most pensions 
were at the end of the 1960s) to the advent of self-management through 
investment portfolios whose paltry returns for most are hardly a means of 
retirement. Now these once public goods of health, education and affordable 
housing, are themselves treated as investments, and citizenship is converted 
to a gambit of pay-to-play. (Martin, 2014, p. 198) 
This development, by all means, cannot be separated from the dominance of an asset 
management discourse that has been considerably influential in the era of 
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financialisation (Langley, 2008; Martin, 2002).
19
 Thus, defined contribution schemes 
put all the responsibility and risk of the value loss within the pension funds on the 
shoulders of the individual in a way that “indicated that primary responsibility for 
saving for retirement lies not with the state or the employer, but with the individual” 
(Langley 2004, p.550). In other words, beyond the destruction of the collectivity 
principle, this development eroded the class character of pensions and social 
reproduction during the old age. 
“The individualisation of responsibility and risk for saving for retirement is, 
furthermore, closely bound up with financialisation as ‘both subjectivity and 
moral code’. As Foucauldian analyses of contemporary Anglo-American 
neoliberal welfare reform highlight, a discursive ‘responsibilization of the 
self’ is in the making. Central here is financial self-discipline, that is, a form 
of discipline ‘which has economic rationality, planning and foresight, 
prudence and social/moral responsibility among its cardinal virtues’. Put 
simply, good citizens do not rely on the state or their employer, but 
voluntarily insure against perceived risks, including those of the incapacity to 
work in old age, through the mechanisms of the financial markets. (Langley, 
2004, p.552)  
 Financialisation undermines ‘pension as a right’ by turning it into ‘pension 
as a security’ (Lazzarato, 2012). When pensions become a security, not a right, in the 
extreme every worker has to negotiate privately for their contract whereas, in the 
past, these negotiations were held by unions on the basis of collective action. 
“The company, then, is not a place of conflict between workers and bosses, 
nor are public services a place where highly asymmetrical powers are 
exercised between agents representing the administration and beneficiaries 
(the unemployed, the sick, welfare recipients). The private firm or public 
institution is a set of individual contracts linking different actors who, in the 
pursuit of their own individual interest, are all equal.” (Lazzarato, 2012, p. 
102) 
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Although scholars of cultural political economy have rightly addressed the way in which 
financialisation has changed the understanding of pensions through discursive analyses, their 
approach does not fit with our framework which aims to highlight the variegated financialised 
neoliberalism of everyday life through attention to the structures, processes, relations and agencies 
rather than their effects in alterations at the level of everyday life. 
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As a consequence of financialisation, pensions are displaced from the arena of class 
struggle towards becoming an individual return rather than a class-related or –
negotiated income for social reproduction. As already emphasised, as its counterpart, 
and even if pension contributions remain collective to some degree in form, 
financialisation of pensions represents the expansion of finance into more areas of 
economic and social life. In this regard, IBC is extended to social reproduction 
processes and attaches old-age income to financial conduits. 
In the next section, we discuss financialisation as the intensive accumulation 
of IBC and pension funds’ roles in this context through their impacts on capital 
markets. It starts with review of the literature on pension funds’ function as 
institutional investors. They imposed the priorities of financial institutions and 
contributed to the deepening of financialisation processes more generally, especially 
in Anglo-Saxon countries with funded pension schemes. Moreover, we discuss 
pension funds’ supply- and demand-side impacts on capital markets in order to show 
intensification of financial operations. 
3.4. Intensive accumulation of IBC: pension funds and financialisation 
It has been a long time since Drucker (Drucker, 1976) published his breakthrough 
book on pension funds. His optimistic insights about the property relationships under 
‘pension fund socialism’ and shared ownership by employers and employees (via 
pension funds’ assets) do not seem to have been borne out. On the other hand, not 
everyone shared Drucker’s optimism; Clark (Clark, 1998) disagreed with him while 
naming his own work ‘pension fund capitalism’. According to Clark, pension funds’ 
significance within the economy was nothing but a new stage of capitalism; pension 
funds, by using their power as investors, changed even the way in which 
corporations were managed (Clark & Hebb, 2004). Despite these contradictory 
approaches, there were some authors suggesting grey instead of black or white; 
Blackburn (Blackburn, 2002, 2006) claimed that the ownership relations created by 
pension funds were ambiguous, i.e. pension funds caused property rights to form a 
‘grey capital’. Now, when we look back to these discussions we surprisingly see that, 
despite many useful insights they provide, they fail to see a major function of 
pension funds: contributing to financialisation of the economy. So far, pension funds 
have not changed the property relations but rather they have shaped the capital 
markets in a way which has reinforced financialisation. 
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This has been realised by some authors with pension funds seen as central to 
some of the theoretical-historical explanations of financialisation. The Regulation 
School attributes pension funds a primary function in a finance-led accumulation 
regime which refers to finance being a key mediation mechanism in regulation of 
capital accumulation. As a result, an increasing percentage of aggregate saving, 
comprising retirement savings and pension accumulations, constitute a claim on 
future profits. Under Fordism, companies were controlled by ‘managerial capitalism’ 
whereas now the control is in the hands of institutional investors such as pension 
funds. These require a high level of financial returns. Thus, the nature of investments 
of the company changes from long- to short-term in order to meet the criterion. “In 
this way, individual savings patterns are becoming the main engine of the 
distribution of income via the institutional investors’ governance of company 
behaviour” (Aglietta, 1998, pp. 80–81). In other words, pension funds have been 
influential on investment decisions through their role as institutional investors. Since 
savings in the form of financial wealth have exceeded the savings in the form of 
bank deposits, institutional investors have become decisive in diversification of 
financial wealth.  
“Institutional investors with holdings in a company, by contrast, insist on the 
performance criteria as evaluated by the financial markets. They compel 
firms to maximize their equity value in the short term, under the constant 
threat of hostile mergers and leveraged buy-outs. This form of company 
management breeds an obsession with cutting wage costs and shedding jobs 
to boost share prices without much thought for future development.” 
(Aglietta, 1998, p. 69) 
Thus, on the basis of their shareholder value, institutional investors in general and 
pension funds in particular, have changed the way in which companies are governed. 
Accordingly, managers of the firms have to adjust their managerial decisions under 
the impact of shareholders who expect high and stable rates of return (Boyer, 2000, 
p. 120). Hence, the shareholder value argument has become popular in the 1980s in 
the United States with the evidence of institutional investors led by pension funds.  
 “The transfer of stockholding from individual households to institutions such 
as mutual funds, pension funds and life insurance companies made possible 
the takeovers advocated by agency theorists and gave shareholders much 
more collective power to influence the yields and market values of the 
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corporate stocks they held. During the 1950s and 1960s, there were legal 
restrictions on the extent to which life insurance companies and pension 
funds could include corporate equities in their investment portfolios, while 
mutual funds played only a limited, although growing, role in the 
mobilization of household savings. In the 1970s, however, a number of 
changes occurred in the financial sector that promoted the growth of equity-
based institutional investing (Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000, pp. 16–17) 
Approaches associating shareholder value and corporate governance concepts 
with pension funds as institutional investors are illuminating for our research which 
aims to highlight pension funds’ role in financialisation. However, it is also true that 
these concepts have their roots in orthodox finance literature. 
“The term corporate governance only passed into common usage in the early 
1990s. The UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992 was the first major public 
document that explicitly took corporate governance as its object. Better 
governance quickly became part of a powerful promise. By the late 1990s, 
proselytising World Bank and IMF reports implied that the whole world 
could be a better place if others adopted the techniques of Anglo American 
corporate governance. But by the early 2000s in the UK and US, corporate 
governance is increasingly associated with disappointment. In 2002 the 
American political classes registered the failure of multiple governance 
mechanisms to prevent or detect dishonest and irresponsible behaviour in 
companies like Enron or World Com; while in 2003 the British media 
protested the failure of such mechanisms to control top executive pay or limit 
‘rewards for failure’.”(Erturk et al., 2004, p. 678) 
 Moreover, as argued by Erturk (Erturk, 2003), “The Washington consensus, 
promoting Anglo-Saxon financial markets in the developing world, is informed by 
this body of work and the practices that emanate from it” (p.186). Accordingly, the 
corporate governance literature defines the ‘optimal managerial behaviour’ in a way 
which ignores the financialised economic environment. By financialised economy is 
meant that the capital markets have moved beyond the point of being simple 
intermediaries but rather have become forces determining firm and household 
decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a more generic framework of 
financialisation which provides insights for macro problems of countries rather than 
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focusing on analysis of firm-level governance. On the basis of this view, Erturk 
suggests the notion of ‘coupon pool capitalism’ by following (Froud et al., 2002). 
“Coupon pool construct of Froud et al. articulates well, by using the Ponzi 
scheme analogy, the gap between capital market expectations due to 
corporate governance, and investor psychology in bull markets, and the 
ultimate financial outcome. Financial engineering and restructuring cannot 
sustain the pyramid scheme forever.” (Erturk, 2003, p. 190)[Emphasis added] 
Ponzi finance, referred to by the authors, is a financial structure which necessitates 
issuing of new liabilities in order to finance existing liabilities.
20
  
Toporowski (Toporowski, 2000), in his influential work, depicts the way in 
which pension funds in the UK and USA have involved Ponzi finance because of the 
long-term securities they hold. “Most of the assets of UK and US pension funds 
consist of irredeemable shares” (Toporowski, 2000, p. 63). Pension funds bring huge 
capital inflows to capital markets through pension contributions and they need these 
inflows to continue and also expand in order to meet their liabilities to pensioners. 
These capital inflows are used to buy securities, such as stocks, shares and corporate 
and government bonds. In the beginning, funded schemes are immature which means 
contributions come in increasingly while the number of people who retire is very low. 
Therefore, as pension fund contributions flow into capital markets, they inflate them. 
Consequently, the price level of securities rises and their yield decreases. This means 
securities become cheaper and a more attractive way of financing companies. So 
companies start issuing securities to repay the bank debt and use it as a more 
convenient and cheaper way of financing which substitutes for bank borrowing. The 
impact of this development on the banking system is disintermediation, involving it 
in risky businesses, focusing on small- and medium-sized firms as well as engaging 
with financial derivatives.  
In addition to this, pension funds eventually mature. Maturation involves 
larger pay-outs as opposed to smaller pay-ins.
21
 As a result, in a ‘mature pension 
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 “Financial structures are simply commitments to make payments in the future, against claims that 
result in incoming payments in the future. Three types of financial commitments: hedge finance; 
speculative finance; the Ponzi finance. “Ponzi finance, in Minsky’s view, is a situation in which both 
commitments and cash inflows are uncertain” (Toporowski, 2000, p. 60). 
21
 “When a pension scheme is established it starts off with a relatively high inflow of contributions 
and current pensions liabilities which are small at first, because the few contributors that retire first of 
all have short contribution records, and therefore only small pension entitlements. In each successive 
year another cohort of retiring workers becomes entitled to a larger pension, by reason of their longer 
contribution record, than each previous year’s cohort. The excess of contributions over pensions is 
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fund’ the pensions paid out exceeds the amount of contributions. The excess amount 
is paid through the investment income of the fund as well as selling the fund’s 
securities. Therefore, pension funds become net sellers when they mature whereas 
they are net buyers when they are immature. The result is that pension funds 
contribute to the instability of the financial markets by inflating asset prices while 
they mature, as their liabilities become a potential strain once they are mature.  
“These [Funded pension schemes] are the main impetus behind the inflation 
of capital markets in the main industrialized countries since the 1970s. Some 
of the consequences of the resulting extended capital market inflation for 
privatization and monetary policy are conserved. It is argued that funded 
pension schemes make the economy less efficient and weaken the financial 
system. They do this by putting large irregular flows of contractual 
savings into capital markets, needing and ever-expanding contributing 
labour force to sustain those flows and prices in securities markets. 
Contribution inflows are limited by the fall in rates of inflation in the 
advanced capitalist countries, the size of the well-paid labour force and by the 
trend towards the casualization of labour, which makes pension fund saving a 
less appropriate form of saving. The reduced financial inflows into pension 
funds will reduce the liquidity of capital markets and thwart the eventual 
disintermediation from securities markets.”(Toporowski, 2000, p. 49) 
[Emphases added] 
Further, pension funds have been one of the main drivers of financialisation 
as the logic of their funding creates demand for enhanced financial products 
(Engelen, 2003). Accordingly, there are four main objectives of pension funds: 
minimising risks, maximising returns, ensuring liquidity and minimising costs.  
“Pension funds are subject to a life cycle during which the ratio of 
contributors and beneficiaries changes gradually, effectuating radical 
transformations in the risk profile of the fund and hence in its investment 
strategies, turning formerly committed, long-term owners increasingly into 
speculative investors. Driving this process is an increasing need for liquidity, 
forcing pension funds to invest in the most liquid markets and within these 
                                                                                                                                          
therefore large at first, but rapidly falls and may even become negative as the scheme ‘matures’.” 
(Toporowski, 2000, p. 73) 
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markets to buy the stocks of those corporations that have the largest daily 
‘free float’.”(Engelen, 2003, pp. 1364–1365)  
Pension funds need to invest in liquid asset categories in order to trade quickly 
according to necessity. This has been a main reason for the development of the asset 
markets and liquid investment instruments while legal restrictions on investment 
decisions pushed the process even more. The logic of funding is not only limited to 
the investment instruments preferred by pension funds, but also the managerial 
structure is decisive. Engelen (2003) defines two management strategies: internal and 
external management. In internal management, funds employ their portfolio 
managers whereas in the external one, the portfolio management company is 
independent. Moreover, in external management, either intensive or extensive 
management strategy might be the case. In intensive management there are few 
external managers who manage a small number of asset categories and have long-
term relations with the fund. However, extensive management means that there are 
many managers who compete and control a high number of limitless asset categories. 
External managers’ relation to the fund is short-term. According to the logic of 
funding, pension funds tend to start with internal management and move to external 
management and extensive management strategy over time. The extensive 
management, in particular, refers to highly sophisticated investment strategies which 
push the development of enhanced investment instruments. At the beginning of the 
life of a pension fund, the focus is on risk minimisation, rather than return 
maximization, because the fund is immature and income inflow is much more than 
payouts. With the 1980s, maturation of several major pension funds caused a shift of 
priority to return maximization instead of risk minimisation. The increasing need for 
liquidity along with the maturity of pension funds, made them push the development 
of existing investment instruments in a way more speculative in nature. 
“For as soon as pension funds mature, their need to push the envelope of 
existing investment norms and practices grows, resulting in increasingly 
speculative behaviour and a frantic search for financial innovations. 
Subsequently, ever more specialised and sophisticated asset categories are 
demanded and constructed, setting in motion a gradual externalisation of 
investment management, ultimately resulting in an elaborate and complex 
division of managerial labour.”(Engelen, 2003, p. 1366) 
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Therefore, the investment instruments become ever more speculative as a result of 
the demand by investment managers, thereby contributing to investment innovation 
and the proliferation of derivative markets. Consequently, the finance industry grows 
in response to the push to meet pension funds’ demands. Hence, this highlights the 
relationship between the maturation process of pension funds and the financialisation 
of the economy. 
On the basis of this literature review, it can be argued that pension funds play 
a substantial role in financialisation of the economies through three channels: 
 With their dominance in capital markets as institutional investors 
which promote shareholder value and changing the way in which 
corporations are governed. 
 Through capital inflows to capital markets which causes asset market 
inflation and results in increasing financial market instability. 
 As a consequence of their logic of funding which contributes to 
innovation in financial instruments and enhancing sophistication of 
capital markets. 
By all means, the extent and degree of explanatory power of these theoretical 
approaches varies across countries on the basis of their own pension funds’ 
experiences. Unsurprisingly, these approaches are frequently referred to in case 
studies in order to explain the key function of pension funds in intensification of 
financialisation. For instance, Macheda (Macheda, 2012) argues that pension funds 
played a decisive role in the financialisation of the Icelandic economy through two 
conduits. One is the money capital flow into national and international markets 
which resulted in inflation in asset prices thus causing asset values to rise 
significantly. The second conduit, on the other hand, is the increasing demand of 
pension funds for short-term yields as a consequence of maturity. Thus, pension 
funds became involved in more risky speculative circuits. Theurillat et al. (Theurillat, 
Corpataux, & Crevoisier, 2010) discuss the financialisation of the property sector in 
the context of Swiss pension funds which have been involved in property as financial 
players between 1992 and 2005. Decisions made by pension funds structured the 
property sector in a financialised way which the authors define as “the continuous 
assessment of economic activities by financial markets” (p.192). Belfrage (Belfrage, 
2008) examines the impact of pension funds on workers in Sweden after the public 
pension reform in 1999. With the new pension system, decommodification and 
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solidarity principles were replaced with self responsibility for pension income. As a 
consequence of the increasing complexity of the financial products, the target of 
securing a high material living standard during retirement has become more volatile. 
Accordingly, risk management becomes situated at the core of financialisation while 
pension funds represent the “recommodification” of pensions, in financialised forms. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Marxist authors have spent a lot of energy in theorising periods for which the 
financial sphere has been of significance. For Hilferding (Hilferding, 1981) finance 
capital gained supremacy at the beginning of the twentieth century through loanable 
capital’s advantageous position relative to industrial capital. For Arrighi (Arrighi, 
1994), on the other hand, the movement of capital (M-C-M’) also summarised the 
historical development of capitalist economies from production to finance. Baran and 
Sweezy (Baran & Sweezy, 1973) put forward the ‘monopoly capital’ as 
characterising a new era where competition rules do not apply to the giant 
corporations in a way that enables them to overcome the law of tendency for falling 
rate of profits through focusing, ultimately and in part on financial activities. 
Following these strands of thought, contemporary authors such as Lapavitsas (2013), 
Krippner (Krippner, 2005) and Foster (Foster, 2007), conceptualised financialisation 
with varying emphases on structural tendencies and financial capitalists’ roles.  
From our point of view, financialisation is a phenomenon that emerges as the 
characteristic feature of the neoliberal period due to structural transformations within 
production and reproduction processes. These alterations occur in relation to inherent 
tendencies of money capital but they are also pushed by historical developments 
promoting finance’s increasing presence across every aspect of economic and social 
life. This brings to the fore the question of whether or not financialisation is a project 
that is run by certain actors? As mentioned before, the author of this study accepts 
the role of actors in pushing changes in political economic processes. Nevertheless, 
our view departs from approaches that argue that the financial character of 
neoliberalism was a project that is run through intervention, especially via monetary 
policy, i.e. a ‘coup’ (Dumenil and Levy, 2001). Rather, we follow the view that 
financialisation is the most significant feature of the neoliberal period (Fine, 2013) 
alongside other attributes of the period that reinforces capitalist class’ power against 
other classes (Harvey, 2006). Therefore, financialisation is neither a period nor a 
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project but it is a phenomenon of spread and condensation of financial accumulation. 
Thus, financialisation has three dominant features: deepening of financial operations 
through new techniques, such as securitisation; transformation of non-financial 
sector due to altering relations with the financial sphere; and, households’ increasing 
exposure to financial activities.  
  This chapter develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of 
financialisation and pensions. To this end, we start by introducing general 
characteristics of financialisation as an underlying tendency that can be found in 
Marx’s investigation of money capital. After defining financialisation as the 
phenomenal extensive and intensive growth of IBC, we give an overview of the 
historical developments underpinning financialisation. In this regard, our emphasis is 
on the neoliberalism which is the contemporary mode of capitalist relations which is 
characterised by the significance of finance.  
In order to show the way in which finance engages with a new area and 
transforms it into a profit-making domain for financial actors, we scrutinise the 
reconfiguration of pensions. Pensions provide a good example of finance extending 
its reach to social reproduction, not least as an aspect the reproduction of labour 
power. Moreover, financialisation of pensions causes finance to displace the state in 
the socialisation mechanism of the costs of social reproduction of retirees. Thus, 
once state pensions are switched to funded saving mechanisms, the collective logic 
of pension as a social right is turned into an individual responsibility of pension as a 
security.  
After revealing the general features of the extensive growth of finance and 
financialisation of pensions, we concentrate on the intensive growth of finance. 
Intensification of financial relations in association with pensions is theorised in the 
context of Anglo-Saxon countries where funded pension schemes have traditionally 
been prevalent. Therefore, we are able to see the substantial role played by pension 
funds as institutional investors in the emergence of shareholder value which is a key 
element of financialisation. In addition, pension funds have asset market inflation 
effects which are again shown to be important in the structural transformations of 
financial and non-financial sectors under financialisation. Finally, the logic of 
funding explains the function of pensions funds in fuelling demand for more 
sophisticated financial instruments which served as a contributory factor for the 
instability and speculation associated with financialisation.  
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Thus, we prepare the reader for the following three empirical chapters. The 
next (Chapter 4) covers the general characteristics of financialisation of the Turkish 
economy in order to show that finance changes pensions through changing the 
economic and social structures shaping pension systems. Then, we shed light on the 
pension reform process in Turkey which resulted in financialisation of pensions, with 
funded schemes becoming significant alongside the state PAYG system (Chapter 5). 
This points to the extensive growth finance, integrating pensions in Turkey into the 
financial domains. What follows after this is an account of the intensive growth of 
finance that can be observed through the recently established Turkish pension funds’ 
impact on the country’s capital markets (Chapter 6). Thereby, across the next three 
chapters, we reproduce our theoretical framework on financialisation and pensions 
presented here in three sections through the empirical evidence provided by the 
Turkish example of pension reform. 
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4. Financialisation of the Turkish economy in the post-2001 era 
4.1. Introduction 
Becker et al (Becker et al., 2010) seek to specify the characteristics of 
financialisation in periphery countries and argue that ‘peripheral financialisation’ is 
marked by high reliance on capital inflows which are sustained by high interest rates 
and overvalued domestic currencies in order to attract capital flows. The pro-
financialisation policies of fighting against inflation in general, not least exchange 
rate policies, have negative impacts on trade and current account deficits which 
result in high external debt. In addition, several restructuring measures are taken to 
integrate households into the financial sphere, i.e. mass-based financialisation. In this 
regard, privatisations of welfare services, in particular pension reforms, have a 
significant role in the emergence of financialisation in countries such as Chile. 
Financialisation in Turkey, indeed, has shown several similarities with this path, 
alongside its own peculiarities. Pension reform is one of the areas advised to 
developing countries by the IFIs (as Turkey’s experience is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter) as part of what can be interpreted as pro-financialisation policies. 
Beyond that, the dependence on capital inflows, inflation targeting policy, financial 
sector restructuring programmes and many other developments are experienced in a 
similar way as framed by Becker et al.  
In the next section, we trace the trajectory of the Turkish economy in order to 
show the historical developments and institutional transformations that have 
underpinned financialisation in Turkey in the post-2001 era. The implementation of 
inflation targeting policy and, in relation with that, massive capital inflows 
underpinned the expansion of the financial sector. Moreover, the restructuring of the 
banking system allowed foreign banks to be integrated into Turkish financial 
markets. Hence, foreign banks, experienced in consumer lending to households, have 
altered the focus of the banking sector alongside regulations that detached banks 
from lending to public sector. We also demonstrate the socialisation of the costs of 
the transformation process towards financialisation in terms of privatisations, fiscal 
contractions and accumulation of international reserves. 
After showing how the Turkish economy has been financialised, in the third 
section we scrutinise financialisation through descriptive statistical evidence that is 
analysed on the basis of our theoretical framework on extensive and intensive growth 
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of finance. The section consists of three subsections, on banks, non-financial 
institutions and households. Although capital markets in Turkey have shown 
considerable development in terms of volume of capitalisation and innovation 
through new financial instruments, we leave that aside for now as Chapter 6 
concentrates on that issue. Turkey has a financial system primarily based on banks 
and, as financial sector’s significance within the economy has increased, most of this 
has originated from the banking sector. With the availability and accessibility of 
external funds, not least in the form of mergers and acquisitions with the reform 
process, banks have expanded their loans rapidly. Moreover, in the 2000s, the public 
sector borrowing requirement has decreased which directed banks’ concentration 
from holding public securities to extending loans. However, what is more important 
than banks giving loans is to whom they were given and for what. All these issues 
are discussed in the section 4.3.1. 
To investigate credit expansion’s impact on the economy, in the following 
sub-section (4.3.2), we scrutinise the development of the non-financial sector’s 
financial situation. Accordingly, we conclude that the real sector in Turkey has taken 
very different positions according to the scale of firms involved. In short, while big 
corporations have enjoyed the bonanza of both domestic and foreign financial 
sources, either in the form of direct investments or bank loans, the small and medium 
scale enterprises (SMEs) have not experienced improvement in their financial 
circumstances. This point explains why growth in fixed investment has not 
increased: banks have not intermediated to transfer, admittedly declining saving, 
sources from households to the SMEs that constitute the majority of the real sector in 
Turkey.  
What did banks do then? They transferred these funds to other households as 
consumer lending. As we show in the last sub-section (4.3.3), household 
indebtedness has increased dramatically in the post-2001 era. When we look at the 
breakdown of consumer lending, we see that low and middle-low income households 
borrow in order to finance their housing mortgages, as well as other needs such as 
education, health, vacations and even weddings and so on.
22
 This does not only 
explain the fast growth of the construction sector, for the expansion of consumer 
                                                 
22
 Indeed there is a consumer loan which is extended purely for the purpose of wedding expenditure. 
For an example, please see the link. Available at: http://www.yapikredi.com.tr/bireysel-
bankacilik/krediler/kredi-urunlerimiz/bireysel-ihtiyac-kredileri/evlilik-kredisi.aspx Access  date: 
09.03.2016  
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lending also signifies the integration of finance into the everyday lives of 
households. We conclude by highlighting this chapter’s importance for our 
understanding of financialisation and its multidimensional impact transforms directly 
or indirectly all areas of the economy, policy and social life.  
4.2. Historical developments and institutional transformations leading to 
financialisation in the Turkish economy 
Turkey saw financial market liberalisation in 1989 as the main instrument for 
decreasing the role of state in the economy while contributing to the development of 
the private sector through financial market promotion. However, the outcome did not 
meet expectations. While the private sector was expected to take advantage of the 
newly established liberal capital account, the public sector became the main 
beneficiary of access to foreign capital. The public sector used financial markets for 
public borrowing due to high public sector indebtedness which constituted the main 
bone of the growth strategy of the early 1990s. Meanwhile, budget deficits were 
financed by issuing public bonds in the Istanbul Stock Exchange, founded in 1986, 
and exchanged the majority of public sector debt requirements (90%) by 1988. In the 
1990s, the domestic borrowing by the Turkish state coincided with a favourable 
environment for financial globalisation, resulting in high reliance on short-term 
capital inflows and the potential for financial crises as a consequence (realised in 
1994 and 1999) (Akkemik & Ozen, 2014).  
“The underlying characteristic of the domestic debt management was its 
extreme short-termism. Net domestic borrowings, as a ratio of the stock of 
the existing debt, hovered around 50% before the 1990s. This ratio increased 
to 105% in 1993, indicating that each year the state had to resort to new 
borrowing exceeding the stock of debt already accumulated. In 1996, this 
ratio reached to 163.5%. Thus, the public sector has been trapped in a short-
term rolling of debt, a phenomenon characterized as Ponzi-financing in the 
fiscal economics literature. For this scheme to work, however, domestic 
financial markets required the continued inflow of short-term capital inflows. 
Thus, the episode of hot money inflows should be interpreted, in the Turkish 
context, as the long arm of fiscal policy, overcoming credit restraints and 
monetary constraints of the monetary authority” (Boratav, Yeldan, & Kose, 
2000, p. 25) 
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In order to attract the so-called ‘hot-money’, i.e. short-term foreign capital inflows, 
the interest rates for treasury bills were kept high and domestic currency was 
overvalued (Boratav et al., 2000). The consequence of this process was a ‘vicious 
circle’ of high interest rates, cheap foreign currency for those accessing foreign 
capital, but dangers of capital flight motivating further increases in real interest rates 
to stem potential outflows against the fear of devaluation (Balkan & Yeldan, 2002; 
Yeldan, 2006).   
Table 4.1 Public sector borrowing requirement as percentage of GDP (%) 
Year PSBR/GDP Year PSBR/GDP 
1990 5.5 1995 3.7 
1991 7.5 1996 6.5 
1992 7.9 1997 5.7 
1993 7.7 1998 7.1 
1994 4.6 1999 11.6 
Source: (Ministry of Development, 2015a, pp. 131–132) 
As seen from the table above, public sector debt requirements remained high 
during the 1990s at an average 6.9% of GDP. Banks took advantage of the financial 
arbitrage caused by high real interest rates while financing public deficit through 
borrowing from foreign banks and lending to government via public sector debt 
securities. This was known as ‘open position banking’ since banks took open foreign 
exchange positions in order to appropriate high profits (Gungen, 2014). Thus, banks 
concentrated on government debt which resulted in the share of government debt 
securities to double up in banks’ balance sheets (23% in 1999) (Bakir & Onis, 2010). 
Financing public debt was preferable as well as being lucrative for banks for several 
reasons. 
“Government securities were granted tax exemptions and carried a stable and 
risk-free net yield higher than other types of securities. More importantly, the 
fact that they could be used as collateral in the interbank money market and 
be held against the liquidity (disponibility) requirements raised their 
attractiveness for the banking sector. Therefore, the increase in the 
disponibility ratio after 1985 led commercial banks to raise the share of 
government securities in their portfolios. Furthermore, only the banks were 
allowed to be primary dealers in the government bond market.” (Ganioğlu, 
2008, p. 369) 
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 The Turkish private sector adapted to this phenomenon by establishing their 
own banks under the big conglomerates which previously served as non-financial 
corporations. In some cases the income gained by financial operations exceeded that 
from the non-financial operations of these big ‘holdings’ most of them containing the 
top 500 manufacturing firms of the country (Kazgan, 2013). Gultekin Karakas 
(Gultekin Karakas, 2009) names this process ‘financial protection’ because she 
argues that, during the 1990s, a transition from import-substitution to an export-
oriented growth model was in place, and the Turkish state smoothened the 
difficulties of this shift through transferring financial funds to non-financial firms via 
high interest rates on government debt securities.  
Alongside indebtedness of the public sector and banks’ pragmatic position in 
financing public debt, another important characteristic of the 1990s was high 
inflation. Therefore, by 1998, the picture of the Turkish economy was not very 
promising: high external debt, high interest rates and high inflation. After the Asian 
crisis, capital inflows to Turkey slowed down in 1998 while falling to 1.8% of GDP 
from 5.8% in 1997 (Akyuz & Boratav, 2002, p. 9). The Turkish government 
prepared a disinflation programme and put it into effect with the 17
th
 Stand-by 
Agreement signed with the IMF in July 1998. The programme aimed to decrease the 
inflation rate below 50% through fiscal and monetary policies. In a nutshell, these 
measures included restricting the lending of CBRT to the Treasury, decreasing the 
banks’ open position as a share of their assets and constraining the subsidies to the 
agricultural sector in order to decrease the sector’s share within the economy. 
Moreover, fiscal measures such as increasing the primary surplus within the budget 
above 4% of the GDP, limiting the salary increases amongst the public sector 
employees in accordance with the inflation rate and reforming taxation, not least 
introducing a tax for income from rent which had not existed in Turkey until then. 
Finally, the exchange rate was aligned with the inflation rate, and privatisations were 
to be accelerated (Kazgan, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the banking system was undergoing a transition period following 
the 1994 financial crisis. As mentioned before, the main function of banks in Turkey 
until 1999 was to finance the public sector debt through holding government 
securities. However, in the second half of the 1990s, due to changing international 
capital flows and instability spread through several financial crisis, not least the 
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Asian crisis, the Turkish banks became insolvent and were taken over by the 
government as a response to the IMF demands (Kazgan, 2013). 
“While a currency crisis was averted over the turbulent years of 1998–1999, 
the banking sector felt the squeeze from tightened external financial 
conditions and contraction in economic activity. Eight insolvent banks had to 
be taken over by the public Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), in 
accordance with the full insurance granted to deposits after the 1994 crisis, 
thereby adding considerably to public debt and deficits.” (Akyuz & Boratav, 
2002, pp. 9–10)[Emphases added]  
 In June 1999, the banking system reform was accelerated in order to show 
commitment to the financial policies advised by the IFIs. This involved in major part 
the rehabilitation of insolvent banks, introducing new banking laws in accordance 
with the Basel II principles, establishing a new independent regulation agency for the 
banking sector and rendering the Central Bank’s full independence (Bakir & Onis, 
2010). 
Thus, Turkey entered the new millennium with an IMF-advised disinflation 
programme and prolonged banking reform. Initially, the programme appeared to be 
successful attaining targets for the nominal exchange rate and primary budget 
deficits. However, the decrease in inflation was slower than intended: 
“At the end of December 2000, the year-to-year change in the CPI was 39 per 
cent while the average inflation for the year as a whole reached 55 per cent 
compared to 65 per cent in the previous year. Given that the predetermined 
path for the nominal exchange rate had been followed, this resulted in a 
significant appreciation of the currency in real terms. This was also 
aggravated by the rise of the dollar against the euro.” (Akyuz & Boratav, 
2002, p. 14)  
Therefore, in November 2000, in light of massive capital outflows, Turkey 
experienced a serious liquidity crisis when the overnight borrowing interest rate 
reached 870% (Yaman Ozturk & Ercan, 2009). This crisis was delayed for a few 
months with IMF aid until the crisis erupted again and more severely in February 
2001. Despite Turkey experiencing these crises during the implementation of an IMF 
programme, the institution continued to advise Turkey and provided financial 
assistance of USD 20.4 billion (net, between 1999 and 2003) (Yeldan, 2008). In 
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March 2001, Turkey appointed Kemal Dervis, who was an influential bureaucrat 
from the World Bank, as the minister responsible for the economic reforms.
23
 
 In May 2001, the Transition to a Strong Economy Programme (TSE) was 
introduced in parallel with the 18
th
 Stand-by agreement signed with the IMF. The 
TSE consisted of three pillars: banking, public and private sectors. Accordingly, 
fifteen regulations were put in effect in fifteen days to reform four strategic sectors; 
banking and finance, energy, telecommunication and transportation, and agriculture. 
These regulations were implemented alongside policy measures for transparency, 
fiscal discipline and flexible public employment and change in wages policy 
(Gultekin Karakas, 2009). The solutions introduced for overcoming the economic 
crisis were a combination of mantras from the Washington and Post-Washington 
consensus. Accordingly, the fiscal reforms such as tax and fiscal restructuring, 
elimination of the extra-budgetary sources etc., were in line with the ideology of the 
‘minimum state’ of the Washington Consensus. On the other hand, good governance, 
transparency and central bank independence were principles in accord with the Post-
Washington Consensus alongside the regulation of banking system, such as 
international norms like Basel II and rehabilitation and restructuring of the banking 
sector (Erturk, 2003). 
In relation with the programme, energy and telecommunication/transportation 
sectors underwent a severe privatisation process which attracted massive foreign 
capital inflows. Regulations regarding the agriculture sector aimed to phase out 
agricultural subsidies and supports; and the privatisation of the agricultural sales 
cooperatives (as promised to the IMF and the World Bank with the letters of intent to 
the IMF signed in 1999). This process later resulted in financialisation of agriculture 
through bank credits to small-scale farmers (Borlu, 2015). Moreover, the programme 
consisted of measures on the productive sector to push exports and support foreign 
direct investments. The financial restructuring programme, also known as the 
Istanbul approach, restructured the debts of the companies which would be able to 
pay them if they had enough time and opportunity. The supported firms were chosen 
from those with positive value added. In this context, their institutional managements 
                                                 
23
 Erturk describes Dervis’ appointment in terms of a ‘pro-regulation coalition’ consisting of 
international financial institutions and domestic parties in order to reform the economy and restructure 
the economic institutions in a more regulated way in relation with the Post-Washington consensus 
(Erturk 2003). 
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were enhanced and their balance sheets were made compatible with the international 
accounting principles (Yaman Ozturk & Ercan, 2009).  
While transforming the structure of the economy, the TSE programme 
introduced the Banking Sector Restructuring Program (BSRP) with the main 
motivation of reshaping the banking sector in Turkey (Marois, 2012, p. 165). The 
programme included a re-regulation of state banks, solving the problems of SDIF 
banks (those overtaken by the state due to insolvency) and private banks after the 
crisis while increasing regulation in the banking system. The feature of the Turkish 
banking system concentrating on financing the public debt was removed within the 
reform process. The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was 
established as one of the major steps to organise the banking sector framework 
through an independent supervisory authority (Ganioğlu, 2008, p. 368). 24  The 
reforms included measures to detach the organic relations between banks and 
conglomerates (Gultekin Karakas, 2009).  
The SDIF, as briefly mentioned before, played a key role in the 
transformation of the Turkish banking system. The SDIF was established as a 
response to the IMF demand after the 1994 financial to provide security for deposits 
in case of default. With the banking system reforms, the SDIF took over 11 banks 
before the 2001 crisis (one bank in 1997, one bank in 1998, six banks in 1999, three 
in 2000). In 2001, nine more banks were taken over by the SDIF and two more were 
added to this number in 2002 (Kazgan, 2013). The purpose of the SDIF was to 
ensure the rehabilitation of these banks through recapitalisation and debt 
consolidation.  
One of the most important elements of the rehabilitation of the Turkish 
banking system was the elimination of the state banks’ non-performing loans also 
known as ‘state duty losses’. These were financed by the Treasury and used for 
funding public institutions deemed key activities for development. Indeed, state 
banks financed crucial developmental projects and provided subsidies, i.e. cushions, 
to those harmed by the neoliberal policies, such as farmers. However, when the loans 
to these institutions or individuals defaulted, the losses of the banks were recorded in 
the budget as duty losses (Marois, 2012; Marois & Gungen, 2013). At the same time, 
the state duty losses were used to hide budget deficits during the 1990s. Thus, the 
                                                 
24
 Before this, the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and the Treasury shared regulatory 
and supervisory power over banks. 
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state duty losses reached 13% of GDP in 1999 (USD19.2 billion). Therefore, in 
2002, USD22 billion was used to cover duty losses of state banks alongside the 
USD25 billion that was used for private banks’ bailout (in total 30% of GDP in 2002 
was used for these bailouts) (Marois & Gungen, 2013, p. 9).  
Finally, the reform process included signing ‘Memorandums of 
Understanding’ (MoUs) in order to meet the institutional criteria of foreign financial 
authorities. The MoUs aimed at the integration and penetration of international 
financial institutions into the Turkish banking system (Marois, 2012, p. 179). This 
was achieved through the contribution of several regulatory arrangements as 
mentioned below. 
“One of the key winners of neoliberal restructuring in the banking sector has 
been foreign bank capital. There were several reasons why foreign bankers 
did not bear the cost of the crisis and were able to penetrate the banking 
market. First, major international banks had privileged access to the Central 
Bank’s foreign exchange reserves immediately before the 2001 financial 
crisis … Second, foreign banks which provided loans to Turkish banks did 
not have to face the losses when these domestic banks became insolvent, 
because of comprehensive Treasury guarantees which were part of the IMF 
conditionality… Third, foreign banks took the lion’s share in the post-crisis 
consolidation of the banking sector by directly or indirectly acquiring 
domestic banks that were recapitalized by public money: bank consolidation 
included nationalization of failed banks and their subsequent sale to domestic 
banks, which were later taken over by foreign banks. Thus, the emergence of 
the regulatory state facilitated foreign bank penetration into the Turkish 
market.” (Bakir & Onis, 2010, pp. 92–93)  
After 2002, with the election of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Justice and 
Development Party in English) as the ruling party and its strong commitment to the 
economic programme advised by the IFIs, the Turkish economy entered a distinctive 
period (Onis & Guven, 2011; Yorukoglu & Cufadar, 2008). The programme 
implemented was known as the ‘twin-targeting programme’ for consisting of two 
pillars, monetary policy designed as inflation targeting and a fiscal austerity pillar 
intended to create a budget surplus of 6.5% of GDP. With the purpose of creating a 
primary surplus to pay off external debt, budget expenditures were kept very low 
during the years the target was achieved (between 1999 and 2008). What is more 
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interesting is that fiscal expenditure remained low even after the budget deficit had 
been decreased and public indebtedness was considerably lowered (Arikboga, 2011).  
The fiscal targets have had substantial impact on the living conditions of 
households in Turkey. However, what is more important in terms of our focus, 
financialisation, is the inflation-targeting policy which was adopted implicitly until 
2006 and explicitly afterwards. In this regard, interest rates were raised and the 
exchange rate was overvalued as the government was seeking to give positive signals 
to international investors. According to the logic of the programme, the commitment 
to the reform process would induce capital inflows. Therefore, with the availability 
of funds, it would be possible to decrease the real interest rate. Thus, private 
consumption as well as fixed investment would increase (Telli, Voyvoda, & Yeldan, 
2009). 
In more detail, the inflation targeting policy was first implemented in New 
Zealand in 1990, then in England, Canada and Chile. This policy means that the 
central bank, which supposedly only has the mission of sustaining price stability, 
declares a certain level of targeted inflation (Yeldan, 2010a). In the beginning, the 
policy was more about sharing the central bank policies and expectations on inflation 
in a transparent way. However, in the late 1990s, the inflation targeting policy has 
become the main instrument suggested to developing countries for integration into 
the international financial markets. This policy generally brings about the legislative 
changes for independence of the central bank and it is underpinned with the 
understanding of price stability as the necessary condition for growth and 
employment. In this regard, high inflation, which refers to 5 or 6 per cent annual 
inflation or more, would destroy the economy in the long run (Epstein & Yeldan, 
2006, 2008, 2010). 
As a result of the implemented policies and in relation with the capital glut in 
the international environment, Turkey experienced an unprecedented capital inflow 
during the first decade of the 2000s. “Total net capital inflows between 2003 and 
2012 amounted to $400 billion, compared with a total of $35 billion between 1980 
and 2002” (Orhangazi, 2014, p. 2). This was because Turkey offered higher interest 
rates than many other countries although these interest rates were comparatively 
lower than the Turkish interest rates of the 1990s. 
“More specifically, the Central Bank, preoccupied with price stability, kept 
interest rates artificially high in an effort to push inflation down to single 
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digits through cheap imports whilst allowing the Turkish lira to appreciate in 
real terms against major currencies. Although there has been a decline in the 
real interest rates, Turkey offered one of the highest real interest rates among 
emerging markets. For example, in mid-August 2008, the Central Bank’s real 
policy rate of 4.7 per cent (i.e. the nominal rate deflated by inflation) was the 
second highest rate among a selected group of thirty-seven emerging 
countries.” (Bakir & Onis, 2010, p. 98)  
Amongst capital inflows, the most important type for the Turkish economy was 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. The FDI inflows to Turkey showed an 
increase of eightfold (USD122 billion) between 2003 and 2012 whereas these only 
amounted to USD15 billion until 2002 (Ministry of Economy, 2013, p. 9). The 
highly significant influence of capital inflows in general, and FDI inflows in 
particular, has been on the foreign exchange rate. Since the CBRT implements a 
floating foreign exchange rate policy, the inflow of foreign capital to the country 
caused appreciation of the Turkish lira. As a result, the Turkish economy consumed 
more of relatively cheaper imported products which in turn caused an increase in the 
current account deficit (Yeldan, 2010b). 
 “During the 2000s, despite rapid growth and a significant surge in exports, 
Turkish economy could not generate jobs at the desired rate. Open 
unemployment rate which stood at 6.5% in 2000, has jumped to 10.3% in 
2002 in the aftermath of the February 2001 financial crisis. Since then the 
Turkish gross domestic product has increased by a cumulative 30% in real 
terms until the contagion of the global crisis in October, 2008. Yet, 
employment generation capacity of this rapid growth had been dismal, and 
the open unemployment rate could not be brought down below 9%. Despite 
rapid expansion of production in many sectors, civilian employment 
increased sluggishly at best, and labour participation remained below its 
levels in the 1990s.” (Yeldan, 2011, p. 9) 
Thus, this phenomenon is called “jobless growth” (Bahçe & Memiş, 2014; Ercan, 
Taymaz, & Yeldan, 2010, p. 5; Ergunes, 2012). The average unemployment rate 
between 2005 and 2015 is recorded as 9.8% (TURKSTAT). 
FDI inflows to Turkey, besides not contributing to employment increase, has 
had another feature of being concentrated on the financial sector. Between 2003 and 
2013, the financial intermediation sector holds the top place for attracting USD38.6 
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billion of FDI inflows. On the other hand, manufacturing sector had only half of the 
amount that was attracted to finance (USD21.8 billion). These sectors are followed 
by the energy, telecommunications and whole and retail trade sectors with 12.1, 11.2 
and 4.8 billion US dollars, respectively (Ministry of Economy, 2013, p. 11). The 
banking system, in particular, has been a magnet for FDI inflows during this period 
(Yorukoglu & Cufadar, 2008, p. 470). However, at the same time, Turkey has 
experienced a ‘puzzling’ phenomenon of increasing international reserves in line 
with the inflation targeting policy implemented by the Central Bank. 
“This phenomenon is puzzling because the well-celebrated ‘flexibility’ of the 
exchange rate regimes were advocated precisely with the argument that, 
under the IT framework, the CBs would gain freedom in their monetary 
policies and would no longer need to hold reserves to defend a targeted rate 
of exchange. In the absence of any officially stated exchange rate target, the 
need for holding such sums of foreign reserves at the CBs should have been 
minimal. The proponents of the IT regimes argue that the CBs need to hold 
reserves to ‘maintain price stability against possible shocks’. Yet, the 
acclaimed ‘defense of price stability’ at the expense of such large and costly 
funds that are virtually kept idle at the IT central banks’ reserves is 
questionable in an era of prolonged unemployment and slow investment 
growth, and needs to be justified more fully.” (Epstein & Yeldan, 2008) 
In more detail, international reserves are readily convertible financial assets 
that are held by central banks and used for international payments. Central banks 
hold these assets in order to “establish and maintain confidence in monetary and 
exchange rate policies, provide FX liquidity for the Treasury’s domestic and foreign 
debt services, reduce the economy’s susceptibility to endogenous and exogenous 
shocks, boost the confidence of international markets in the Turkish economy” 
(CBRT). 
“It is widely recognized that these reserves have become much more 
significant for emerging capitalisms’ financial stability since the mid-1990s 
as a signal of creditworthiness for financial capital. Since 2001 the AKP has 
increased net foreign reserves nearly fourfold, or from about $29 billion (in 
constant dollars) to over $108 billion by late 2010. … As analysts recognize, 
however, there is a ‘social cost’ tied to the current phase of financialization 
and recurrent crisis. Because Turkey is subordinate within the international 
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hierarchy of states, state agents are compelled to hold foreign reserves as a 
signal of stability and creditworthiness to globally mobile financial capital. 
Moreover, Turkish authorities must offer a higher rate of interest for Turkish 
state bonds than the rate of return earned by holding the bonds of states at the 
zenith of the hierarchy, such as US bonds. The difference between these rates 
is structural and is absorbed by the Turkish state as a fiscal loss (that is a 
socialized loss).” (Marois, 2012, p. 180) [Emphasis added]  
Another form of the socialised loss emerges from the costs of ‘sterilisation’ which is 
applied in the countries with high levels of international reserves in order to prevent 
reserve accumulation from undermining targeted inflation (Acar Balaylar, 2011). 
Sterilisation means that monetary authorities’ interventions in the foreign exchange 
markets do not induce an expansion (or contraction) in the monetary base. However, 
in countries with high domestic interest rates, sterilisation results in considerable 
costs as with the total cost of sterilisation in Turkey between 2003 and 2010 at TL12 
billion (p.32). Further, such operations prevent domestic interest rates from 
decreasing, raising the government’s borrowing costs.25  
To sum up, the Turkish economy has experienced tremendous capital 
inflows, importing capital from 2002 (Erdem & Donmez Atbasi, 2011). 
Overvaluation of the Turkish lira is associated with these capital inflows, and this 
overvaluation of the currency has had an aggravating impact on the current account 
deficit. In 2008, as with the 1994 and 2001 crises, these capital inflows switch to 
capital outflows. After 2009, foreign capital inflows mostly consisted of so-called 
hot money, i.e. short-term investments. Thus, it can be argued that one of the most 
important characteristics of the financialisation in developing/periphery countries is 
the reliance on capital inflows (Becker et al., 2010).  
 
 
                                                 
25
 Sterilisation means that the monetary authority buys or sells foreign assets in the case of an 
expansion or contraction. Thus, the monetary basis is adjusted through the opposite transaction. For 
this, CB buys foreign currency from banks, and then sells the assets in domestic currency from its 
portfolio. While selling bonds in the domestic markets, CB might prevent convergence of domestic 
interest rates to foreign interest rates, and high interest rates might induce even more capital inflows 
exacerbating the problem. Therefore, sterilisation has a financial cost which is the difference between 
the returns on international reserves and issued debt securities. If the domestic interest rates exceed 
international reserves’ returns, holding reserves would create a sort of ‘tax-effect’ so the monetary 
authority has to offer a high interest rate in order to suppress domestic demand (Acar Balaylar 2011).   
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Table 4.2 Main indicators of the Turkish economy in the post-2001 era 
Year GDP (mil 
TL) 
FDI 
(mil 
USD) 
Exports 
(mil 
USD) 
Imports 
(mil 
USD) 
GDP 
Growth 
(%) 
FDI 
Growth 
(%) 
Unemploy
ment rate 
(%) 
2002   72,519  1,082 36,059 51,553 6.2 -67.7 10.8 
2003   76,338  1,702 47,252 69,339 5.3 31.0 11 
2004   83,485  2,785 63,167 97,539 9.4 33.6 10.8 
2005   90,499 10,031 73,476 116,774 8.4 16.3 10.6 
2006   96, 738 20,185 85,534 139,576 6.9 16.4 9 
2007   101,254  22,047 107,271 170,062 4.7 25.4 9.2 
2008   101,921  19,851 132,027 201,963 0.7 23.0 10 
2009   97,003  8,585 102,142 140,928 -4.8 -22.6 13.1 
2010   105,885  9,086 113,883 185,544 9.2 11.4 11.1 
2011   115,174  16,136 134,906 240,841 8.8 18.4 9.1 
2012   117,625 13,283 152,461 236,545 2.1 13.0 8.4 
2013   122,556  12,357 151,802 251,661 4.2 -0.4 9 
2014   126,127  12,146 157,610 242,177 2.9 3.8 9.9 
 Source: (UNCTAD, 2016), (TURKSTAT, 2016), (Ministry of Development, 2015a) 
In Turkey, in relation to capital inflows, the share of financial activities in GDP has 
grown more rapidly than all other sectors. The most important implication of this 
development has been change in banking system. While the number of banks has 
decreased as a result of banking reforms, the assets and liabilities of the banking 
system have grown significantly. The growth of balance sheet items of the banking 
system has been accompanied by a functional shift from financing government debt 
to extending loans as we show in detail in the next section. 
4.3. Extensive and intensive growth of finance 
The extensive growth of finance in relation to financialisation in Turkey can be 
traced through the sudden growth of the financial sector in general and the banking 
system in particular. Indeed, while finance has extended into several aspects of 
economic and social life, the significance of the financial sector within the economy 
has shown a considerable increase in a way that indicates intensification of financial 
relations. To start with, in the era of financialisation the financial activities have 
grown rapidly and occupied a larger share within GDP.  
 107 
Figure 4.1 Sectoral shares and growth rates of financial activities in GDP (%) 
 
Source: (TURKSTAT, 2016) Gross Domestic Product in Constant Prices by Kind of 
Economic Activity, NACE Rev. 2 - at 1998 Basic Prices. The left axis is sectoral share of 
Financial and Insurance activities (FINS) and Financial Intermediation Activities (FINM). 
The right axis is growth rate of FINS and FINM.  
According to the figure 4.1, financial and insurance activities had a sectoral 
share of 7.6% and financial intermediation activities had a share of 5% of GDP in 
1998. Both these activities have increased their shares with a consistent trend and 
were recorded as, respectively 13.2% and 9.3% in 2014. As a result of this trend, the 
Turkish financial sector has reached a total asset value of TL2,357 billion by 2015 
(BAT, 2015b) from its value of TL185 billion in 2001 (BRSA, 2006). The Turkish 
financial system consists of three institutional components: banks, insurance 
companies and non-bank financial institutions, such as financial leasing companies, 
factoring companies and financing companies.
26
 Banks are the most important 
financial institutions in Turkey with an asset value of TL1,994 billion in 2015. Banks 
have increased their assets more than six times since 2004. After banks, we have 
portfolio management companies and insurance companies with their total asset 
value around TL80 billion. Real estate investment partnerships and pension 
investment funds constitute the third layer of the Turkish financial system with their 
asset value at around TL40 billion by 2014. Non-bank financial institutions have 
shown a rapid increase in the last decade with their asset value totalling TL78.7 
billion in 2014. 
                                                 
26
 Non-bank financial institutions of Turkey have recently established “The Association of Financial 
Leasing, Factoring and Financing Companies”. For further information see the link. Available at: 
http://www.fkb.org.tr/home-page Access date:10.03.2016 
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Table 4.3. Asset size of financial sector in Turkey (in billion TL) 
 2004 2010 2014 
Banks 306.4 1,007.0 1,994.1 
Portfolio Management Companies 24.5 44.9 81.8 
Insurance companies 9.8 31.0 79.0 
Real Estate investment partnerships 1.4 5.1 41 
Pension investment funds 4.2 17.8 37.7 
Financial leasing companies 6.7 15.8 32 
Factoring companies 4.1 14.5 26.5 
Financing companies 1.5 6.1 20.2 
Total 455.2 1,303.8 2,330.9 
Source: (BAT, 2015b) (BRSA, 2006) (Bedirhanoglu et al., 2013)  
The dominance of the banking sector within the total financial assets has even 
increased in the post-2001 era, while the financial assets of the Central Bank have 
decreased (Bedirhanoglu et al., 2013).  
Table 4.4 Capital market indicators, Turkey 2007-2014 
Years Corporations Traded on Borsa Istanbul Price/Earnings 
Ratio % 
Turnover 
Ratio % Number of 
traded 
corporations 
Total 
nominal 
capital Mil 
TL 
Total Market 
capitalisation 
Mil TL Mil $ 
2007 327 51,685 335,948 289,986 11.9 129.7 
2008 326 63,300 182,025 119,698 5.8 135.1 
2009 325 70,061 350,761 235,996 16.8 178.7 
2010 350 80,806 472,553 307,551 13.3 150.6 
2011 373 89,724 381,152 201,924 11.9 115.8 
2012 395 96,634 550,051 309,644 12.5 113.1 
2013 405 103,179 503,668 236,586 10.2 161.8 
2014 401 104,540 624,369 268,511 14.4 139.5 
Source: (CMB, 2014a, p.66) 
The significance of public securities has decreased while private sector securities 
have expanded within the Turkish capital markets. According to total financial assets 
data provided by the Ministry of Development (Ministry of Development, 2015a), 
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total public securities were more than ten times of private sector securities in 2001. 
However this ratio decreased to less than three by 2014.
27
 
The number of traded corporations on Borsa Istanbul increased from 327 to 
401 from 2007 to 2014. Moreover, the total nominal capital has doubled in 7 years 
and was recorded as TL104,520 million in 2014. Total market capitalisation has also 
doubled in domestic currency. However, due to the fall of the TL against the US 
dollar, market capitalisation value remained as low as 268 billion in terms of US 
dollars (by 2014).  
Figure 4.2 Market capitalisation in Turkey in billion USD and Market capitalisation/GDP (%) 
between 2002-2015 
 
Source: (CMB, 2015b) International Economic Financial Indicators December 2015. Market 
capitalisation in billion USD left axis, Market capitalisation/GDP right axis 
After the price/earnings ratio peaked in 2009 at 16.85, it has decreased to 10.2 in 
2013 and has shown a recent recovery of 4.2% in one year (14.4% in 2014). Finally, 
the turnover ratio of the Turkish capital market has not shown a considerable 
development as it was 129.7% in 2007 and is recorded as 139.5% in 2014. 
Table 4.5 (below) shows the comparison of the financial sector in Turkey 
with developing countries and World averages. Accordingly, the ratio of financial 
sector/GDP in Turkey was recorded as (112%) which exceeded the developing 
countries’ average (110%) in 2013. However, capital markets’ ratio over GDP is as 
low as 58% whereas the world capital markets have a ratio of 217%. Again in terms 
of stocks, Turkey falls behind the developing countries’ average with 32% as 
                                                 
27
 2001: 122.930.009 Public sector securities vs. 10.517.096 private sector securities. 2014: 
414.648.522 Public sector securities vs. 153.020.242 Private sector securities (Ministry of 
Development, 2015, p. 125). 
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opposed to 39% in 2013. Finally, the percentage of bills of exchange and bonds 
within GDP is below other developing countries.  
Table 4.5 Financial sector/GDP (%) in Turkey, Developing countries and World in 2013 
 World Developing countries Turkey 
Bank Assets 161 110 112 
Capital Markets 217 78 58 
Stocks 84 39 32 
Bill of exchange/Bonds 134 39 26 
Total 379 188 170 
Source: (BAT, 2015b, p. 27) 
Another issue on capital markets is the increasing integration of foreign capital in 
relation with the upward trend in international capital inflows to Turkey in the post-
2001 era. In a nutshell, international capital flows are classified under three titles: 
direct investments, portfolio investments and others (definitions by both IMF and 
Turkish Central Bank). Foreign direct investments stand for financial activities such 
as buying a firm, providing initial capital for a new firm and capital increase for an 
existing firm. On the other hand, portfolio investments stand for capital owners to 
invest in foreign capital markets with the purpose of gaining interest or dividend 
yield alongside other financial returns on money market instruments and derivatives. 
Portfolio investments mostly consist of liquid instruments; thus they are referred to 
as ‘hot money’ which might leave the country in an unfavourable situation. Finally, 
‘others’ include all the capital flows except direct and portfolio investments as well 
as reserves. The latter two, portfolio investments and others, mostly have a financial 
character, thus they are called financial capital flows. On the other hand, foreign 
direct investments are more likely to have non-financial character for investing in 
physical capital. As financial capital inflows are mostly short-term, they are 
associated with potential instability in the country. In the case of FDIs, however, the 
crucial point is whether or not these capital inflows increase long-term investments 
or simply take over an existing company without any contribution to development as 
such. In Turkey, the significance of the short-term speculative, i.e. hot money, capital 
inflows has always been higher than long-term investments. These capital inflows do 
not only have speculative character but also they are variable. This the liquidity 
character carried by the hot money increases Turkish economy’s vulnerability to 
crises (İpek & Karahan, 2013).  
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Figure 4.3 Turkish financial account between 2002 and 2015 in millions USD 
 
Source: IMF
28
  
 As can be seen from the figure above, the Turkish financial account has 
attracted tremendous financial inflows. Amongst them, the significance of ‘other’ 
investments has been higher than direct and portfolio investments. In effect, a closer 
look at the data shows two diverse trends in relation with the balance between 
portfolio and direct investments. The first trend is seen between 2003 and 2009 when 
direct investments are at considerable levels and portfolio investments are 
comparatively low. On the other hand, the trend between 2009 and 2014 shows that 
direct investments lagged far behind portfolio investments. Thus, it can be argued 
that the significance of speculative activities has increased with the unfavourable 
environment for direct investments. As mentioned previously, these direct inflows 
mostly penetrated the Turkish markets through privatisations and restructuring of 
substantial sectors, such as banking. Moreover, with the consistent weight of other 
investments it can be interpreted that the foreign capital inflows to Turkey have 
                                                 
28
 Available at: 
http://data.imf.org/PlatformService.axd/GetBin?mon=NCMHOCBIIMDNEOAECNJGPFLHMMHH
BNFEMJAIHPMOLCDGNHMC!M!S!PFFOOIBJKIMDNEOAEKLPFDJHLFBPBPENEBKJOLON
NFACADBPC!Bin!1&fileName=Balance_of_Payments_and_Internation.xlsx&attach=1 Access date: 
01.11.2016 
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mostly had financial character as other investments mostly consist of short-term 
liquid investment instruments.  
 This inflow has its reflection in the steady increase in significance of foreign 
capital in the Turkish capital market. As shown in the figure below, the share of 
foreign investors according to BIST market capitalisation has increased significantly 
since 2004. 
Figure 4.4 Share of foreign investors according to total market capitalisation of BIST btw 2002-
2015 
 
 
Source: (CMB, 2015a).  
Note: Right axis: share of domestic and foreign investors in %. Left axis: total market 
capitalisation in million TL and $. 
This is important because, as shown below, within total issue investors, almost 99% 
of the Turkish capital market investors is domestic. In other words, despite their 
small numbers of foreign investors, foreign investors have higher concealment 
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balance
29
 shares within total market capitalisation compared to the domestic 
investors’ shares.  
Figure 4.5 Number of investors in BIST and investors’ concealment balance, foreign versus 
domestic, 2003- 2015 
 
Source: (CMB, 2015a)  
Note: Right axis % as of total concealment balance. Left axis number of issue investor. 
In this sense, it can be argued that Turkey has mainly developed its financial system 
on the basis of banks which constitute the only element through which Turkey 
catches up with other developing countries. Nevertheless, the Turkish capital markets 
have shown qualitative transformations besides considerable quantitative 
development. The transformation of the Turkish financial system in general has 
stemmed from innovation through new instruments, such as asset-backed securities, 
derivatives, bank bills and Islamic-referenced ‘sukuk’ instruments which we do not 
explain here. However, all of these are investigated in detail in the last chapter where 
we discuss pension funds’ impact on intensification of financial relations through 
their influence on capital markets in Turkey. Therefore, we continue here by 
focusing on banks which constitute the main component of financial relations in 
Turkey.   
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 Concealment balance stands for the stock transactions that are kept safe by the custody institution, 
i.e. Takasbank. 
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4.3.1. Banks 
By December 2015, the Turkish banking sector consisted of 47 banks comprising 34 
deposit banks, 13 development and investment banks. There were also five 
participation banks.
30
 Three of the deposit banks are owned by the state while nine 
are private with foreign ownership of 21 deposit banks. The total number of branches 
of deposit and development and investment banks was 11,193 while their employees’ 
number is 201,205 at the end of 2015 (BAT, 2015c). As can be seen from the table 
below, the 2000s have witnessed a clear turning point within the development of the 
banking system. Since 1980, the total number of banks increased steadily until 2000 
when it reached 79. As mentioned before, this increase was due to lucrative profits 
made by banks through financing public debt. Moreover, the loose financial 
regulations allowed big conglomerates to establish their own banks in order to 
finance their non-financial activities while taking advantage of access to capital 
(Gultekin Karakas, 2009). After the intense banking sector restructuring reforms, the 
number of banks decreased significantly. On the other hand, the number of foreign 
banks has increased across the banking system in the post-2001 era. This has been 
achieved through the integration of foreign capital into the Turkish banking system 
through mergers and acquisitions of foreign banks with the SDIF banks (the banks 
which were taken over by the state due to insolvency).  
Table 4.6 Development of the Turkish banking system 1980-2015 
  1980 1990 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Deposit banks 40 56 61 34 32 34 
Based on public 
capital 
12 8 4 3 3 3 
Based on private 
capital 
24 25 28 17 11 9 
Based on foreign 
capital 
4 23 18 13 17 21 
Development and 
Investment banks 
3 10 18 13 13 13 
Participation banks 0 0 0 4 4 5 
Total 43 66 79 51 49 52 
(BAT, 2014a, 2015a) 
The consolidation of the banking system in Turkey has increased after the 
reforms, as the biggest five banks’ share in total assets, deposits and loans is, 
respectively, 86%, 90% and 85% in 2014 (BAT, 2015a). After the 2008 crisis, the 
                                                 
30
 Data on participation banks are not included here, but will be given in detail in the following pages. 
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Turkish banking system continued to increase the number of branches despite a 
temporary slowdown during 2008-9. However, we should note that the job creation 
of the sector falls behind the growth of the banking system. Accordingly, the 
financial sector’s share within total employment has decreased since 2005 while, as 
shown earlier, its share within GDP has increased (Karakas, 2015).  
Another interesting point to note about banking sector’s development during 
the financialised era is the significant presence of state-owned banks in Turkey. As 
can be seen from the table below, which consists of biggest banks with different 
capital structures, we see that the state-owned Ziraat, Halk and Vakif banks own 
31% of the total assets of the banking sector. Moreover, the Ziraat Bank, which is the 
oldest bank (founded in 1863 to support agricultural sector (Marois & Güngen, 
2016), has the second largest assets within the sector. IsBank, that is the leading 
actor of the sector, has also an interesting shareholder structure that consists of 28% 
Ataturk Shares that are controlled by the Republican People’s Party (also 40.15% 
shares of this bank is owned by the bank’s employees’ occupational pension scheme-
to be discussed further in the sixth chapter).  
Table 4.7 Assets of the banking sector banks by capital structure Million TL 2016 June 
Banks Total Assets 
Banking Sector 2,374,699 
        Deposit Banks 2,343,255 
  State Owned Deposit Banks 736,888 
              T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. 331,879 
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. 204,814 
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O.            200,195 
   Private Banks 983,872 
Akbank T.A.Ş. 265,536 
Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş. 341,821 
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 245,820 
   Foreign Banks 622,496 
Denizbank A.Ş. 117,864 
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 287,248 
Development and Investment Banks 31,444 
Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 22,549 
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Source: BAT 
31
 
There are two issues to discuss regarding state-owned banks: one is to explain how 
they survived the restructuring process without being privatised; and the other is to 
shed light on their role in financialisation process as the latter’s answer is strongly 
related to the former’s. 
During the post-2001 era, state-owned deposit banks and development and 
investment banks based on public capital have been restructured alongside other 
measures regulating the banking sector as a whole. However, these banks have not 
been privatised in bulk despite initial plans. This can be analysed in the context of 
the fact that public banks are often attributed progressive roles regarding emerging 
countries’ economies such as counter-cyclical loaning activities (as opposed to 
private banks which contract their loanable capital at the bust times in a way which 
exacerbates crises’ impacts) and providing sources for developmental goals (Marois 
and Gungen 2016). Indeed, the history of public banks in Turkey signifies their key 
functions in capitalist development.
32
 Nevertheless, the dominance of state within the 
banking sector has been diminished gradually at the neoliberal period of the 1990s 
through privatisation in small-scale and selling of public share in private banks. 
However, at the same time, state was instrumentalising public banks to cover fiscal 
deficits through duty losses (as mentioned at the section 4.1). Hence, it was not easy 
for authorities to privatise these huge public institutions for several reasons: 
“First, it took time for the public banks to recover from the 2001 crisis and to 
establish a more marketable operational structure for privatization... Second, 
there remains ongoing and unresolved intra-state debate on the functional 
roles of the state banks... Third, the technical aspects of bank privatization 
were not easily resolved. The large size of the public banks militates against 
one-off block sales as the purchaser needs to be larger than the public banks 
…There are also questions for the competition authority, as any buyer of a 
public bank would become an immediate market marker… Fourth, the public 
                                                 
31
 Available at: 
https://www.tbb.org.tr/Content/Upload/istatistikiraporlar/tumu/1050/Bankasecilmis_06-16-
konsolide.zip Access date: 01.11.2016 
32
 Ziraat Bank that is older than the republic was founded to finance the farmers/agricultural sector 
while Sümerbank targeted the industrial sector alongside many ‘Halk banks’ (People’s banks) for 
addressing local necessities. In addition to state-owned deposit banks, there have been investment and 
development banks with state capital such as Iller banks for municipalities which provided sources for 
financing infrastructure operations. 
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banks are becoming instrumental for emerging AKP plans to expand Islamic 
financial alternatives (dubbed ‘participation’ banks) in Turkey since the 
global financial crisis. For example, the AKP founded the first publicly 
owned participation bank as a subsidiary of Ziraat in 2015. Vakifbank and 
Halkbank are expected to follow suit in 2016. Fifth, empirical evidence also 
suggests that the public banks in Turkey may issue loans for political reasons, 
notably during election cycles, while at the same time playing an important 
role in mitigating economic shocks… (Marois and Gungen 2016, 
p.14)[Emphases added] 
Thus, state-owned banks have remained as strong banking sector players even after 
the restructuring process. While acting so, public banks have not been divorced from 
the rest of the financialised banking system. As can be seen from the table below, 
state-owned deposit banks issued one-third of total consumer loans. Moreover, 
possibly due to their state’s long history regarding housing loans (Erol and Patek 
2005), public banks exceeded both private and foreign capital banks in housing 
loans, in particular Ziraat Bank. While foreign banks pioneer the vehicle loans, 
private banks have become the leader in terms of general purpose loans.  
Figure 4.6 Consumer loans extended by banks with different capital structure, Million TL, June 
2016 
 
Source: BAT
33
  
In more detail, amongst public banks Ziraat Bank pioneers individual lending 
while Vakifbank is the prominent bank in terms of commercial lending. It might be 
expected that public banks would focus on commercial lending (lending to 
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Available at: 
https://www.tbb.org.tr/Content/Upload/istatistikiraporlar/tumu/1050/Bankasecilmis_06-16-
konsolide.zip Acess date: 011.11.2016. 
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corporates rather than individuals) rather than household lending. However, this is 
not the case as seen when comparing the two types of loans, with the private banks 
double the levels of public banks’ commercial loans. 
Figure 4.7 Commercial Loans, Million TL, June 2016 
 
Source: BAT 
This is not to say that public banks are financialised in exactly the same way as 
private and foreign banks. For instance, although state-owned deposit banks have 
been engaged with household lending, they do not show a presence in terms of 
individual credit card issuance. 
Figure 4.8 Individual Credit Cards, Million TL, June 2016 
 
Source: BAT 
 To sum up, due to country-specific features of the financial system, which 
comprises public banks as major actors of the banking system, the financialisation 
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process has affected banks with different capital structures in common ways by 
engaging with individual lending more than commercial lending. On the other hand, 
there have been certain differences between state-owned banks which fall behind the 
sector in terms of issuing individual credit cards or integrating with non-conventional 
banking activities such as derivative transactions.
34
 This peculiarity of state-owned 
banks can be explained by their dual function in terms of both providing tools for 
government to implement neoliberal transformation policies and providing 
mechanisms to mitigate the negative affects of these transformations through 
developmental state banking roles (Marois and Gungen, 2016). 
Another important development within the Turkish financial sector is the 
recent flourishing of Islamic banking. The participation banks are the frontiers of the 
Islamic-referenced banking activities. By 2014, there were four participation banks 
with 1001 domestic branches and 5.5% of total assets in the banking sector. These 
banks have been growing faster than the rest of the banking sector (Karakas, 2015). 
“The emergence of these actors went hand in hand with the transformation of 
political Islam during this period, where politicians vehemently recruited 
pious businessmen into their support base via attractive incentives and 
investment benefit schemes. More recently, the AKP government – with 
strong roots in political Islam – incentivized the development of alternative 
banking instruments to facilitate capital accumulation while lowering 
associated risks. Especially after the 2008 crisis, the government closely 
works with major Islamic banks and assists them to attract domestic and 
international investors to maximize their profits. Proponents of Islamic 
banking suggest that the faith-based codes (Shari’a) on economic transactions 
such as mutual risk sharing, the ban on interest and contractual ambiguity 
serve as key barriers to protect ordinary individuals from the detrimental 
effects of liberal market capitalism.” (Apaydin, 2015, p. 2).  
In a nutshell, the roots of faith-based finance in Turkey go back to the 1960s. In the 
1980s, with the neoliberal era which was preceded by the military coup, the right-
wing government initiated the Islamic banking legislation with the expectation of 
                                                 
34
 State-owned banks integrate with derivate financial operations much less than other deposit banks. 
This is evident as state-owned banks’ income from derivative financial operations is TL4,268 million 
whereas private and foreign banks have gained TL21,500 and TL16,135 million, respectively, by June 
2016 (BAT 2016). 
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attracting Gulf capital. The first Islamic banks, which were called finance houses, 
were established as joint ventures with Middle Eastern entrepreneurs with the 
motivation of channelling petrodollars into international finance through selling them 
as credits of their banks at the end of 1980s. Then, in the following years, Islamic 
banks and faith-based capital increased their significance in relation with the rise of 
political-Islam (Apaydin, 2015).  
On the basis of this development, participation banking can be argued to be a 
peculiarity of the financialisation in Turkey. Participation banking consists of 
instruments called sukuk which commonly refer to the Islamic equivalent of bonds. 
The main difference between bonds and sukuk is that the former provides ownership 
of a debt whereas the latter gives a share of an asset to the investor (Islamic 
Development Bank).
35
 The instruments based on ‘sukuk’ are not only used in the 
banking system, but also their influence extends to capital markets, more specifically 
pension funds’ investment (as shown in the sixth chapter in detail).   
“In Muslim and non-Muslim countries, various organizations issue Sharī’ah-
compliant participation certificates or securities, frequently referred to as 
Sukūk (plural of Sakk). According to the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB), Sukūk are defined as certificates with each sakk representing a 
proportional undivided ownership right in tangible assets or a pool of 
predominantly tangible assets, or a business venture (such as Mudārabah). 
These assets, which must be clearly identifiable, may be related to a specific 
project or investment activity in accordance with Sharī’ah rules and 
principles. Issuance of Sukūk, including the utilization of funds raised 
through such issuance, should not involve any elements of interest (Riba), 
excessive uncertainty (Gharar), or activities prohibited by Sharī’ah.” (IMF, 
BIS, & European Central Bank, 2015, p. 117)  
In this sense, participation banks collect savings and invest in industrial or 
commercial activities. Then, the bank shares the profit or loss with the owners of the 
savings. The interest-free principle refers to 1) not promising a pre-determined 
return; 2) not loaning in cash; but buying in once and selling in instalments. These 
                                                 
35
 Islamic development bank. Access date: 10.03.2016 Available at:  
http://thatswhy.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/thatswhy/en/sukuk/wh
at-is-sukuk.html  
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participation deposit accounts can be in TL as well as USD and Euro.
36
 The rapid 
growth of interest-free deposit accounts in Turkey in the last ten years can be seen in 
the figure below. 
Figure 4.9 Breakdown of participation accounts in participation banks between 2003-2014 (in 
Millions) 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey. Available at: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/TCMB+TR/TCMB+TR/Main+Menu/Istatistikler/
Bankacilik+Verileri/Katilim+Bankalarindaki+Katilim+Fonlari Access date 21.05.2015 
Note: Since the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency changed the deposit 
classification in 2011, the precious metals, which used to be classified under the ‘other’ 
label, are gathered under the relevant label. The decrease in the ‘other’ deposits is due to this 
change.  
This is why the following quotation from Ernest Young’s ‘World Participation 
Banking Report’ points at the need for more reforms in this ‘big prize’ country. 
                                                 
36
 This definition is based on a booklet published by the Albarakaturk Participation bank which is the 
first participation bank established in Turkey. Available at: 
http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0C
CsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.albarakaturk.com.tr%2Fimages%2FPartDocuments%2FKatili
m_Bankaciligi_Sistemi_Nedir_.pdf&ei=w-
BcVbP_Acm17ga6tYD4Dg&usg=AFQjCNFu7GlAz_aKXrrLdl1OJRo7rjGRSA&sig2=CtiFBTopSG
aHSOe36u_oUQ&bvm=bv.93756505,d.ZGU Access date: 21.05.2015 
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“Given the size of its economy, Turkey is the big prize for the global 
Participation banking. However, meaningful growth in its national market 
share requires clarity in the regulatory requirement for Participation banking 
in Turkey. Regulatory reforms will encourage new market entrants, including 
some who might use technology-based market entry strategies, thereby 
enhancing the sophistication in the Turkish financial sector as a whole.” 
(Ernest Young, 2016, p. 58)  
The rest of the banking system has experienced a functional shift in the post-
2001 era since the share of government debt securities has decreased within the 
balance sheet. As mentioned before, the twin programme, which created a primary 
surplus of 5 per cent of GDP and fiscal measures taken after the crisis, has decreased 
the budget deficits with a reduction in public sector indebtedness. Therefore, public 
sector borrowing requirement has declined in a way that led banks to focus on credit 
activities while decreasing the share of securities in total assets (Bakir & Onis, 
2010).  
Figure 4.10 Breakdown of the assets of the banking sector in the post-2001 era (%) 
 
Source: (BAT, 2015a)  
 The decrease in government debt securities’ transactions has had a 
significant impact on the profitability level of the banking system because financing 
public debt was lucrative during the 1990s. The interest income from loans was 
TL7.8 million as opposed to interest income from securities which was TL5.1million 
in 1999. In other words, banks were making almost similar amounts of profits from 
securities transactions and extending loans. These rates have even intensified in 2002 
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when securities’ returns were 2.5 times more profitable than interest income from 
loans. However, this trend changed until 2006 when loans became more profitable 
than securities. By 2014, the banking system’s interest income from loans was 
recorded as TL104.7 million whereas interest income from securities was only 
TL26.4 million (BAT, 2015a). 
Figure 4.11 Profitability of the banking system ROE, ROC, ROA 
 
Source: (BAT, 2015a) Left axis: ROE, ROC; Right axis: ROA 
In other words, banks started to run ‘traditional’ banking operations which 
decreased their profitability relatively. At the same time, in order to increase the 
sources for loans, banks have engaged in derivative transactions. In 2015, the 
banking sector bought TL793 billion in derivatives and sold TL791 billions. 
However, this should not deceive us about the motivation involved: banks do not 
engage in derivative activities in order to make profits. This is clear from income 
statements of the banks which show that banks’ gained TL164 million interest-
income whereas non-interest activities caused banks to lose TL28 billion (BRSA, 
2015). Then, why do they buy and sell derivatives? According to Aybar and Dogru 
(Aybar & Dogru, 2013), the Turkish banks run derivative transactions in order to 
create cheap currency through currency swaps. Indeed, when we check the 
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components of the derivative transactions, we see that swaps constitute 45% of the 
total derivate transactions (BAT, 2015a). In other words, the Turkish banks 
increasingly appeal to derivative transactions in order to exchange foreign exchange 
deposits for cheap domestic currency. Within the off-balance-sheet items of the 
banking sector at the end of 2015, outstanding obligations reached the level of 
TL2.082 billion whereas 1.584 of this consisted of financial derivatives. Derivatives 
within the banking system as off-balance sheet items have grown 29.4% since the 
previous year. 
Table 4.8 Off-balance sheet items of the banking sector in Turkey 2006-2014 (in Thousands) 
 Guarantees and 
Warranties 
Commitments Derivative Financial 
Instruments 
2006 77,019,710 81,493,635 106,125,271 
2007 83,958,432 125,663,247 157,916,586 
2008 105,976,500 149,749,550 192,575,682 
2009 114,382,093 187,299,889 246,194,648 
2010 142,070,342 361,507,973 384,521,033 
2011 192,376,434 840,570,630 565,823,122 
2012 214,395,960          1,066,803,109 609,229,676 
2013 300,883,846 525,801,756 1,066,840,798 
2014 350,127,644 481,423,733 1,207,129,674 
Source: (BAT, 2015a)  
Finally, when we look at the most recent picture, we see that the Turkish 
banking sector’s assets over GDP ratio was 1.14 by the end of 2014 (BRSA, 2015). 
This share is close to the level of developing countries (BAT, 2015a). 
Table 4.9 Balance sheet of the banking sector in Turkey (as of 31.12.2015 billion TL) 
Assets Liabilities  
Cash 151 Deposits 1,245 
Required reserves 206 Loans to other banks 361 
Non-performing loans 48 Issued securities 98 
Securities 330 Repo  157 
Loans 1,485 Equity  262 
Other assets 186 Other liabilities 234 
Total assets  2,357 Total liabilities 2,357 
(BRSA, 2015, p. 2)  
To sum up, the banking system has been restructured as the main component 
of the financial sector in a way that fits with main line of the reform process of the 
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Turkish economy. The changing distribution of balance sheet items from government 
debt securities to loans signify an alteration in the relations between banks and state, 
the non-financial sector and households. However, this is not a one-way relation 
where non-financial sector and households remain passive. Rather, these parties have 
also repositioned themselves according to the changing financial environment. In this 
regard, we trace the presence of the phenomenon that is known as financialisation of 
the non-financial sector. 
4.3.2. Non-financial sector 
Financialisation of the non-financial sector can be understood in terms of financial 
institutions’ changing attitude towards non-financial firms as well as non-financial 
firm’s increasing involvement with financial activities. To start with, the most 
significant change within the financial relations of the non-financial sector in Turkey 
in the post-2001 era has been the increasing external debt of the private sector. As 
mentioned before, in the 1990s, the majority of external debt was with the public 
sector. However, with the shift in economic policies, public sector debt decreased 
and the debt burden shifted to the private sector (Ergunes, 2012). As mentioned 
before, during the 1990s, the average public sector borrowing requirement’s share to 
GDP was recorded as 6.9%. However, in the 2000s, this average decreased to 2.9% 
between 2000 and 2013 (Ministry of Development, 2015a). Thus, public sector 
indebtedness has decreased significantly while private sector has become 
increasingly indebted. 
Figure 4.12 External debt of the private sector in Turkey (in million USD) 
 
Source: (Ministry of Development, 2016c) Left axis Banks and Non-banking sector, Right 
axis: Financial and Non-financial sector. 
The graph above tells us a lot about the characteristic of the private sector 
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indebtedness between financial and non-financial sectors. Until 2013, non-financial 
sector borrowed the majority of the foreign loans with a peak in 2008 of USD90 
billion. The financial sector’s debt amounted USD50 billion by then. However, the 
financial sector has accelerated borrowing from outside since 2010 and exceeded the 
non-financial sector debt with USD100 billion in the third quarter of 2015. In other 
words, according to the most recent data, the financial sector in Turkey has become 
more indebted than the non-financial sector. Moreover, when we look at the 
breakdown of financial sector debt, we see that banks have always constituted the 
majority of external debt but the difference between banks and non-banking 
institutions has increased since 2010. By the third quarter of 2015, banks were 
responsible for USD80 billion of the total external debt of the financial sector. This 
is to say that, banks have enjoyed the available external debt to finance the loans that 
they have extended. 
In order to understand the position of the non-financial sector, on the other 
hand, we need to look at sectoral balance sheets presented by the Central Bank. 
According to the balance sheet of the both manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
real sector firms, the short-term liabilities have been high with an average of 40% of 
their total liabilities since 2001. The rest of the liabilities are again around 40% 
equity and only 20% long-term liabilities. What is more interesting here is the 
changing dominance of financial liabilities as opposed to bank loans. There is a trend 
of financial liabilities’ increasing weight within total liabilities. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the Turkish private sector, while concentrating increasingly on foreign 
markets, has increased its borrowings from non-bank resources (CBRT, 2016). This 
data do not tell us which real sector firms mostly engage with financial operations 
and for what purposes the real sector firms use these loans. Therefore, we need a 
closer investigation of the real sector in Turkey. In this regard, we can start from 
differentiating between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors of the real 
economy in Turkey.  
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Table 4.10 Turkish real sector liabilities (million TL) 
 
(CBRT, 2016) 
The manufacturing sector in Turkey mostly consists of large-scale companies 
with more than 500 employees (58.2% of the manufacturing sector). The share of 
mid-scale entities is 38.7% whereas only 3% of all 3803 companies in manufacturing 
sector are small in scale.
37
 This indicates that the manufacturing sector is mainly 
comprised of big corporations with the majority of the manufacturing sector formed 
as joint stock companies (2259) while the number of limited companies is 1535 and 
only 1 holding company performs in this sector (CBRT, 2016).  
Table 4.11 Loans of the manufacturing firms according to currency and duration (In Millions 
TL by the end of 2014) 
 Short term Long term Total 
Cash loans 49,709 74,265 123,975 
Domestic Currency 26,321 21,277 47,599 
Foreign Currency 23,387 52,988 76,375 
Non-cash loans 32,709 20,537 53,246 
Domestic Currency 10,197 4,828 15,025 
Foreign Currency 22,512 15,709 38,221 
Total 85,086 97,801 182,887 
(CBRT, 2016) 
The liabilities of the manufacturing sector at the end of 2014 gives a picture of its 
borrowing structure. As can be seen from the table above, the dominance of the 
foreign currency loans in total cash loans is clear with their value of 76 million out of 
                                                 
37
 The criteria for the SMEs according to employee number are as follow: less than 10 employees 
refer to micro firms, those have between 11 and 50 employees are small-firms and up to 250 
employees are named as mid-scale. For more detail, see the link for the definition of the SMEs in 
Turkish. Available at: http://www.kobi.org.tr/index.php/tanimi/layout Access date: 10.03.2016. 
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123 billion Turkish Lira. Moreover, the cash loans used by the manufacturing sector 
in 2014 mostly consist of long-term loans in foreign currency. In terms of short-term 
cash loans, domestic and foreign currencies have similar weights. However, in long-
term cash loans, foreign currency is 2.5 times more than domestic. In non-cash loans 
of the sector, the foreign currency has an absolute weight in both long- and short-
term borrowings (CBRT, 2016). These data indicate that when it comes to cash 
borrowings for the short run, domestic or foreign currency does not make a 
difference for the manufacturing firms in Turkey. However, for the long-term cash 
borrowings, foreign currency is the first choice. On the other hand, for non-cash 
loans, which are guarantee letters from banks, foreign banks are mostly chosen for 
the short term. 
To recap, the trend in terms of non-financial corporations’ relation to 
financial activities has several features: first, non-financial companies took 
advantage of the strong Turkish Lira and low interest rates in the international 
markets and started to borrow from foreign sources which can be observed in the 
increasing external debt of the private sector. Second, the non-financial sector’s loan 
maturity date was significantly short as is evident in the weight of short-term loans 
within total liabilities. Finally, the Turkish real sector firms became engaged with 
foreign banks in particular for the purpose of access to non-cash loans.  
Now the question is what was the impact of this development on production 
levels in Turkey? There are two opposing views on this issue. One is comparatively 
optimistic and claims that the Turkish manufacturing companies have used external 
funds to invest in fixed capital investment. This is evident, accordingly, in the rising 
fixed capital formation and increasing labour productivity due to application of 
higher technologies. In this regard, Ergunes’ (Ergunes, 2012) claim is that industrial 
production in Turkey has shifted more from consumer goods to intermediate goods 
with potential for a higher level of productivity. However, when we check the data 
on different capacity utilisation rates within the main industry groupings from the 
table below, we do not see clear evidence for rising capacity within intermediate and 
investment goods. This is not to deny that Turkey has moved to a higher level of 
development within industrial technology and this might be associated with the 
lucrative profits form financial activities of the 1990s in particular.  
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Table 4.12 Capacity utilisation rates within the Turkish industry by main industry groupings 
(weighted average %) 
 Total 
Industry 
Durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Non-durable 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Goods 
Intermediate 
Goods 
Investment 
Goods 
2007 80.2 73.9 74.6 74.4 81.2 82.3 
2008 76.7 67.9 72.7 71.8 77.1 79.6 
2009 65.2 66.1 68.7 68.2 67.7 57.6 
2010 72.6 70.7 71.9 71.7 75.9 68.8 
2011 75.4 74.5 72.1 72.5 77.7 74.9 
2012 74.2 73.6 72.9 73 76.1 72.3 
2013 74.6 72.4 72.9 72.8 76.3 74.3 
2014 74.4 72.2 73.1 72.9 76.3 72.7 
2015 74.7 72.6 72.1 72.2 75.8 75.7 
Source: (Ministry of Development, 2016b)  
Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that a similar effect of the access to external funds 
has been evident in the era of financialisation.  
The other view argues that the Turkish manufacturing sector has mostly used 
these funds to hedge against fluctuations, volatility and instability of the economy. 
Therefore, the fixed capital investments have not shown significant increase despite 
increasing availability and accessibility of external funds. According to Demir 
(Demir, 2009c, 2009a, 2009b) high real interest rates and volatility originating from 
capital flows pushes the Turkish non-financial firms to increase the share of liquid 
assets within their portfolios at the expense of fixed capital investments which 
decrease in proportion. This shift can be interpreted as a move away from 
industrialisation while the share of manufacturing value added in GDP kept 
decreasing in the 2000s as well as fixed capital formation (Akkemik & Ozen, 2014; 
Demir, 2009c).
38
  
                                                 
38
 Demir (2009a) investigates firm profitability for publicly traded manufacturing firms in Turkey 
between 1993 and 2003 in order to reveal the reasons firm engage in financial activities. He draws the 
conclusion that increasing availability and accessibility of investment opportunities in financial 
markets help real sector firm accrue high profits. In the context of a developing country, Turkey, 
where uncertainty and volatility of capital flows have negative impact on firms’ profitability, 
manufacturing firms have preferred to increase the share of financial investments in total assets in 
order to sustain their profit margins. In particular during the 1990s, large financial gains were present 
due to government debt financing policy (as mentioned in the previous section). Therefore, although 
with a decrease in the 2000s, the share of financial returns in the form of interest derived from 
government debt securities, have been significant within the balance sheets of manufacturing firms. 
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Indeed, when we check the fixed capital investment data, we see that despite 
the decrease in total savings, fixed investment has not shown a considerable increase. 
As clear from the figure 4.13, the share of fixed investment within GDP has 
decreased compared to the percentage in 1998. Even the peak point of the 2000s 
(22.6% in 2006) is lower then the level in 1998 (23.1%). Domestic savings’ share 
within GDP has decreased by four points since 1998 and is recorded as 20.5% in 
2014. 
Figure 4.13 Savings and investments in Turkey since 1998 (% of GDP) 
Source: (Ministry of Development, 2016a)  
When we look closer at more recent data (figure 4.14), we see that the fixed capital 
investment has shown some improvement since 2009 but the share of private sector 
within total fixed investments has been extremely volatile. The dramatic drops in 
2009 and 2013 can be associated with cyclical circumstances while a sudden rise is 
recorded in 2011. Therefore, it can be argued that the private sector in Turkey invests 
in fixed capital on the basis of the economic circumstances, rather than according to 
the source of the funds. 
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Figure 4.14 Shares of public and private sectors within gross fixed capital investments (million 
TL and %) 
 
Source: (Ministry of Development, 2016a) Left axis: Private and Public sectors’ gross fixed 
investments in million TL. Right axis: Percentage of private sector in gross fixed 
investments. 
The evidence provided and the studies discussed mostly concentrate on big 
corporations in the country. However, it is crystal clear that the majority of the real 
sector in Turkey, not least the non-manufacturing firms, is comprised of small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). This is an important point to note because the SMEs 
have a significantly different relation with banks as well as foreign funds. As data on 
these companies are not readily available, let us look at them from the banks’ side in 
order to understand financial relations between them and non-manufacturing SMEs.  
Loans are classified in the Turkish banking sector under three main titles: 
corporate/commercial loans; loans to small and medium Enterprises (SMEs); and 
consumer loans. The first type of loans is given to big corporate firms for 
commercial purposes. The second type of loans is divided into three subsections, 
respectively, micro, small and medium enterprises, whereas the consumer loans are 
given to individuals for consumption purposes. As can be seen from the figure below, 
commercial loans have a dominant share within total loans of the banking system.  
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Figure 4.15 Breakdown of bank loans 2010-2015 (%) 
 
Source: (BRSA, 2015) 
The total amount of credit given in 2015 is TL1,485 billion and TL711 billion 
is extended as commercial credit while the amount of consumer and SME loans are, 
respectively, 385 and 389 billion Turkish Liras (BRSA, 2015). Accordingly, 
commercial loans have increased their share within the total outstanding bank loans 
since 2012 reaching 48% by 2015. Interestingly, over the same period, the share of 
consumer loans has decreased. This signifies that banks have concentrated on 
commercial loans while relatively decreasing consumer loans since 2012. By 2015, 
the shares of loans to SMEs and consumer loans are the same (each 26%). However, 
even with the fluctuations in the shares of commercial loans and consumer loans, the 
share of SMEs has been stable within total bank loans. Middle-scale firms obtained 
TL157 billion, small firms had TL133 billion and micro scale firms only had TL99 
billion of total bank loans given to SMEs. This is important to note because in 
Turkey the SME sector constitutes 99.9% of all enterprises, 76% of employment, 
53% of wage and salary payments, 53.3% of added value, and 53.7% of gross 
investment in material goods (TURKSTAT).
39
 This means that the SME sector has a 
different financing method than bank loans, however much the government has tried 
to increase their involvement. Ozlu and Yalcin (2010) explain that small firms 
mainly rely on trade credit rather than bank loans.
40
 Trade credit refers to the credit 
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 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15881  
40
 “Contrary to many other countries, trade credits constitute a large portion of corporate sector’s 
external finance in Turkey, which should have implications for monetary policymaking. In general, 
small firms are more likely to rely on trade credits especially during the recessions while large firms 
tend to use more bank loans. In other words, large firms are financially less constrained and have 
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relations across suppliers and they are mostly used during tight periods. Moreover, 
according to Karakas (2015), an important reason for banks to choose individuals 
rather than firms for lending is that it is easier for banks to identify/detect 
individuals’ financial conditions. On the other hand, firms require a detailed 
investigation and calculation period before granting loans. In this regard, SMEs are 
costly for banks in taking a long time to process loans. For this reason, some of the 
small firm owners apply for individual loans rather than commercial loans even 
though they need and use the credit for their business (Karakas, 2015). 
Moreover, not all non-manufacturing sector’s branches have similar relations 
with banks. Rather, there are some economic activities which have benefited from 
the expansion of bank loans more than the others. For instance, the construction 
sector is one of the lucky ones with a share of 7.54% of bank loans given to this 
sector in 2015. The construction sector has been growing rapidly since 2002 and it 
consists of a wide range of activities besides housing, such as construction of new 
highways, dams, power plants, etc.  
 
Figure 4.16 Selected sectors' shares in total bank loans (%) 
 
Source: (BRSA, 2015)  
One of the main parts of the construction sector in Turkey has been dwelling 
construction. The absence of social housing in Turkey created severe need for supply 
                                                                                                                                          
access to bank finance during tight periods and behave as financially intermediary by extending trade 
credits to their financially constrained customers mainly small firms.” (Ozlu & Yalcin, 2010, p. 15) 
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of affordable dwellings. During the period of the AKP government, therefore, 
construction of dwellings has expanded dramatically under the control of the TOKI 
(abbreviation stands for Toplu Konut Idaresi Baskanligi, the Housing Development 
Administration in English). As can be seen from the table 4.13, demand and supply 
sides of the housing sector have expanded significantly with financialisation in 
Turkey. By 2013, the number of newly-built dwelling units, i.e. supply, has reached 
five times that of 2002. In a similar vein, demand increased considerably and the 
number of newly-built dwelling units was recorded at almost 700,000 by the end of 
2013. The rapid growth of the sector has attracted both domestic and foreign 
investors, such as Gulf-based property investors (Bedirhanoglu et al., 2013). This 
development also underpinned the expansion of consumer loans for housing as 
investigated next alongside other forms of household credit. 
 
Table 4.13 Demand for, and supply of, housing since 2002 
 Supply: 
Building 
permits 
Demand: 
Occupancy 
Permits 
Supply: Building 
permits 
Demand: Occupancy 
Permits 
Year Floor Area 
(thousand m²) 
Floor Area 
(thousand m²) 
Number of Dwelling 
Unit 
Number of Dwelling 
Unit 
2002  36,187  31,676  161,920  161,491 
2003  45,516  30,936  202,854  162,908 
2004  69,719  31,028  330,446  164,994 
2005  106,424  50,324  546,618  249,816 
2006  122,909  57,207  600,387  295,389 
2007  125,067  63,403  584,955  326,484 
2008  103,846  70,957  503,565  357,286 
2009  100,726  94,567  518,475  469,981 
2010  176,429  85,281  907,451  429,755 
2011   123,621   105,650   650,127   556,769 
2012   158,749   106,950   771,878   556,331 
2013   175,807   138,495   839,630   726,339 
2014   220,264   151,465  1,030,684   770,308 
2015   184,050   141,441   870,515   724,331 
Source: TURKSTAT Construction and Housing Statistics 
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4.3.3. Households  
There are several factors addressing the rise consumer lending by banks in the 
Turkey in the post-2001 era. As mentioned before, the banking system restructuring 
increased the presence of foreign banks. These already had the experience, 
specialised knowledge and focus on household loans. Thus, they carried their 
practices from other countries to Turkey in a way that pushed competition in 
consumer lending. Moreover, the bonanza of capital inflows created alternative 
financing methods for non-financial corporations which relatively decreased their 
dependence on banks. Therefore, banks compensated for this trend by increasing 
lending to households. Further, banks also benefited from the external funding 
alternatives which made it easier to raise funds for lending to households. Finally, 
and presumably the most peculiar development in Turkey, was the changing relations 
of banks with public sector which was the main profit source of the 1990s as 
mentioned before. In other words, the decline of the public deficit through 
macroeconomic policies (the twin-targeting regime) has paved the way for banks’ 
increasing focus on lending to households (Karacimen, 2014).  
It is important to note that foreign banks have not introduced consumer 
lending not only because they did not have enough retail networks that would be 
necessary for this kind of breakthrough, but also because consumer lending, in the 
form of housing loans in particular, was already popular in Turkey from the late 
1990s. However, what is meant here is that foreign banks altered the focus of the 
banking sector by showing how lucrative it was to lend to individuals on the basis of 
their previous experiences in other countries. 
“Foreign bank entry was stimulated by: legislation implemented to upgrade 
the regulatory structure to the standards of the European Union; the 
opportunity that the crisis created for foreigners to take over Turkish banks 
cheaply; and the willingness of domestic capitalists to have foreign partners 
so as to more easily meet new regulations. According to statistics from the 
BAT, the share of foreign banks in total assets of the banking sector increased 
from 3.3 per cent in 2002 to 16.4 per cent in 2011. Having already been 
specialized in lending to households in their home countries, foreign 
banks were motivated to take advantage of a rapidly growing consumer 
credit market in Turkey. NBG, Dexia, HSBC and Citibank were among 
those banks which pursued an aggressive strategy to take part in the growing 
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Turkish consumer credit market, mainly by mergers and acquisitions. As a 
matter of fact, the average shares of consumer loans in total loans of Citibank, 
Finansbank (NBG) and HSBC were 38.5, 49.0 and 54.1 per cent, respectively, 
between 2004 and 2011 (BAT statistics). (Karacimen, 2014, p. 
169)[Emphases added] 
 
Figure 4.17 Top consumer lender banks in Turkey (2003-2015) 
 
Source:(BAT, 2016). Available at: 
https://www.tbb.org.tr/Content/Upload/istatistikiraporlar/tumu/1002/Bankasecilmis_
09-15-konsolide.zip  
The eleven top consumer loan lender banks are shown above. These banks extend 
around 90% of total consumer loans in Turkey. HSBC, Denizbank and Finansbank 
are foreign banks which have minor significance in terms of amount of consumer 
lending. Therefore, it can be argued that foreign banks pioneered household lending 
in at most a qualitative way rather than showing quantitative significance. Finally, a 
recent development has abruptly increased the significance of foreign banks’ in 
household lending since one of the major private banks, Garanti Bank, has been 
bought by a foreign company in 2014. 
As a result of these developments, consumer loans’ share has increased in 
total loans and receivables of the banking sector from 5.8% in 2002 to 14.9% in 2003 
and 20.6% in 2004. After 2005, as can be seen from the table 4.14, the share of 
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consumer loans within total loans and receivables of the banking system has varied 
between 29% and 33%. Thus, the consumer loans of TL251,582 million occupied 
28.5% of the total loans and receivables in 2014 (BAT, 2016b). 
Table 4.14 Volume of consumer loans and their share within total loans and receivables of the 
banking system (million TL and %) 
Year Volume of consumer loans 
(million TL) 
Share of consumer loans in total loans 
and receivables of banking sector (%) 
2005 28,265 29.8 
2006 45,175 31.2 
2007 64,002 33.3 
2008 78,844 31.7 
2009 88,320 33.7 
2010 122,210 33.3 
2011 159,224 33.0 
2012 182,124 33.7 
2013 231,181 31.6 
2014 251,582 28.5 
2015 283,562 Not available 
Source: (BAT, 2014b) 
Now the question is for what purposes do the consumers in Turkey borrow from 
banks? Consumer loans are divided into three subsections: automobiles, housing, and 
general-purpose loans (loans for durable and semi-durable consumer goods, 
education, marriage and health purposes). Further, those not otherwise classified are 
designated ‘other consumer loans’. 
Figure 4.18 Breakdown of consumer loans according to purpose, Million TL 
 
0.000
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Automobile Housing General Purpose Loans Others
 138 
Source: (BAT, 2016b) 
Amongst all kinds of consumer loans, the housing loans have shown the most 
significant development by growing from TL12,389 million in 2005 to TL132,620 
million in 2015. With the fall of inflation and mortgage interest rates, banks have 
become the primary source of mortgages.
41
 Research on the subject suggests that 
according to the Turkish population the best excuse for borrowing a bank loan is to 
buy a new house (Karacimen, 2013). In a similar vein, general purpose loans which 
amounted TL9,372 million in 2005, reached the level of TL145,248 million in 2015 
and exceeded the level of housing loans for the first time in Turkish banking history. 
The loans which cannot be classified under any of these loan types, i.e. others, have 
increased rapidly to the level of a TL44,136 million peak in 2014 and then decreased 
to TL21,517 million in 2015. On the other hand, the volume of automobile loans has 
shown little change while remaining around its initial value of TL6 million over ten 
years (BAT, 2016b). 
Figure 4.19 Breakdown of consumer loan borrowers according to their income level 
 
Source: (BAT, 2016b) 
When we break down the profile of borrowers according to their income groups, we 
see that almost half of the borrowers have income between 0 and TL2000 per month 
(figure 4.19). This means that mostly low-income groups borrow from banks in order 
to sustain their consumption. What is even more interesting is that the amounts 
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 “Currently, annual mortgage interest rates of commercial banks are about twice as high as the rates 
applied by the HDA. There is not any subsidy to the households for the interest payment of the 
mortgage loans if they use the house for their own usage. However, for the houses purchased to earn 
rental income, interest paid for the mortgage loan can be deducted from that part of the rent that is 
subject to income tax.” (Bedirhanoglu et al. 2013, 310) 
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extended for these income groups also constitute almost half of the total outstanding 
loans(figure 4.13). According to data, 45% of total loans are lent to borrowers with 
income level between 0-TL2000 (BAT, 2016b).  
Figure 4.20 Extended consumer loans in September 2015 according to borrowers' income levels 
(%) 
 
Source: (BAT, 2016b) 
The indebtedness amongst low-income groups can be explained in light of 
labour market policies of low wages, insecurity and flexibility (Karacimen, 2014, 
2015).
42
 As participation rates in the labour force, particularly for women, have 
remained chronically low, decline of real wage income has been a worsening factor 
in terms of the consequences of employment outcomes (Yeldan, 2010b). Despite 
high unemployment rates, consumption norms have been sustained through 
indebtedness of households, thus through consumer loans. Although some part of the 
consumption increase can be explained by cheap imports (as mentioned while 
foreign exchange rates were favourable) the rest of the consumption increase is 
associated with bank loans (Yeldan, 2006). In other words, the working class has 
sustained consumption through bank loans (Akcay & Gungen, 2014). Therefore, the 
                                                 
42
 An important example of this process can be seen in the tragic mine accident that occurred in Soma 
(Manisa, Turkey) which resulted in 301 miners losing their lives on the 13
th
 May 2014. The Bogazici 
University Research Group on Soma published a fieldwork report after the incident. According to the 
report, 95% of the miners who lost their lives had consumer loans. Moreover, the interviewees 
frequently referred to their indebtedness in order to explain the reason for working in the mines 
although they were aware of inadequate workplace safety and risks originating from it. For more 
detail see the link of the report in Turkish. Available at: 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0ahUKEwi6wJPurb
jLAhWCZQ8KHddQBTQQFghUMAc&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.busomarastirmagrubu.boun.edu.
tr%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fcalismaraporu.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFpgdtGRceKJnF_CMQeWozY
wuiN9g&bvm=bv.116573086,d.ZWU Access date: 11.03.2016 
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number of consumer loan borrowers has quadrupled since 2005 when the number 
was around 5 million and is recorded as nearly twenty million in 2015 (BAT, 2016b).  
Indebtedness becomes an economic problem in the case of default. That is 
why non-performing loans have increased rapidly such that regulations had to be 
introduced for restricting instalments on credit card. In other words, low-income 
households were sustaining their lives, prior to the introduction of the regulation, 
through use of several credit cards and with limitless instalments on corresponding 
expenditure (Aybar & Dogru, 2013). In 2015, non-performing loans’ share in total 
loans and receivables was 3% (BAT, 2016a). Thus, we can draw the conclusion that 
when the non-performing loans reach unsustainable levels, the indebted households 
in Turkey will confront serious economic crises. 
4.4.Conclusion 
In this chapter, we argue that financialisation took off in Turkey in the aftermath of 
the 2001 crisis due to a substantial transformation wrought by the economic policies 
advised, encouraged and supported by the IFIs. These policies, especially inflation 
targeting and contractionary fiscal policy, served to restructure all areas of economic 
and social life from agriculture to social policy, from construction to labour markets, 
and so on. Moreover, this era witnessed a substantial restructuring of the financial 
institutions in Turkey, not least the banking system. In this sense, the expansion of 
the financial sector in relation to the massive capital inflows is important and is 
indicative of the contagious nature of financialisation. However, what is also 
important is the intensification of finance with and within the non-financial sector 
and with households. We began to demonstrate these latter processes through 
investigating these financial relations with the non-financial sphere as well as 
through banks’ repositioning in terms of lending to households. 
Even in developed countries, as is recognised in the literature, financialisation 
is uneven, complex and differentiated in incidence and impact. This applies equally 
to developing countries and that is why it is not easy to prove financialisation. 
Nevertheless, there are certain findings which point to the peculiarity of 
financialisation in developing countries which Turkey illustrates. First of all, in 
Turkey, the emergence of financialisation is related to the changing relations 
between the state and banks. In this regard, banks have not focused on consumers 
because non-financial corporations raised cheaper funds through involving 
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themselves in financial market operations. Rather, as we showed, big corporations 
always had access to funds from both foreign and domestic sources in the form of 
bank loans or through financial market activities. On the other hand, what has 
increased banks’ focus on consumer lending has been the decrease in the public 
sector’s borrowing requirement. 
Second, despite the availability and accessibility of financial sources, the 
expansion of the financial sphere has not contributed substantively to real sector 
growth. This is evident in the decrease of fixed investment capital as well as the 
disadvantaged condition of the SMEs in terms of bank loans despite financial 
expansion. Banks have preferred not to lend to small firms, finding them too costly 
compared to big corporations and households. Some sectors have benefited from 
financialisation through greater availability of funds for both suppliers and 
demanders with the sector, as with (housing) construction. 
Finally, integration of finance is not confined to the economic era. In effect, 
finance has become increasingly significant in the social lives of the Turkish 
population. Although within the literature mostly indebtedness is shown as the 
evidence of this development, as confirmed by our findings as well, in effect the 
impact of finance goes beyond this. Finance has created a phenomenon in which all 
the social life is reshaped including education, housing, health and pensions. As 
shown in the next chapter, the pension system in Turkey is part and parcel of the 
social security system, i.e. pay-as-you-go (PAYG), statutory, earnings related social 
insurance schemes whereas a private, funded, voluntary pension scheme, the 
Individual Pension System (IPS), has recently been introduced. This has been 
achieved through international financial organisations’, not least the WB’s, 
involvement in modelling the pension system. We argue that the IPS represents the 
financialisation of pensions for channelling pension contributions into financial 
markets and providing pension income through financial returns. In this regard, the 
transformation of the Turkish pension system has been subject to financialisation 
which functions as an underlying factor and official rationale that shapes the pension 
provision as elsewhere across the world. 
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5. Pension reforms in Turkey 
5.1. Introduction 
The transformation of the pension system in Turkey started after negotiations 
between the Turkish government and the WB with the latter insisting on putting 
pension reform on the agenda as a condition for the loan agreement signed in 1994. 
The WB’s main argument was that the Turkish social security system in general, and 
pension provision in particular, was not sustainable and so needed to be reformed. As 
a result of the agreement with the WB in 1994, the Turkish authorities assigned the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) experts to prepare a reform proposal for 
pension provision in Turkey. Subsequently, the ILO came up with a detailed report 
which consisted of four alternative pension systems ranging from a completely 
individual, funded system to a restructured PAYG social insurance system (ILO, 
1996). The Turkish Government chose the two-pillar pension system, comprising a 
PAYG state scheme complemented by a funded, voluntary and individual system.   
In the second section, we review the arguments put by the reform advocates. 
In the ILO Report, it was argued that the private schemes would decrease the burden 
of state through individual responsibility. Moreover, accordingly, coverage of 
pensions would expand for self-employed and agricultural workers as the private 
funded schemes are flexible in terms of participation and amounts contributed. The 
arguments for the necessity of pension reform in Turkey are further developed in a 
subsequent report which is also known as the White Book and published by the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS) in Turkey (MoLSS, 2005). 
According to the report, a substantial pension reform is necessary because of high 
deficits of the Turkish social insurance institutions (main providers of pension 
income at that time), ageing population, inadequacy of existing social security 
system in terms of poverty alleviation, low coverage of the state scheme due to 
informality and structural problems of the existing social security system. We deal 
with all these arguments in detail and show that high government pension spending 
and ageing arguments do not fit the Turkish context where spending is low and there 
is a young population. On the other hand, deficits of the social insurance institutions 
and poor coverage of the pension schemes are undeniable facts for which the pension 
reforms do not provide a solution.  
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In third section, we discuss the Turkish pension reform which was undertaken 
in three stages. The first stage of the reform was held in 1999 and targeted the social 
insurance pensions. In a nutshell, the social security system of the time consisted of 
three social insurance institutions which were the main providers of statutory and 
earnings-related pensions for workers, self-employed people and civil servants. The 
1999 reform determined the retirement age of 58 for women and 60 for men (before 
this reform there was not age constraint, only contribution days were required), 
changed the calculation methods for old age, disability and survivorship pension 
benefits, and introduced unemployment benefit. The second stage of the reform was 
the foundation of the IPS in 2001 which came into effect in 2003. The IPS represents 
the private pillar suggested by the ILO, and indirectly by the WB, complementing 
the social insurance institutions’ PAYG schemes. It works on a voluntary basis, i.e. a 
person can join the IPS without joining or opting out from the state system. The IPS 
is based on the contract between the participant and the private pension company that 
invests the contributions made by the participant to the pension funds. Then pension 
funds invest in financial markets and the returns from these investments are paid to 
the participant as the pension benefit. The third stage of the pension reform was 
completed with Law 5510 that came into effect in 2008. With the law, three separate 
social insurance institutions have been gathered under one roof. Moreover, the 
retirement age is set at 65 from 2036, being gradually increased for the new entrants 
beginning in the system from 2008; the number of contribution days to be eligible for 
retirement were increased from 7000 to 7200 for private sector workers and to 9000 
for civil servants and self-employed people. Further, the benefit calculation methods 
have been changed in a way in which current contributors to the system will draw 
lower pension benefits in the future and current retirees’ pension income is increased 
by less than the previous incremental rate (the index was consisting the entire GDP 
growth whereas after the reform only 30% of the GDP growth is included in the 
valuation of pension benefits). 
In the fourth section, we analyse the arguments of pension reform advocates 
and the pension reforms in Turkey in the context of financialisation. We argue that 
pension reforms have paved the way for financialisation of pension income by 
shrinking the state PAYG pensions in order to open space or create necessity for the 
private scheme. In this sense, increasing importance of the IPS within the pension 
system demonstrates the integration of finance in old-age income provision. As this 
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is another example of extension of finance into ever more areas of economic and 
social life, financialisation of pensions is observable in the Turkish context. 
Moreover, as financialisation transforms every area it penetrates, the IPS also has 
significant implications on pension system in Turkey. First, the IPS is a saving 
mechanism heavily skewed towards middle- and high-income earners. In other 
words, private funded schemes like the IPS, do not primarily play the role of 
enhancing the pensions of the majority, with some degree of choice over how much 
to contribute. Rather, they serve to cream off the pension funds of the better off and, 
in doing so, locating these funds within private financial markets and, thereby, 
immune from inter- and intra-generational redistribution (whilst simultaneously 
worsening the conditions attached to state pensions). This is the basis for the IPS 
serving to promote the financialisation of pension income, in association with the 
worsening impact of social security reforms on PAYG pensions. 
Moreover, the IPS does not fulfil most of the functions those are attributed to 
it during the reform process by the pension reform advocates. Accordingly, it was 
argued that private schemes would increase the coverage by covering agricultural 
sector members and self-employed. We find that most of the self-employed people 
indeed responded to the pension reforms in an anticipated way and have joined the 
IPS while opting out from the state scheme. However, most rural workers cannot 
afford to join the IPS because they earn low incomes and the IPS is a system for 
high- or middle-income earners since contributions lower than a certain amount 
(although being allowed) do not give reasonable pension incomes. Thus, we argue 
that the IPS does not provide a solution to the coverage problem of the Turkish social 
security pensions because it only covers people from certain income levels (middle- 
or high-income) while excluding the rest.  
Finally, we argue that the main problems for the social insurance pensions 
originate from the Turkish labour market which is characterised by high levels of 
unemployment and informal employment and the low rate of labour-force 
participation particularly amongst women. These features of the labour market 
underlie the inadequacies of the PAYG pensions as well as exacerbating the impact 
of pension reforms. In this way, we shed light on the impact of social security 
reforms and the IPS on these more marginalised groups (unemployed people, 
informally employed people and women who do not participate in the workforce). It 
is argued that the high unemployment rate, which is around 10% on average over the 
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last ten years, is one of the most important factors threatening the sustainability of 
the pension system through its increasing the pension-dependency ratio. The 
unemployed are much more vulnerable to social security reform, as it has tightened 
eligibility. The IPS does not provide an alternative because it is a system for 
professionals with regular payrolls rather than the low-income unemployed. Similar 
are the conditions of informally employed workers, corresponding to 36% of the 
labour force. Informal workers are mostly low-waged, employed for short periods 
without a contract that would provide them social security (including health and 
pension).  
Low participation of women in the labour market is the Achille’s heel of the 
social security system in Turkey. Only 30% of women participate in the workforce 
which is less than half of the men’s rate (70%). This aspect of the labour market is 
important because it renders women dependent on men in terms of pensions while 
increasing the dependency rate thus threatening the sustainability of the social 
security pension system. It is shown that, after the social security reform, women 
have become even more vulnerable because of the increase in contributory days that 
makes it more difficult for them to qualify for a pension because of their interrupted 
careers with maternal breaks. Further, with the reform, the conditions to benefit from 
dependency pensions have been tightened while the level of benefit has been 
decreased.
43
 In this regard, the impact of private-funded schemes on women is 
discussed in detail. At first glance, the IPS seems gender neutral because most of the 
participants are from similar socio-economic backgrounds. However, looking closer 
we see that the IPS is far from being a solution to women’s social security problems 
which originate primarily from their lack of participation in the workforce due to the 
labour market’s patriarchal structure. Moreover, if the IPS becomes the only source 
of pension income, gender-inequality (in terms of income) amongst the elderly is 
liable to increase because of the lack of redistribution within the pension system. 
In the conclusion, we discuss both social security reform and the IPS together 
and emphasise that the relation between old-age income and financial market 
performance has become stronger than ever which indicates that pension provision in 
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 The dependency pension is the benefit paid to the partner or the children of the social security 
system pensioner after s/he dies. It is shown in the fourth section of this chapter that the dependency 
pension is the main source of old-age income for most women because they do not have any pensions 
on which to draw from their working history. 
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Turkey is financialised.
44
 In this regard, financialisation of pensions point at the 
social security and old-age income as new areas to which finance has extended. This 
analysis ties a summary of arguments made within the chapter to the broader and 
overall themes of our study. 
5.2. Arguments put forward for the necessity of pension reform  
Before publishing the report of ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’ (WB, 1994), the WB 
and IMF had meetings with policymakers from 39 countries. The logic of those 
meetings was to explain the arguments of the Report and convince them of the idea 
of privatisation of the social security systems (Guzel, 2006). The social security 
reforms in Turkey are shaped by this idea under the impact of WB and IMF. On the 
5
th
 of May 1994, the Turkish Republic and the WB signed a loan agreement which 
pre-conditioned pension reform. Consequently, the Turkish authorities appointed the 
ILO for the project on Pensions and Social Security Reform (ICC, 1999).
45
 With the 
sponsorship of the WB, the ILO presented the Final Report on Social Security 
Reform in Turkey in 1996 (ILO, 1996). The ILO Report starts with a pessimistic 
evaluation of the pension system. According to it, the three social insurance 
institutions of the Turkish social security system then had deficits of 1.8% of the 
GDP. By taking the premium levels constant, the Report built actuarial model 
projections through which it projected a deficit of the social insurance institutions 
that would reach 10.1% of GDP by 2050. 
In the Report, four different reform model alternatives are presented in order 
to avoid this consequence. The first is the PAYG model which only restructures the 
existing social insurances institutions and does not add any other schemes. The 
second is an extreme model of individual saving accounts which shows similarities 
with the reform implemented in Chile (Tuncay, 2000). The third alternative is a 
mixture of PAYG and individual saving accounts where the existing insurance 
institutions are kept and complemented with a mandatory funded scheme. The fourth 
proposal also suggests a mix of PAYG and funded system whereas this time the 
participation in the funded scheme is voluntary. Amongst all these different reform 
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 It should be noted that the impact of the IPS funds on financial markets, and on the economy in 
general, is covered in the next chapter. In this chapter, the IPS is examined purely in terms of its 
relation to the financialisation of pensions. 
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 With the same agreement, the Commission on Australian Health Insurance was assigned to the 
project on Health Insurance Reform in Turkey. This Commission submitted a report in 1995 to the 
Turkish authorities. 
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scenarios, several issues are common: fixing the retirement age to a 58-60 age band 
(at that time there was not a retirement age floor, people who worked for a certain 
number of years were able to retire independently of their age); tightening the early 
retirement conditions; preserving the existing premium levels which already ranged 
between 20% to 35% of net income of the participant; and social insurance benefits 
would be adapted to developments in the economy in order to avoid income loss for 
some pensioners (Alpar, 2000).  
Turkey chose the fourth alternative model which is called ‘Alternative 4a and 
4b: the multi-pillar system including voluntary complementary schemes’. It includes 
a PAYG social insurance scheme providing a basic monthly income and a voluntary, 
private and funded individual scheme complementing the scheme. It is argued that 
this system would decrease the social expenditures significantly in ten years. With 
this system, it is projected that the deficit of the pension system would be 0.7% of 
GDP by 2050. The Report does not suggest any coordination between the social 
insurance pensions and the additional scheme for the reason that the latter would be 
completely voluntary and, presumably, would only cover a minority of the private 
sector employees.  
According to the Report, the major positive impact of the multi-pillar system 
on income distribution across pensioners would be through the social assistance 
expenditures for people more than 65 years old and the coverage of agricultural 
workers and self-employed people in the rural sector. However, it is admitted that the 
funded scheme would increase income inequality within the elderly because some 
people would not be able to participate in the complementary schemes. Projected 
positive impacts of the system were as follows: 
 Social protection expenditures and the subsidies to the social security system 
would be reduced in the mid-run. 
 In the long run, the social insurance programmes would give smaller deficits. 
 In the long run, the pension system would give a lower cumulative deficit and 
the decrease in the social protection system subsidies would enhance the 
government budget. 
 More options would be open to the employers and employees to establish 
alternative schemes for retirement.  
 Contribution would be made to development of the financial markets. 
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Negative impacts of the system are summarised as follows: 
 Because all of the workers would not be able to benefit from the additional 
schemes, the pension income inequality would be aggravated. 
 Civil servants between 30 to 50 years old would not have enough time to 
accumulate within the complementary scheme and would be negatively 
affected. 
Moreover, it is indicated that all the reform scenarios would cause lower replacement 
ratios for almost each group of participants. People who are entirely excluded from 
the system are covered with the social protection (non-contributory social assistance) 
expenditures because decreasing the subsidies to the insurance schemes would 
increase the resources devoted into the social assistance for people who do not have 
any old-age income (ILO, 1996). 
Although the programme suggests that the deficit of the social insurance 
institutions would decrease, there is no measure within the programme that decreases 
the deficit of the social insurance without decreasing the pension benefits. In other 
words, the programme is based on the measures decreasing the replacement ratios 
within the PAYG social insurance pensions while establishing the additional 
individual schemes in order to compensate the income loss originating from the state 
pension scheme. On the other hand, this system excludes the self-employed people 
from the PAYG scheme and incentivises them (through tax relief) to join the 
complementary individual schemes. This is presented as a way of increasing 
coverage particularly amongst self-employed people. To sum up, the additional 
scheme has two functions: one is providing an option for people to compensate for 
their losses, thus enabling the contraction within the PAYG benefits. The other one is 
increasing the coverage of the pension system by covering self-employed people 
under a private scheme.  
What this report tells us is that although the pension system in Turkey 
required an urgent reform in the mid-1990s, the way in which this reform proposal is 
introduced indicates the dominance of neoliberal ideology rather than the needs of 
the system. In order to correct a problem within a system, the reasons underlying the 
problem should be clarified. Then the question is what were the reasons resulting in 
high deficits of the insurance institutions providing pensions in the 1990s? There 
were several premium holidays, early retirement opportunities and legislative 
interventions that decrease the contributions to the social security system those are 
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known as ‘populist policies’. Moreover, during the years social security system were 
giving surpluses, these funds were being used to finance the budget deficit which 
was the substantial problem of the 1990s as mentioned in the previous chapter (4.2). 
In addition, pension system of the time was suffering from institutional limitations, 
such as lack of auditors who would detect the corruption at the administrative level 
or in individual workplaces. In relation with this, the informality within the labour 
market was growing while people were employed either without any security or with 
fake payroll cheques which hide the real amount of the wage in order to contribute to 
the pension system less (Yasar, 2013). None of these structural inadequacies are 
addressed within the reform proposal.  
Moreover, there is another shortcoming of the reform proposal which has 
been clearer in more recent publications of the IFIs, that is the idea that social 
security and social assistance schemes are opponents of each other. Thus, state has to 
prefer between choosing to contribute to old-age income of employed and providing 
a basic income for those who are in need. That is why in the ILO report, despite not 
establishing any organic relations between private scheme and the PAYG system, the 
private schemes are deemed to be solving the problem of deficits. Accordingly, when 
the government starts to pay less in the PAYG scheme, it would then be able to 
increase the social policy assistance. In this context, the employed and unemployed 
or informally employed people are suggested to be opponents of each other within a 
zero-sum game (Turcan Ozsuca, 2006). However, this approach, which suggests a 
trade-off to exist between social security and social protection, is disputable. Rather, 
these two are different issues in which the state has different roles to play. Therefore, 
state should contribute to employed people’s pensions as well as providing a 
minimum income for those who are not able to work (Guzel, 2006). 
Despite all these shortcomings, the Turkish government of the time 
committed to transform the pension system in line with the reform proposal of the 
ILO report. Thus, the government started the preparations for the individual private 
scheme while restructuring the PAYG component through social security reform in 
1999. Nonetheless, after the reform in 1999, the Turkish social security system 
continued to have deficit which reached 4% of GDP by 2003. Therefore, the WB 
took the opportunity to publish a Turkish pension system reform report in May 2003. 
In relation with that, the IMF included social security reform into the other structural 
reform pre-conditions for the 19
th
 standby agreement in 2005 (for more detail see 
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3.2.) (Egeli & Ozen, 2009). As a result, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security 
(MoLSS) started to prepare a report to present the necessity of social security reform 
with three representatives from social security institution and four delegates from 
Treasury and Central Bank of Turkey. This indicates that the perspective on social 
security reform was from a budgetary concern rather than improving the adequacy of 
the pensions (Celik, 2006). 
The report is published in 2005 with the name of the “Social Security System, 
Reform and Suggestions” which is also known as the White Book (MoLSS, 2005). 
The arguments put forward within the White Book, those underlying the reform for 
social security in general, and social insurance pensions in particular, can be gathered 
under five points: 
 Ageing population, 
 Existing social security system’s insufficient protection against poverty,  
 Deficits of social insurance institutions that cause financial burdens on the 
state budget and macroeconomic instabilities, 
 Low coverage of the social security system, 
 Structural problems of the existing social insurance institutions and social 
assistance expenditures. 
5.2.1. Ageing population 
Within the pension reform literature, the ‘ageing population’ is a well-known 
argument that is put forward by the WB to push pension reform (WB, 1994). In line 
with the WB argument, the White Book claims that Turkey gets older rapidly. The 
rate of number of people older than 65 years old within the number of people 
between 0-64 years old would increase from 7% to 14% in 27 years. This transition 
in the weight of elderly within the population has been experienced in developed 
countries in much longer periods (ranging across 26 years in Japan to 115 years in 
France). Moreover, the dependency ratio, which stands for the number of people 65 
years old and more plus the population between 0-14 years old over total population, 
would increase after 2025 with acceleration after 2035. This means that the number 
of people who are not able to work will increase more rapidly than the number of 
people who work. Hence, the next 20 years represent the ‘window of opportunity’ 
for Turkey to restructure the pension scheme in order to enable its sustainability 
(MoLSS, 2005).  
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The argument of ageing appears to be convincing at the first glance. 
However, it can be argued that it is pushed too much in the Turkish context where 
the problem is presented in a more exaggerated way than it is in effect. Ageing 
population refers to an increase in the median age of the population. According to 
this, in the world the share of elderly people to the total and working-age population 
has increased around 10% to 15% in every country since the 1950s. This is 
associated with the baby-boom generation of the post-war era getting older, as well 
as other factors such as decreasing fertility rates and increasing health-technology. 
Indeed, when we look at the data for OECD high-income countries, the average 
proportion of population more than 65 years old to working-age population reached 
24% by 2010. In a similar vein, the elderly population is 16% of the overall 
population on average in all high-income OECD countries (OECD, 2014).  
Nevertheless, when we examine whether or not Turkey is ageing, the findings 
indicate that the demographic development is different in Turkey than high-income 
countries. In effect, the share of people older than 65 years old was 4.4 in 1970 and 
increased to 7.6% in 2013.  
Table 5.1 Share of population over 65 years old within working age and total population 
between 2001-2010 (%) 
%/Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Working 
age 
population 
8.3 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.6 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.8 
Population 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 6 
Source:WB
46
  
In other words, the WB and other advocates of pension reforms rely on projections 
which are produced on the basis of high-income level countries’ experiences. Thus, 
they do not address the real problems specific to each country. 
5.2.2. Protection against poverty 
The other argument within the White Book regards the inadequacy of social security 
system in terms of alleviating poverty. According to this, “the main purpose of social 
security is to protect people against poverty” (MoLSS, 2005, p. 9). When the 
government brought this issue to a meeting with interest groups and trade unions in 
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Available at:  
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Brief/Social%20Protection%20and%20Labor/1.1
_Env_OA_Dependency_Ratio&Population+65_2Q2012.xlsx Access date:13.02.2015 
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July 2004, the left-wing trade union DISK (Confederation of Progressive Trade 
Unions of Turkey, Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu in Turkish) declared 
their opposition on this point (DISK, 2004).
47
 According to DISK, associating the 
social security system with impoverishment is not appropriate. Rather, social security 
provides income for temporary or permanent incapacity to work. 
“First of all, the goal of social security is to provide an economic security to 
an individual who confronts a social risk. If this security is adequate, that 
prevents the individual to fall in poverty. However, except this indirect 
influence, the social security does not have an aim to protect against poverty 
or abolish the inequalities. Moreover, with the proposed model, it is not clear 
how this goal would be achieved. Hence, yet at the beginning, the social 
security system is restructured with a reform that is based on a wrong target 
and mission.”(Guzel, 2005, p. 72) 
Government authorities reject this objection by arguing that the poverty reduction is 
related to the economic growth which is negatively influenced by the deficits of the 
social security institutions. Moreover, the resources devoted to cover the deficits of 
these institutions mean subsidising people who are in least need. In other words, 
while the poverty amongst the employed and self-employed people is already low, 
the social security expenses are transferred to these people through government 
contributions to cover the deficits of the social insurance institutions. Therefore, 
people, who are in absolute poverty, do not benefit from the subsidies whereas the 
social security system should have covered them (MoLSS, 2005).  
It is indeed true that the narrow definition of social security needs to be 
broadened as its definition as the income security (restoring income to some extent in 
the case of the inability to work, including old age) does not meet the realities of the 
neoliberal era (van Ginneken, 2003, p. 4).  This is so because in the past, social 
security covered most of the population and those marginal groups who were out of 
the umbrella were taken care of through social assistance schemes. And, the costs of 
these schemes were insignificant thus easily financed by the state. On the other hand, 
now, the number of those not covered because of the informality of employment is 
extremely high. Therefore, the cost of social assistance schemes is paramount. 
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 DISK’s statement against the social security reform, November 2004. Accessed on 06.04.2015. 
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However, this is not to say that the expansion of social security definition and 
practices, in a way that covers social protection, need to done at the expense of those 
employed. The idea of state should cover those who are in poverty while the 
employed should take individual responsibility for their income security destroys the 
link between production relations and social security. In other words, social security 
becomes poverty-related instead of being related to contributions to social 
production. In effect, social security is established as result of struggles of workers 
through the historical process. Thus, social security is a right and the transfers made 
to the social insurance institutions are not subsidies but rather government’s mission 
to accomplish its role as a social state (DISK, 2004). Therefore, it can be argued that 
positing social insurance as an opposite of the social assistance expenditure is not a 
good way of analysing social security deficits. This is because these two schemes 
(social insurance and social assistance) are not complements of one another. Each is 
contributed by different parties and has different budgetary constraints.  
5.2.3. Deficits of the social security system 
The third main argument put forward in the White Book is related to the deficits of 
social insurance institutions those provide pensions. According to the White Book, 
the financing problem of the social security system has negative impacts on inflation 
and some other essential economic indicators because of the pressure it causes on 
state finances. The transfer made from the state budget to cover the deficits of the 
social security system has reached 4.5% of GNP while the total resources devoted to 
cover the deficits of the social security system in the last ten years equal total 
national income in 2004. The deficit of the social security system increases the 
public sector debt requirement which causes the interest rates to increase. Hence, 
investment and economic growth are influenced badly which stimulates 
unemployment and aggravates income distribution. To sum up, the system, which is 
meant to provide social security creates completely reverse consequences. (MoLSS, 
2005, pp. 12–13). 
With this argument, as Celik (2006) rightly puts it, the deficits of social 
security institutions are pointed at as the ‘scapegoat’ of all the problems within the 
economy such as unemployment, macroeconomic instability and income inequality. 
Moreover, the share of interest payments within the budget over the same period 
(1994-2004) is four times the share of transfers made to cover the social security 
 154 
deficit. Finally, with incomprehensible reasoning, the White Book calculates the 
resources devoted to the social security over 10 years in comparison with only one 
year’s GNP and debt stock. Thus, draws a chaotic picture (Celik, 2006).  
Table 5.2 Non-interest Balance of Social Security System as % of GDP (IMF Definition) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
% -0.19 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.12 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
% 0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.33 -0.36 
Source: Ministry of Development Public Sector Debt Requirement Indicators (%GDP) 
(Ministry of Development, 2015b) 
In the Book, the deficits of the social insurance institutions originate from 
‘income decreasing factors’ and ‘cost increasing factors’. Income decreasing factors 
are early retirement, difference between declared income (for premium calculation) 
and real income, informality and contribution holidays. Cost increasing factors, on 
the other hand, are early retirement, high benefit levels, long benefit periods due to 
ageing (health costs due to ageing although we do not cover this issue here)(MoLSS, 
2005). Amongst these the most emphasised is early retirement.  
Accordingly, Turkey is the country with longest pension payment period. 
When the retirement age is too low, the actuarial balance of the pension system is 
distorted because the number of active workers is much lower than the number of 
passive participants of the system. Thus, dependency ratio decreases in a way which 
threatens the sustainability of the social security system. In order to have a 
sustainable system, the dependency ratio should be around four (Egeli & Ozen, 
2009). However, increasing retirement age is an arguable measure because features 
of the Turkish labour market are very specific: 
“Turkey has a relatively young labour force with average age of 36. The 
average age of workers in the industrial sector is 32.7 and in service sector 
this average is 34.7. The average age of unemployed people for starting to 
work is 29.6. In other words, people who are not employed but ready to be 
employed are 6 years younger than the already working population average. 
Finally, the average education year of already employed people is 7 whereas 
people who are not employed but ready to be employed have an average 8 
years of study. Thus, Turkey has a young working population and even 
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younger and more educated unemployed people who are ready to 
work.”(Turcan Ozsuca, 2006, p. 52)  
As the author rightly puts it, the young working population is a challenge for the 
increase in the retirement age in Turkey. Moreover, there is a generation in Turkey 
that started working at very young ages and are more exhausted due to longer 
working hours, difficult working conditions and less working place security etc. 
therefore have shorter life expectation. In particular, when we consider the high 
unemployment rate, increasing retirement age to higher levels while there are many 
young and educated people who are ready to work does not seem reasonable.  
In addition to this fact, despite all these wrong implementations of early 
retirement and long benefit payments, Turkey still has a comparatively low rate of 
pension spending compare to other OECD countries. The OECD defines the data on 
pension spending as all cash expenditures (including lump-sum payments) on old-
age and survivor pensions that provide an income for persons retired from the labour 
market or guarantee incomes when a person has reached a 'standard' pensionable age 
or fulfilled the necessary contributory requirements. Pension spending in Turkey, by 
2009, is 6.8% of GDP whereas the OECD total average is 7.8%.
48
 Since the Turkish 
pension system does not require government contribution to the earnings-related 
social security system, pension spending is related to the means-tested pension 
income (for people more than 65 years old and in need). When we check the key 
indicators in the table below to see whether or not the Turkish pension system is 
generous, it can be easily seen that the average worker earning level is very low 
compared to the OECD standards. Therefore, in terms of deficits of the social 
security system and generosity of the Turkish pensions, the arguments of the White 
Book are discredited with data.  
Table 5.3 Key indicators of the Turkish pension system compare to OECD averages 
 Turkey OECD 
Average worker earnings (USD) 15400 42700 
Public pension spending % GDP 6.8 7.8 
Population over 65% working age 12.5 25.5 
Life expectancy at birth 75.1 79.9 
Source: (OECD, 2013, p. 354)  
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 OECD (2015), Pension spending (indicator). doi: 10.1787/a041f4ef-en (Accessed on 10 February 
2015) http://data.oecd.org/socialexp/pension-spending.htm 
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These contradictions between the reality in Turkey and reform proposals 
prepared on the basis of other countries’ experiences show the failure of ready-made 
policies in fitting specific circumstances. Another example of this approach is the 
persistence about decreasing the replacement rates in the Turkish pension systems. In 
a nutshell, the net replacement rate is defined as the individual net pension 
entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings (taking into account personal 
income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners). This 
rate measures how effectively a pension system provides a retirement income to 
replace earnings before retirement. In other words, replacement rates indicate the 
success of the pension system in a country. Thus, suggesting Turkey to decrease this 
rate is incomprehensible in this sense. Nevertheless, the average gross replacement 
rate is 54.5% and the average net replacement rate is 64.5% by 2012 for all OECD 
countries. However, in Turkey, the gross replacement rate is 66.8% and the net 
replacement rate is 94.9% (OECD).
49
 On the basis of these data, the official rationale 
argues that the replacement rates in Turkey, which are higher than OECD standards, 
should be decreased (Karadeniz, 2009). However, the high levels of replacement 
rates can be explained by very low wage levels which are replaced by the pension 
benefits even though the benefits are not high at all. Although this deserves a more 
detailed investigation which we cannot cover within the limits of this study, this is an 
important point to see in terms of peculiarities of each country. 
In addition, budget deficits of the social security institutions are not only 
about expenditures but also related to the income of the institutions. In this regard, in 
Turkey the individuals’ contributions to the social security system have increased 
from 4.5% GDP to 8% of GDP between 2000 and 2013. On the contrary, the average 
social security contributions’ rate has increased only slightly across the OECD 
countries, i.e., from 8.6% to 9% of GDP over the same period.
50
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 OECD (2015), Gross pension replacement rates (indicator). doi: 10.1787/3d1afeb1-en (Accessed on 
10 February 2015) http://data.oecd.org/pension/gross-pension-replacement-rates.htm 
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Social security contributions are compulsory payments paid to general government that confer 
entitlement to receive a (contingent) future social benefit. They include: unemployment insurance 
benefits and supplements, accident, injury and sickness benefits, old-age, disability and survivors' 
pensions, family allowances, reimbursements for medical and hospital expenses or provision of 
hospital or medical services. Contributions may be levied on both employees and employers. Such 
payments are usually earmarked to finance social benefits and are often paid to those institutions of 
general government that provide such benefits. This indicator relates to government as a whole (all 
government levels) and is measured in percentages of both GDP and of total taxation. OECD (2015), 
Social security contributions (indicator). doi: 10.1787/3ebfe901-en (Accessed on 12 February 2015) 
http://data.oecd.org/tax/social-security-contributions.htm 
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5.2.4. Coverage 
Fourthly, the coverage problem is approached within the White Book mostly in 
terms of informality and social protection. Accordingly, there are 11 million people 
who are working unregistered and this number corresponds to 52% of the workforce 
(data for 2004). It is also mentioned that, although more than 21 million people 
appeal to social assistance, the expenditure on this constitutes only 0.8% of GDP 
(MoLSS, 2005, p. 16). The coverage problem of the Turkish social security is rightly 
pointed at despite the confusion of terminology: the coverage of the social security 
system is different than the coverage of social expenditure. One form of coverage is 
related to the social security system and the OECD compares countries according to 
two different pension coverage definitions for the active members of the pension 
systems: the first one is the total number of active contributors over labour force; 
whereas the second one is the total active contributors over all population of working 
age. In this regard, in 2008, Turkey had 58.6% and 30.5% coverage, respectively. 
These rates are very low compared to the high-income OECD countries which have 
an average of 90.0% and 78.6%, respectively. In effect, the coverage of the Turkish 
pension system is low even compared to the average of the country group of Europe 
and Central Asia under which Turkey is classified. The Europe and Central Asia 
country group has an average of 68.6% of coverage for the first definition and 46.0% 
of coverage for the second.  
Table 5.4 Coverage of the pension system in Turkey between 2008 and 2013 (in Thousands) 
Year Working-age 
population (1) 
Labour-force 
(2) 
Active 
contributors 
(3) 
1st 
Coverage 
(3/2)  
2nd 
Coverage 
(3/1) 
2008 50,772 23,805 15,041 0.63 0.3 
2009 51,686 24,748 15,967 0.65 0.31 
2010 52,541 25,641 16,196 0.63 0.31 
2011 53,593 26,725 17,375 0.65 0.32 
2012 54,724 27,339 18,353 0.67 0.34 
2013 55,608 28,271 18,887 0.67 0.34 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security Labour Statistics and Social Security 
Institution (MoLSS, 2014) 
The table above is drawn through application of the OECD method to the 
data available since 2008. Despite the improvements within the coverage of the 
pension system, Turkey is still far below the average coverage rates of other OECD 
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countries. As can be seen from the table, 34% of working age population is not 
actively covered by the system which means that around 18 million people are 
excluded (working-age population in 2013 is 55.608 million).
51
 The main reason of 
the coverage inadequacy is the informality within the labour market. However, 
informality does not only refer people who work without registering in the social 
security system, rather it also covers those declare their income much lower than 
their real income in order to pay lower social security contributions (Egeli & Ozen, 
2009).  
The other form of coverage is related to the social expenditure which is, in 
Turkey, the flat-rate old age income granted to people who are excluded from the 
social insurance schemes. Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind 
provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes to low-income 
households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons. According to 
the OECD data, total net social spending, by 2011, is second lowest in Turkey with 
11.1% of GDP whereas the OECD average is 20.8%.
52
 Hence, public expenditure is 
very low compared to other OECD countries which explains the shortcoming of the 
social expenditure coverage. 
5.2.5. Structural problems 
The final point brought forward by the White Book is related to the structural 
problems of the social security system in Turkey. When the structural problems of 
the social security system in Turkey are analysed, it is seen that they are not 
demographically related, such as ageing or increasing life expectations, as suggested 
for developed countries (Egeli & Ozen, 2009). Turkey has a young population but 
despite that because of distorted actuarial balances and institutional inadequacies, the 
social security system has become unsustainable.  
In this regard, the fragmented structure of the social security system which 
consisted three insurance institutions is addressed to be problematic. Indeed, 
switching between institutions, due to employment status change, was very slow and 
inefficient. However, this can be associated with the insufficient technical 
infrastructure which required a lot of paperwork for social security issues. According 
to the White Book, all these structural problems of the social security system would 
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be solved through unifying three social insurance institutions under one roof, 
supporting this new organization with a well-established internet based technical 
infrastructure and generating commonality of the norms while simplifying the 
chaotic legislation.   
Despite the shortcomings of the reform proposals’ arguments in terms of 
reflecting the real problems of the pension system, Turkey reformed pensions in line 
with these arguments. In the next section, we investigate the development of pension 
reforms in detail. 
5.3. Pension System Reforms and Their Impacts 
The main structure of the social security system in Turkey is established on the basis 
of social insurance schemes which classify participants according to their 
employment status. Accordingly, public sector workers have a different scheme than 
private sector workers and across the private sector, self-employed people have a 
scheme that is separated from those serving to an employer through a contract (ICC, 
1999). On the basis of this frame, as can be seen from the figure below, the Turkish 
social security system in 1999 comprised three parts: the first and main component 
consisted of the social insurance institutions which provided defined-benefit and 
PAYG-based state pensions. For workers in the private sector the Social Insurances 
Institution (Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu in Turkish); for public employees and civil 
servants the Superannuation Fund (Emekli Sandigi in Turkish); and for independent 
workers the Social Insurance Organization of Craftsmen, Tradesmen and Other Self-
Employed (Bag-Kur in Turkish) provided pension (and health) insurance services. 
The second component consisted of the social assistance under the name of social 
relief either in kind or money. These included aid from the Social Cooperation and 
Solidarity Institution, a modest old-age income for people who do not have any other 
pension, and the Green Card for free health services. The third part of the system is 
comprised of supplementary occupational funds for certain group of employees. The 
fund OYAK was organised for military service pensioners. The Workers’ Union 
which is a fund under the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and private 
insurance schemes under the life insurance companies, were also of minor 
importance in terms of additional coverage (Uralcan, 2005). 
In more detail, certain institutions, organisation and companies have been 
providing additional pension income alongside some social rights and aids in case of 
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need, under collective schemes those are called ‘foundation’ (‘sandik’ in Turkish). 
According to Banksen’s report (BANKSEN, 2012), there are 18 active foundations, 
twelve of them are provided by banks, five by insurance companies and one by a 
profession union.
53
 The total number of members of these foundations is around 
360.000. There are also ‘friendly societies’ (vakif) which allegedly control funds that 
amount to TL7 billion (in 2013).
54
 These funds are required to be transferred to the 
Individual Pension System by 2017.
55
 According to the Central Bank’s Institutional 
Sector list, there are four institutions founded with the special law to provide 
additional income for pensions
56
 alongside eighty institutions which provide 
additional pension income for their members and employees. These institutions 
consist of government agencies, private companies, financial intermediaries and 
banks.
57
  
  Amongst these foundations, one of the most important is the Isbank pension 
foundation which was established in 1933 and had 25.000 active members and 
26.000 passive members by 2015.
58
 This foundation invests in Isbank as it owns 
40.15% of the biggest private bank in the country. Thus, the additional pension 
income is provided through financial activities while making the bank’s employees 
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 1-) Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. Memur ve Hizmetlileri Yardım ve Emekli Sandığı Vakfı 2-) T.C. 
Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. ve T. Halk Bankası A.Ş. Mensupları ve Yardım ve Emekli Sandığı Vakfı  3-) 
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. Memur ve Hizmetlileri Emekli Sandığı Vakfı    4-) Akbank T.A.Ş. 
Mensupları Tekaüt Sandığı Vakfı       5-) Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası T.A.Ş. Memur ve 
Hizmetlileri Emekli Sandığı Vakfı          6-) Şekerbank T.A.Ş. Memur ve Hizmetlileri Sigorta ve 
Emekli Sandığı Vakfı    7-) Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O. Memur ve Hizmetlileri Emekli Sandığı 
Vakfı      8-) Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş. Mensupları Emekli Sandığı Vakfı      9-) Türkiye İmar Bankası 
A.Ş. Mensupları Yardım ve Emekli Sandığı Vakfı         10-) Fortis Bank A.Ş. Mensupları Emekli 
Sandığı Vakfı     11-) Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. Mensupları Yardım ve Emekli Sandığı Vakfı 
(Pamukbank Sandığı)     12-) Esbank Eskişehir Bankası T.A.Ş. Mensupları Emekli Sandığı 
Tesisi        13-) Milli Reasürans Mensupları Emekli Sandığı Vakfı        14-) Anadolu Anonim Türk 
Sigorta Şirketi Mensupları Emekli Sandığı Vakfı 15-) Türkiye Genel Sigorta A.Ş. Memur ve 
Hizmetlileri Emekli Sandığı Vakfı 16-) Ankara Anonim Türk Sigorta Şirketi Memur ve Hizmetlileri 
Emekli Sandığı Vakfı        17-) Liberty Sigorta A.Ş. (Şeker Sigorta) Personeli Sigorta Ve Yardım 
Sandığı Vakfı     18-) Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar ve Birlik Personeli Sigorta ve Emekli Sandığı Vakfı 
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 Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu (OYAK), İlkokul Öğretmenleri Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Sandığı 
(İLKSAN), Ereğli Kömür Havzası Amele Birliği Biriktirme ve Yardımlaşma Sandığı, Polis Bakım ve 
Yardım Sandığı (POLSAN). 
57
 Turkish Republic Central Bank Institutional Sector List, 2015. Available 
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and staff the major shareowner of the company. However, this is not to say that this 
investment model is common for other foundations providing pension income. 
Rather, there is another strategy implemented by the OYAK pension foundation 
which does not exclusively buy shares rather than becoming direct partners of 
companies or founding its own companies. OYAK was founded in 1961 with 65.000 
participants in order to provide additional social security coverage for social and 
physical risks confronted by its members, i.e. military forces and their families.
59
 
What is significant for OYAK’s case is that this foundation benefited from and 
contributed to the developmental state idea of the 1960s through establishing 
industrial factories and directly involving itself in productive activities. Thus, while 
OYAK has become one of the biggest conglomerates (holdings) in the country, it 
provided a remarkable additional pension income for its members while operating in 
industrial, service and finance sectors through activities including housing, 
automotive and investment trusts. To sum up, prior to the IPS, the Turkish pension 
system consisted of archaic forms of, mostly occupational, pension funds with 
country-specific features both in terms of coverage and investment strategies. With 
the IPS, most of these funds were transferred to the system but there are still some 
foundations which are to be transferred to the system by 2017 according to the IPS 
code. 
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 For history of OYAK see in Turkish. Available online: 
http://www.oyak.com.tr/TR/kurumsal/tarihce/1981---1990.html  Access date: 07.10.2016 
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Figure 5.1 Structure of the Turkish Social Security System in 1999 
Source: Adopted from (Uralcan, 2005, p. 22) 
The first stage of the pension reform process in Turkey started following the 
advice in the ILO Report (ILO, 1996), the Turkish government prepared the social 
security reform with Law No: 4447 which was legislated and came into effect in 
September, 1999 (Alpar, 2000). This Law implemented measures to decrease 
informal employment (re-organising a mandatory registration process at the 
beginning of the employment for the social insurance institutions). It also increased 
the premium levels, and pension benefits were tied to the inflation rate. The 
retirement age was also determined as 58 for women and 60 for men at this point. 
Unemployment insurance, which was a missing element in the social security system 
in Turkey until then, was introduced alongside other regulations changing old-age 
pension eligibility criteria and benefit calculations (ICC, 1999). 
The second stage of the reform was the foundation of the Individual Pension 
System (IPS) (Egeli & Ozen, 2009). The IPS is a private, funded pension scheme, 
which works on a defined contribution principle, and participation in the system is 
voluntary. The IPS does not abolish the PAYG pensions provided by the Social 
Security Institution; rather it goes along with them. The IPS was accepted on the 28
th
 
of March, 2001, with Law No. 4632 and the system officially commenced on the 27
th
 
of October, 2003 (PMC, 2004). The preliminaries of the IPS go back far beyond 
2003 as a Commission was established on the IPS in August 1999. The 
representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Institutions of 
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Social Security, the Under-Secretariat for the Treasury, and the relevant sectors 
attended that Commission. In May 2000, the draft of the law of “the Individual 
Pension Saving and Investment System” was presented to the Cabinet and, was 
accepted by the “Grand National Assembly of Turkey” on 28th March of 2001 
(GNAT, 2001). Furthermore, in order to organise the tax incentives for the 
Individual Pension System, the Turkish Government accepted another Law to change 
some of the tax rules on 28
th
 of June 2001. With this Law (GNAT, 2001), some tax 
incentives are provided for the participants in the system at different stages in their 
participation. The Law defines the IPS as follows: 
 The IPS is an individual pension system that is based on defined 
contributions and voluntary-participation principles. 
 The IPS is complementary to the public social security system. 
 The IPS aims to direct individuals’ pension savings into investment. 
 The IPS aims to provide additional income during retirement, thereby 
increasing welfare levels. 
 The IPS enables creation of long-term resources for the economy thus 
increasing employment and contributing to the development.
60
 
The organisational structure of the IPS includes the participant, the pension 
company, the portfolio manager and the regulatory bodies. The Under-Secretariat of 
the Treasury and the Capital Market Board (CMB) are the key institutions because 
they regulate the IPS and supervise the coherence between the separate elements of 
the system. The Pension Advisory Board is established to determine the individual 
pension policies and to make recommendations about the measures to be taken for 
the implementation of such policies. This Board consists of the Under-Secretariat of 
the Treasury as the President, and representatives (at least at the general manager 
level) of the Ministries of Finance and Labour and Social Security, as well as the 
representatives from the CMB (PMC, 2004).  
The Takasbank is the custodian of the system which is established under the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and assigned by the CMB of Turkey. Assets of 
pension mutual funds are safe-kept by Takasbank. The Takasbank’s major purpose is 
to provide clearing, settlement and custody services for the pension fund for buying 
and selling of assets. Procedurally, pension companies have to open an account at 
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 The Law is available at: www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4632.pdf (In Turkish) Access 
Date: 03.12.2014 
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Takasbank for each participant and they are required to present to the custodian the 
participant’s identity and communication information. Thus, the assets of the 
portfolio fund are kept in these accounts and they are under the assurance of 
Takasbank. The Pension Monitoring Centre (PMC), on the other hand, is a 
checkpoint where operations of pension companies are monitored on a daily basis 
and reported to the public authorities, as well as generating and providing 
information to the public and the participants. The PMC is founded by the Under-
Secretariat of the Treasury and eleven pension companies in July 2003 as a 
requirement of Law no. 4632 (GNAT, 2001). The Under-Secretariat of the Treasury 
authorises the PMC to produce accurate information.
61
  
In the IPS, private pension companies collect contributions of participants 
and invest these contributions in financial markets. The returns on the investment are 
paid to the pensioner in the case of retirement or exit from the system. Entrance to 
the system is based on the pension contract made between the participant and the 
pension company. On the basis of the retirement plan the participant chooses, the 
pension company signs a contract with the portfolio management company which 
manages the pension funds (PMC, 2004). A participant over 56 years old can be 
retired from the IPS if s/he has contributed to the system for at least 10 years 
(Gokbayrak, 2010b). Account holders are able to transfer their savings and 
accumulated rights to another pension company after fulfilling one year in the 
pension company (Korkmaz & Uygunturk, 2006). If the participant dies, the 
beneficiary of the participant can apply to the pension company for payment of the 
amount accumulated in the system. In a similar vein, if the participant suffers a 
permanent disability, s/he can apply for refund without being retired. However, in 
both circumstances, the payments are calculated on the basis of not-retired condition; 
which means that the participant cannot benefit from incentives and subsidies 
provided by the state. Finally, if the participant dies when s/he is retired from the 
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 The PMC is founded by the shareholders with 1.7 million USD paid-in capital. One of the 
shareholders is the Under-Secretariat of the Treasury with a privileged share in capital, other 
shareholders are 17 pension companies (Aegon Emeklilik Hayat, Allianz Hayat & Emeklilik, Anadolu 
Hayat Emeklilik, Asya Emeklilik & Hayat, Avivasa Emeklilik & Hayat, Axa Hayat & Emeklilik, 
BNP Paribas Cardif Emeklilik, Metlife Emeklilik & Hayat, Ergo Emeklilik & Hayat, Finans 
Emeklilik & Hayat, Garanti Emeklilik & Hayat, Groupama Emeklilik, Halk Hayat & Emeklilik, ING 
Emeklilik, Vakıf Emeklilik, Yapı Kredi Emeklilik, Ziraat Hayat & Emeklilik). These companies have 
licences to operate in the pension branch with an equal share in the capital. Available at: 
http://www.egm.org.tr/?sid=13 Access date: 03.12.2014 
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system, the benefits from the system and accumulated amount cannot be transferred 
to a spouse. 
The third stage of the reform has been wrought through the implementation 
of Law No: 5510, which was legislated in 2006, fundamentally changed the social 
security system (GNAT, 2006). The Law is known as the Social Insurance and 
General Health Insurance Law. On the basis of legal objections, the Law was 
amended and only came into effect in October 2008.
62
 With this reform, the three 
social insurance institutions are gathered under one roof and named as the Social 
Security Institution (SSI) (In Turkish Sosyal Guvenlik Kurumu SGK). Thus, the 
fragmented structure of the social insurance institutions has been changed alongside 
parametric adjustments explained below. 
Table 5.5 Pension eligibility criteria before and after the reform 
For entrants to the 
system 
Age of eligibility for 
retirement 
Contribution days Alternative eligibility 
condition 
Between 
September 1999 
and October 2008 
58 for women 
60 for men 
7000 25 Years of insurance 
with 4500 days of 
contribution 
After October 2008 58-65 for women 
60-65 for men 
9000 for civil 
servants and self 
employed; 
7200 for private 
sector workers 
65 Years old with 
5400 days of 
contribution 
Source: Law No: 5510 (GNAT, 2006) and Pensions at a Glance (OECD, 2013) 
According to the Law, entrants to the system after October 2008 can draw a 
pension at the age of 65 and with 7200 contribution days for workers whereas for 
civil servants and self-employed people the criterion is 9000 contribution days. The 
eligibility age will increase gradually between 2036 and 2048 when the age 
requirement will be 65 years for both women and men.
63
 The age of retirement is 
determined according to the year in which the contribution day requirement is 
fulfilled. The alternative eligibility condition (for entrants to the system after October 
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 Some of the articles of the Law were brought to the Constitutional Court by the President at the 
time, arguing that they were against the equality principle of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution 
cancelled those articles and government legislated new laws to fill the gaps. 
63
 The eligibility age was implemented as following: between 1/1/2036 and 31/12/2037 for women 59, 
for men 61, between 1/1/2038 and 31/12/2039 for women 60, for men 62, between 1/1/2040 and 
31/12/2041 for women 61, for men 63, between 1/1/2042 and 31/12/2043 for women 62, for men 64, 
between 1/1/2044 and 31/12/2045 for women 63, for men 65, between 1/1/2046 and 31/12/2047 for 
women 64, for men 65, and as of 1/1/2048 for both women and men 65. 
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2008) is 65 years of age with 5400 days of contributions. The minimum pensions are 
granted to those who are at or older than 65 years without any other income or 
insurance to be detected by a means test. Moreover, miners can draw a pension when 
they are 55 years old with a 20-year contribution record. 
With Law No: 5510, the calculation methods of pension entitlements and 
benefits are also changed. There are two main calculations for defined-benefit 
pension schemes; the first one is the indexation of the monthly benefits which are 
being paid to current retirees. The purpose is to prevent any purchasing power loss of 
retired people because of price movements. The second one is the calculation of 
future benefits that is based on the actuarial rate (expected value of future loss), i.e. 
the multiplier of current salary and service duration of the worker. The reform has 
changed both calculation methods in a way which results in lower pension benefits. 
The indexation used to include the whole of economic growth whereas it is modified 
to reflect only 30%. The actuarial rate was 2.6% under the non-linear formula 
whereas now it is linear and 2% (Karadeniz, 2009). 
“The pension under the scheme [for participants between 1999-2008] is based 
on average lifetime earnings revalued in line with real GDP growth and the 
change of CPI [(1 + GDP) x (1 + CPI)]. The pension has a non-linear formula 
with years of coverage. The first ten years earn a pension of 35% of pay, with 
2% per year extra for the next 15 years and 1.5% per year thereafter. The 
pension under the new scheme [for participants after 2008] is based on 
average lifetime earnings revalued in line with real GDP growth and the 
change of CPI [(1 + CPI + 30% GDP)]. The accrual rate is 2% for one year of 
coverage and it cannot exceed 90% of pension.”(OECD, 2013, pp. 354–355)  
The last measure regarding the pension level within the reform is the change of 
premium rates. The social security system in Turkey is financed through 
contributions of employees and employers, namely premium which is a certain 
percentage of the wage. In the Turkish system, premium is collected under two 
different names. The first is defined as the long-term premium and it includes the 
disability, old age and death categories. This premium equals to 20% of the wage and 
the employee contributes 9% while the employer contributes 11%. The second type 
of premium is called short-term and it consists of contributions for occupational 
disease, occupational accident, sickness and maternity. This premium is 2% of the 
wage and is paid by the employer only. Until very recently, the premium for the 
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short-term insurances was determined gradually according to the jeopardy of the 
work, ranging between 1% and 6.5%. However, with a regulation in September, 
2013, the risk classification has been abandoned and the contribution is fixed at 2%. 
Besides long- and short-term insurances, there are two other categories of premia for 
general health insurance and unemployment fund. The total contribution to the 
general health insurance, which is required for benefiting public health services, is 
12.5% of the wage (contributed 5% by employee, 7.5% by employer). Finally, the 
unemployment fund contribution is 1% for the employee and 2% for the employer 
while government also contributes with 1% of the wage. 
Table 5.6 Premium rates in the Turkish Social Security System after the Reform (%) 
Type of insurance Employee Employer Government  
Occupational accident, 
disease, sickness and 
maternity 
- 2 - 
Disability, Old-age, 
invalidity 
9 11 [6 by employer] 
[5 by government] 
- 
General Health Insurance 5 7.5 - 
Unemployment insurance 1 2 1 
Source: Law No: 5510 (GNAT, 2006) (Social Security Institution, 2013) 
Premium incentives are introduced for the first time with Law No: 5084 in 
2004. The aim of the incentive is to increase investment and employment as well as 
encouraging regular premium payments by the employers. According to this, the 
Law No: 5510 implemented 5% of the premium of the employer to be paid by the 
government. This means the Treasury directly subsidises employers by paying 
almost half of their long-term premium payments (5% over 11%). The only 
requirement to benefit from this incentive is that the employer is to pay all of the 
remaining social security contributions on time and regularly. As a result of this 
incentive, the new premium rates are as follows: the employee pays 9% of the net 
wage to the state PAYG pension scheme, whereas the employer pays 6% and 
government pays the 5% of employee’s net wage (Social Security Institution, 2013). 
As a result of all these measures within the reform, the Turkish pension 
system has changed in a way that: 
 Getting a pension is more difficult, needing to be older and work for longer 
periods; 
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 Already entitled pension benefits will be increased less after the pension 
reform and for entrants to the system after 2008 - the pension benefits they 
draw will be lower than the level before the reform; 
 The premium burden of employers decreases within the system whereas the 
burden of employees remains the same and is highest amongst other parties 
contributing to the system. 
Figure 5.2 Structure of the social security system after 2008 
 
In other words, these reforms have managed to achieve the initial goal of 
decreasing state-scheme’s weight within the pensions while rendering retirement 
difficult from the PAYG system as well as decreasing the benefits. However, these 
reforms also have adverse impacts on certain groups within the population which 
occupy a vulnerable position in the labour market. In effect, the Turkish labour 
market consists of a considerable amount of people that would be deemed to be in 
fragile conditions. These people are those unemployed (temporarily or permanently), 
those employed informally and women whose labour force participation rate is 
dramatically low in Turkey (Dedeoglu, 2012). Unemployment is very high at 10.7% 
on average between 2004 and 2013 despite the relatively low labour force 
participation rate (50.8% in 2013). 
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Table 5.7 Main indicators of the Turkish labour market 2004-2013 (in 000s) 
Year Non-
institutional 
population 
Working-
age 
population 
Labour-
force 
Employment Unemployed Informal 
employment 
2004 66,379 47,544 22,017 19,632 2,385 9,843 
2005 67,227 48,359 22,455 20,067 2,388 9,666 
2006 68,066 49,174 22,751 20,423 2,328 9,593 
2007 68,901 49,994 23,114 20,738 2,376 9,423 
2008 69,721 50,772 23,805 21,194 2,611 9,220 
2009 70,542 51,686 24,748 21,277 3,471 9,238 
2010 71,343 52,541 25,641 22,594 3,046 9,772 
2011 72,376 53,593 26,725 24,110 2,615 10,139 
2012 73,604 54,724 27,339 24,821 2,518 9,686 
2013 74,457 55,608 28,271 25,524 2,747 9,379 
Source: Labour Statistics Reports by Ministry of Labour and Social Security, (MoLSS, 2014) Note: 
Non-institutional population comprises all the population excluding the residents of dormitories of 
universities, orphanages, rest homes for elderly persons, special hospitals, prisons and military 
barracks. (MoLSS, 2014) 
As a result of the high unemployment and low labour force participation rate 
characteristics of the Turkish labour market, the rate of insured over pensioners 
decreases. This means that while there were more people paying into the system to 
support one pensioner, this number has decreased in a way that increases the burden 
of each insured individual. Therefore, the contribution rates are high as frequently 
complained about the Turkish social security system. The purpose of the pension 
reforms increasing the eligibility age for retirement is to increase this rate by 
decreasing the number of pensioners. However, what is always missed, or neglected, 
is the fact that there is another way to intervene in this rate; that is to increase the 
number of insured by pushing up the employment rates. Indeed, as can be seen from 
the table below, the measures taken by the pension reforms have not resulted in 
quick improvements at the environment of high chronic unemployment rates in 
Turkey. 
Moreover, with the latest reforms, the unemployment feature of the Turkish 
labour market has become more crucial because (private sector) workers have to 
contribute 7200 days (and civil servants and self-employed people 9000 days) for 
retirement. Therefore, any interruption within working life would cause severe 
problems in drawing a pension. In a similar vein, the low rate of labour force 
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participation has become even more problematic since the dependency pensions are 
significantly restricted with reforms.  
Table 5.8 Coverage of the Turkish social security system 
Years Insured Pensioners Dependents 
Coverage of 
Social 
Security 
Rate of Insured 
over Pensioner 
2003 12,289,808 6,848,022 28,661,079  48,094,450   1.99 
2004 12,553,265 7,174,632 30,109,280 50,138,617 1.93 
2005 13,156,439 7,504,453 31,423,261 54,667,326 1.95 
2006 14,124,935 7,913,724 32,330,398 56,423,907 1.95 
2007 14,763,075 8,279,444 33,070,537 56,423,907 1.95 
2008 15,041,268 8,746,703 33,227,265 57,338,454 1.87 
2009 15,096,728 9,173,750 33,989,891 58,591,574 1.78 
2010 16,196,304 9,518,648 35,470,436 61,506,194 1.84 
2011 17,374,631 10,014,982 36,348,316 64,088,819 1.87 
2012 18,352,859 10,382,419 33,807,725 62,899,043 1.90 
2013 18,886,989 10,607,263 32,944,917 62,806,374 1.90 
2014 
(July) 
19,482,604 10,795,051 33,557,833 64,209,254 1.91 
Source: Social Security Institution Insurance Statistics, Monthly Basic Indicators 2014 July 
(Social Security Institution, 2014) 
In addition to high unemployment rates, the Turkish labour market is also 
characterised by the high informality problem. It is often argued that the reason 
underlying the informality is that social security institutions require high contribution 
levels, i.e. high premiums. In order to decrease the social security related labour 
costs, employers hire workers without formal contracts. However, when these 
workers are not registered, the rate of insured over pensioners decreases. In turn, 
social security institutions have to increase contribution premiums in order to finance 
pensioners. As a result of this vicious circle, informality is high within labour market 
in Turkey (Gokbayrak, 2010b) (Balci Izgi, 2008).  
That is why some authors have opposed the pension reform by arguing that 
the underlying reason behind the social security deficit is the structural ‘informality’ 
and, since the reform cannot solve this problem, it is inappropriate to change the 
system as proposed (Guzel, 2005). Nevertheless, informality within the Turkish 
labour market has shown a declining trend from 50.1% in 2004 to 36.7% in 2013 
according to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security data (see the table 5.9).  
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Table 5.9 Informality within the Turkish labour market (in 000s and %) 
Year Informal 
employment 
Non-agricultural 
informal 
employment 
Informal 
employment 
rate 
Informal 
employment rate in 
non-agricultural 
workers 
2004 9,843 4,707 50.1 33.8 
2005 9,666 5,119 48.2 34.3 
2006 9,593 5,285 47.0 34.1 
2007 9,423 5,132 45.4 32.3 
2008 9,220 4,814 43.5 29.8 
2009 9,238 4,818 43.8 30.1 
2010 9,772 4,195 43.3 29.1 
2011 10,139 4,988 42.1 27.8 
2012 9,686 4,589 39.0 24.5 
2013 9,379 4,369 36.7 22.4 
Source: Labour Statistics report for the years 2009, 2011 and 2013 by the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security (MoLSS, 2014) (MoLSS, 2012) (MoLSS, 2010).  
The third characteristic of the Turkish labour market regarding the varying 
impacts of reformed pension system is the low participation rate of women in the 
workforce (Gokbayrak, 2010a). This is extremely low, only 30.8% whereas it is 
71.5% for men in 2013. This low rate, by some authors, is associated with the 
transition from agricultural to industrial production because, under the former, 
women are included in the labour force statistics as non-paid family workers whereas 
in the latter they are dropped from employment as a result of difficulties in adapting 
to the urban labour market (Gokbayrak, 2011). Further, on average women earn less 
than half as much as men, and institutional services for childcare are inadequate 
which causes women to stay out of professional life. Also, there are labour market 
regulations those strengthen the patriarchal structure of the labour market, such as 
enabling women to receive severance pay if they quit a job after marriage (Dedeoglu, 
2012). Given the interrupted careers of women due to time spent out of working life 
for giving birth and taking care of the children, the social security reform, which 
extended the contributory periods to 9000 days, makes it difficult for women to fulfil 
the lifelong career target.  
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Table 5.10 Participation to the labour force according to gender 2004-2013 (%) 
Year Labour force participation rate Male Female  
2004 46.3 70.3 23.3 
2005 46.4 70.6 23.3 
2006 46.3 69.9 23.6 
2007 46.2 69.8 23.6 
2008 46.9 70.1 24.5 
2009 47.9 70.5 26 
2010 48.8 70.8 27.6 
2011 49.9 71.7 28.8 
2012 50 71 29.5 
2013 50.8 71.5 30.8 
Source: (MoLSS, 2014) (MoLSS, 2012) (MoLSS, 2010) 
Even if women work for a while, they mainly get pension income as 
dependants (on the basis of a family member’s working period) as they do not work 
until their retirement. As a result, most women have dependency pensions whereas 
for men it is the opposite (men mostly have pensions as a result of their working 
history not their family members’). In this regard, the new social security system 
decreases the level of benefit from dependency pensions. In the previous system, 
women who lost their husbands were able to get 75% of their husbands’ pension 
benefit, whereas now, if they start working, they will be paid 50% (M. Sahin, 2012). 
In this regard, the social security reform by tightening eligibility conditions for 
dependent pensions aims to push women’s labour force participation rate. However, 
this does not imply increasing gender equality within the social security system 
because the causality is from the labour market to the social security system, not the 
other way around (Ş. Sahin, Elveren, Dedeoglu, & Elveren, 2012).  
To sum up, pension reforms in Turkey has fundamentally transformed the 
old-age income provision with arguments of solving social security system’s ageing, 
deficit, coverage, and institutional management related problems while strengthening 
its power to alleviate poverty. However, through a detailed investigation of the 
reform process and the implications of reforms we have shown that some of the 
problems, such as ageing and deficits related to ageing population, do not exist in the 
Turkish context (at least not in the way which is proposed by the WB or because of 
the reasons suggested by reform advocates). Moreover, the problems which are 
addressed correctly by the reform advocates, such as low coverage and structural 
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problems of the system, are not solved by any measures taken with the reforms. 
Therefore, there is a serious problem-resolution mismatch within the reform process 
of the Turkish pensions.  
What is even more interesting is to see that the latest pension reforms have 
exacerbating impacts on characteristic problems of the Turkish labour market, such 
as unemployment, informality and low female participation rate to the labour force. 
On the basis of this reasoning it can be argued that the main motivation of the 
pension reforms has been to increase the finance’s integration to the old-age income 
provision rather than solving the problems of the Turkish pension system. This is 
why the IPS has been suggested to solve structural problems of the Turkish pension 
system while there is no chance it can have the slightest influence on issues such as 
unemployment, informality or women’s disadvantaged position within the labour 
market. By discrediting these arguments regarding the IPS, we show its essential role 
to prevail financialisation of pensions in the next section. 
5.4. IPS, financialisation and the pension reforms 
The social security reforms and the IPS seem completely independent of one another 
at first glance. This is because they were enacted under different laws with 
arguments that they would solve different problems in terms of old-age income. In 
this regard, the social security reform is argued to stand for solving the social 
security budget deficits by decreasing the replacement ratio and enhancing the 
sustainability of the system through the change of eligibility criteria. On the other 
hand, missions attributed to the IPS are considerably different for being mostly 
economic goals, such as increasing employment, creating long-term resources and 
reinforcing economic development (Korkmaz & Uygunturk, 2006). Accordingly, the 
pension funds within the IPS will achieve these goals by transforming capital 
markets. This will occur as a result of the transformation of the individual into 
institutional investment through pension funds. Moreover, pension funds will deepen 
capital markets with the supply of long-term funds for accumulation (Sener & Akin, 
2010). Finally, the system is claimed to provide the optimum use of resources 
because the participants in the IPS would desire their savings to be applied in the 
best way and competition between the pension companies for the highest 
performance would lead to higher returns (Avci, 2011).  
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Any of these missions attributed to the IPS are related to the social security 
system’s problems. However, as we recall from the discussions on the individual 
pillar that is suggested by the WB, the private funded scheme is argued to have the 
implicit advantage of being independent from the structural problems of labour 
markets. This implies that whatever the eligibility requirements of the PAYG state 
scheme, such as the retirement age, contribution days or low benefits, the 
participants of the individual scheme are able to engage in the private scheme more 
easily. Moreover, the return of the funded scheme is not limited to the actuarial 
regulations or low indexation rates; rather, the pensioner gets what s/he contributes, 
on the basis of financial performance of investments. This flexibility argument, along 
with the additional income provided by the private scheme, provides a discourse of 
justification for the financialised pension schemes. Thus, pension reforms should be 
considered alongside the introduction of the individual schemes as an element of 
financialisation of pension provision. In other words, the IPS is only another stage of 
the pension reform advised by the WB (Guzel, 2005).  
For that reason we argue here that despite the independent appearance of 
social security reform and the IPS, both serve for the financialisation of pensions 
while the former shrinks the state pensions and paves the way for the latter for those 
able to participate. The argument of financialisation of pensions is based on three 
assertions. First, it is aimed to change the main source of the pension income from 
state schemes to individual savings with the reforms. Second, the main factor 
determining the level of pension income is changed from tax and contribution 
premiums to financial market performance. Third, the perception of pension as a 
right for social security is changed into pension as an individual investment under the 
shadow of the IFIs. These three features of financialised pension provision are 
demonstrated by investigating the experience of the pension system in Turkey. 
The role of the IPS in terms of financialisation is even more explicit when we 
investigate the way in which it has developed and general characteristics of its 
participants. As illustrated in the table below, the IPS started its journey in 2004 with 
330 thousand participants’ funds of TL300 million which is invested by 10 
companies. However, these modest numbers have increased substantially when in 
2013 the number of participants were more than four millions and the value of funds 
within the system amounted TL25 billion.  
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Table 5.11 Development of the Individual Pension System between 2004 and 2013 
Year 
Number of 
Participant 
Funds (TL) 
Number of 
intermediaries 
Number of 
pension 
companies 
2004 334,557 296,133,224 5,597 10 
2005 714,146 1,227,661,174 10,029 11 
2006 1,073,650 2,821,487,474 12,135 11 
2007 1,457,704 4,570,924,599 12,422 11 
2008 1,745,354 6,372,756,623 13,735 12 
2009 1,987,940 9,097,436,467 15,666 13 
2010 2,281,478 12,011,986,651 16,716 13 
2011 2,641,843 14,329,771,986 17,868 15 
2012 3,128,130 20,346,290,278 20,176 17 
2013 4,153,055 25,145,718,418 26,639 18 
Source: Data are collected from several Pension Monitoring Centre Reports available at: 
http://www.egm.org.tr/?pid=360 Access date: 12.Dec.2014 
In line with the ILO Report (1996) the IPS has been supported by tax 
incentives from the beginning. Before 2013 the incentive was implemented as tax 
exemptions, i.e. the contributions to the IPS and a certain percentage of the benefit 
gained from the IPS was excluded from income tax. The form of incentive was 
changed in 2013 from tax exemption to direct contribution of 25%, i.e. for 
participant’s every TL100 contribution government contributes TL25. 64  This 
lucrative incentive doubled the increase in the number of new participants and 
caused one million new people to join the IPS in 2013. Moreover, the average 
contribution paid by new participants in the system increased by around 30%. As a 
result, at the end of 2013, the fund value of the system rose beyond 25 billion 
Turkish Liras with an increase of 24% in one year.
65
 But not all contributions 
accumulated within the system are invested because the administrative expense fees 
are deducted. As the IPS came into effect in 2003 and those entering the system 
needed to stay within the system at least ten years, by 2013 the system rewarded its 
first pensioners who turned 56 years old. The number of participants entitled to 
pensions in 2013 was 7,577.
66
  
                                                 
64
 State contributions are subject to certain contribution ceilings and they are invested separately from 
individual’s contributions. This is elaborated in the next chapter. 
65
 Although the Turkish lira value of the funds increased in 2013, because of the depreciation of the 
Turkish lira against US$ the value of funds contracted in US$ terms (PMC, 2014). 
66
 By the end of 2013, TL 21,455,900,238 was invested after deduction of TL 465,959,876 fees for 
administrative expenses from the total amount collected from contracts in force. Apart from 
contributions, an amount of TL 188,221,931 was paid as entrance fee. 
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The participants in the IPS are mostly middle- or high-income earners who 
see IPS as an external saving mechanism that is supported by lucrative tax incentives 
rather than additional old-age income. This argument is supported by the data on 
participants of the IPS. Most of the IPS participants have monthly income that is 
higher than the gross minimum wage (GMW). More than 70% of participants’ net 
income ranges between one and three times monthly GMW.
67
 On the other hand, 
participants with net monthly income more than six times of GMW (but less than 10 
times of GMW) make up 12% of total participants (they own 33.8% of total 
accumulation). The number of participants with monthly income equal or less than 
the GMW is only 0.5% of total participants while they accumulate only 0.2% of total 
funds. On the other hand, participants with income level higher than 10 times of 
GMW (7.8% of participants) accumulated 43% of total funds (PMC, 2013, p.24). It 
is transparent that people with low-income levels do not have a place in the IPS 
whereas high-income participants mostly benefit from the system.  
Figure 5.3 Average monthly incomes of workers according to monthly gross minimum wage 
 
Source: (PMC, 2013)
68
  
By 2013, the average age of the IPS participants is recorded as 38 while the 
weighted average age in terms of accumulation owned is 44.8. This means most of 
the participants are young or middle-aged whereas older participants own more 
assets. According to the profession data in 2013, the dominant share of the 
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 The share of this income group within the total accumulation of the funds is 53.2% 
68
  The data on net income of participants are collected on the basis of information they give during 
registration to the pension company. The figure is drawn on the basis of the information given by 
21.5% of participants. Not all participants give accurate information on their income level. 
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participants is the self-employed with 28.9% of all the IPS participants. Further, 
16.1% of participants are housewives and the share of doctor/pharmacist is 8.2% 
while 8% of the participants are workers.
69
 The shares of participants with 
professions of bank personnel, engineer and civil servant are all around 6%. Finally, 
a mixture of teacher, academician, lawyer, architect and retired people consist of 
20% of participants.  
There are other researches supporting our argument. For instance, research by 
Sener and Akin (2010) shows that almost 75% of the participants have income more 
than 1000 Turkish Liras per month (which is more than the minimum wage of the 
time); and the willingness for participating in the system is less with people who 
have income lower than 1500 TL per month. This reveals that the system is popular 
amongst people who are from the middle-income range. In a similar vein, Onal 
(2001) argues that lower income-groups would not participate in the system because 
modest contributions would draw insignificant returns as shown by Ergenekon 
(2001) with a simulation (lower income groups get a pension from the IPS with a 
replacement rate of 53%). 
What all these findings tell us is that the IPS is a system which mainly 
comprises of young, middle- and high-income earners with high-education levels. 
However, this participant profile is not exactly what was suggested within the ILO 
Report (1996). Accordingly, the IPS was supposed to increase the coverage of 
pension system by including self-employed and agricultural workers. This argument 
was underpinned by the reasoning that people from these employment statutes have 
very unsteady income flow thus they are not able to fit in PAYG scheme. However, 
the flexible nature of private schemes would suit their conditions. 
Indeed, agricultural workers in Turkey are excluded from the social security 
system through high premium floors (Gokbayrak, 2011). The agricultural workers 
who constitute the lowest income group (ILO, 1996) are not covered by the IPS as 
revealed by the income characteristics of members above.
70
 Thus, most of the 
agricultural workers is compelled to survive with a means-tested social assistance 
pension, which is given to people who are more than 65 years old and is very low 
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 Only 35% of the participants give accurate information of profession. 
70
 As mentioned before, the share of people who have less income than minimum wage is only 0.5%. 
Thus, it can be argued that rural area workers could not have participated in the IPS. Even if they did 
so, their returns would not be satisfactory since the studies show that the IPS can only provide 
reasonable pension income if the contributions are higher than a certain threshold which is beyond the 
limits of what farmers can afford. 
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(around 35% of monthly minimum wage and paid in every three months). Thus, the 
IPS is far from providing solutions for the coverage problem of the reformed pension 
system in terms of agricultural workers. 
On the other hand, self-employed people participate in the IPS as the most 
dominant group of professionals as mentioned above. The number of participants in 
the IPS is 4.1 million as of 2013. This means there were around 1.2 million self-
employed in the IPS by 2013.
71
 The decreasing number of self-employed people in 
the social security system can be seen from the table below. We read this as self-
employed people who opt out from the state system, due to lower pension benefits 
and higher premium contributions, participate instead in the IPS. 
Table 5.12 Active members of the Turkish social security system 
Coverage 4a Private 
sector workers   
4b Self-employed  4c Civil Servants Total Insured 
2008 9,574,873 3,260,719 2,205,676 15,041,268 
2009 9,618,438 3,236,872 2,241,418 15,096,728 
2010 10,575,935 3,337,858 2,282,511 16,196,304 
2011 11,547,134 3,273,297 2,554,200 17,374,631 
2012 12,527,337 3,162,914 2,662,608  18,352,859 
2013 13,136,339 2,927,250 2,823,400 18,886,989 
2014 July 13,609,439 3,008,365 2,864,800 19,482,604 
Source: Social Security Institution Insurance Statistics, Monthly Basic Indicators 2014 July 
(Social Security Institution, 2014)  
The second column of the table 5.12 shows the number of self-employed 
people in the PAYG pension scheme (with the official code of 4b). This number has 
decreased whereas the numbers of workers in the private sector (4a) and civil 
servants (4c) have increased. When we calculate the percentage of self-employed 
people with active membership of the social security system, we see that their share 
decreased from 21% to 15% between 2008 and 2013.
72
 On the other hand, at the 
same period, the total number of self-employed people in the IPS increased from 
815.000 to 1.162.000. Thus, we draw the conclusion that self-employed people have 
responded to the social security reform, exactly in the way the authorities expected: 
replacing the state pension with the individual scheme. 
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 28.9% of 41530055 equals to 1.200.232. 
72
 3261/15041= 0.21 and 2927/11887=0.15. We take the social insurance systems’ data for 2013 
because the data on IPS are available for that year. 
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Table 5.13 Passive members of the Turkish social security system (in 000s) 
SSI Coverage 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
4a 5,024 5,290 5,535 5,777 6,026 6,260 6,409 
      -Old Age 3,467 3,665 3,850 4,041 4,235 4,412 4,534 
      -Survivors 1,362 1,426  1,483 1,531 1,582 1,635 1,659 
4b 1,965 2,088 2,160 2,381 2,469 2,422 2,444 
     -Old-age 1,252 1,341 1,383 1,515 1,553 1,575 1,587 
     -Survivors 698 731 760 847 896 828 836 
4c 1,756 1,795 1,822 1,856 1,886 1,923 1,941 
     -Old-age 1,252 1,341 1,383 1,515 1,553 1,575 1,587 
    -Survivors 528 543 552 566 578 592 603 
Total pensioners 8,746 9,173 9,518 10,014 10,382 10,607 10,795 
Source: Social Security Institution Insurance Statistics, Monthly Basic Indicators 2014*:July 
(Social Security Institution, 2014)  
Another projection of the ILO report was that the establishment of the IPS 
would decrease the burden of state in terms of pension spending while assigning 
individual responsibility within the pension system. Meanwhile, the government 
would devote the resources previously used to subsidise the PAYG scheme into the 
social assistance scheme. Thus, the pension spending, which is high but not adequate 
to cover low income groups who do not have any other pension benefits, would be 
less but much more effective (covering more people in poverty). However, this 
projection proved to be wrong because the IPS does not decrease the state’s burden 
since it is subsidised by incentives. By the end of 2013, the total amount paid in this 
regard was TL1,369,932,116 for 2,800,129 participants which equals to TL489 per 
person for contributing to the IPS (PMC, 2013).  
It is clear that the IPS cannot provide solutions to problems of the Turkish 
pension system as long as it does not mitigate the structural problems of the labour 
market. There is no need to show for what reasons unemployed and informally 
employed people are not able to join the IPS. However, there is an interesting point 
worth to be discussed. That is the female participation in the IPS which is 
considerably high in a way that supports the argument that the private scheme is 
gender-equal for being independent from employment status. Indeed, female 
participants own 42% of the total accumulations. Moreover, 16.1% of participants 
define themselves as housewives, i.e. unpaid house worker. Some authors explain 
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this outcome, the IPS being equal in gender terms and gives similar results for 
women and men, with the fact that most of the participants in the IPS belong to 
similar socio-economic backgrounds (Ş. Sahin et al., 2012). Moreover, it is argued 
that as much as social security system becomes commercialised in Turkey, gender 
disparity within the IPS would reflect those in labour markets in particular and 
society in general (A. Y. Elveren, 2008) (Bozkus & Elveren, 2008).
73
  
There are several reasons for private pension schemes to not provide the 
gender equality that is attributed to them. First of all, although contributions are 
flexible, it is still a crystal clear fact that the wage levels are different for men and 
women. Moreover, starting with lower wages and having lesser increases in wages 
cause another significant difference between men and women. Further, since 
women’s funds are smaller than men’s, the management expenses’ share is higher 
for women than men. Finally, women live longer than men with a smaller pension 
pot (Ş. Sahin & Elveren, 2014).  
“Since women have a higher life expectancy even if they have the same 
capital accumulation through their working years compared to men, women’s 
retirement income will be lower because the total amount is distributed 
during a longer time period. Gender inequality is perpetuated and deepened in 
the private pension scheme with overall gender-biased regulations in social 
security. Our results show that women are disadvantaged from the outset, 
receiving a lower wage than men, and therefore contributing less to their 
private pension scheme than men, on the whole. This discrimination is 
worsened when we account for the fact that women work fewer fulltime years 
than men”. (A. Elveren Y. & Hsu, 2007, p. 8)  
Thus, projections show that the pension income difference of women and men from 
the IPS would range around 20% to 79% on the basis of age and education (Ş. Sahin 
et al., 2012). 
Indeed, when we look closer at the monthly contributions according to 
gender, we see that women’s contributions are always lower than men. Since the 
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 According to Bozkus and Elveren (2008), when the income effect is eliminated, women and men 
differ significantly in terms of their contributions to the system which change according to the age, 
education level and the cities in which they live. Second, although the regular contribution rates seem 
similar for both genders, the influences of other social factors (age, education level and the city in 
which they live) make considerably different impacts on women and men. This finding is reached as a 
result of a simulation which assumes that all working people join the system, and the state system is 
completely privatised to show how women and men’s pension income would vary. 
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return from the contributions determines future pension income, it can be argued that 
women would draw lower pension benefits from the IPS.
74
  
Figure 5.4 Average monthly contributions according to gender (TL) 
 
Source: (PMC, 2013, p. 33)  
To sum up, pension reform and the IPS do not address the problems with the 
Turkish pension system which originate from structural distortions within the labour 
market, such as high unemployment, high informality and low labour participation 
rates particularly across women. This invalidates the arguments of the WB and other 
defenders of pension reforms who bring forward the ageing population and high 
pension spending of governments to justify reforms. In particular, in developing 
countries where the income level is low, not least amongst the elderly, destroying the 
state schemes exacerbates the inter-generational redistribution of income. The private 
schemes, like the IPS, do not compensate for the backlash within the social security 
system pensions because private pensions are mostly preferred by, and benefit, 
middle- and high-income earners. Moreover, the pension returns from these schemes 
are completely dependent on financial market performance. This feature of private 
schemes puts old-age income under threat particularly in countries with unstable 
financial markets.  
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 The regional dimension of the IPS also shows expected features. The monthly regular contributions 
paid for the contracts in force in 2013 is 205 TL whereas this amount is 219 for participants who 
reside in the Marmara region which is the most developed, industrialised and urban region of the 
country. Moreover, there are 18,159 contracts with participants who are living abroad. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the idea of financialisation of pension provision is discussed in the 
context of the Turkish social security reforms and the private funded scheme, the 
IPS. In 1999, the transformation of the pension system has started through several 
reforms including a Social Security Reform reorganising the social security pensions 
and the Individual Pension System reform which introduced the private component 
to the pension system.  
We argue that pension reform trends in Turkey display significant similarities 
with pension reforms across the world. These themselves can be dated from the 
second half of the 1990s, following the WB’s “Averting the Old-Age Crisis” Report 
(WB, 1994). In common with elsewhere in the world, pension reform in Turkey has 
involved: tightening eligibility rules for getting a pension, such as higher retirement 
age and longer contribution periods; lower pension benefits through changing the 
benefit calculation and indexation methods; and introducing, or strengthening, the 
existing (private) financial component of the pension system.  
The WB’s pension model posits the state as basic income provider for the 
elderly in need whereas the main source of pension income is the accumulated funds 
of individuals. In this regard, the WB points at the involvement of the IFIs in 
policymaking on pensions while representing the interests of finance. Thus, the 
pension income has increasingly become financialised by being channelled through 
financial conduits, as well as, being dependent on financial market performance. This 
does not only put the elderly income at risk, but also changes the perception of 
pension income from ‘right to social security’ to ‘individual responsibility’.  
The pension reform in Turkey has been accomplished in three stages and, 
with the new model, the PAYG state scheme pays less (basic) pension benefits and 
with more difficult eligibility criteria, while the private funded scheme, the IPS, 
functions as a complement to the state scheme. As showed earlier, this model fits 
entirely with the advice of the WB for decreasing the state PAYG scheme’s share in 
the pension income and increasing the role of the financial element, the IPS in the 
case of Turkey. The IPS is attributed overwhelming functions to solve the problems 
of the social security system, such as coverage and state burden. In effect, this is not 
surprising because the argument of ‘ageing population’, which holds for the high-
income countries, does not address the problems of the social security system in 
Turkey, a country with a very young population. By illustrating through empirical 
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data it is shown that addressing funded schemes for problems they are incapable of 
solving is a way of concealing the real logic underlying pension reforms, i.e. 
financialisation. Analysing the social security reform in association with the IPS is 
crucial in providing evidence for the financialisation of pensions. 
This three-staged reform process has a rationale behind it: financialisation. 
For, pensions provided by the state should be lowered to a minimum, basic level; 
thus, the private schemes are designed to allow for desirable living conditions in old 
age. Since these, heavily propagated, individual schemes invest in financial markets, 
pension income is contingent on financial market returns and performance. This can 
be read as the financialisation of pension provision while financial markets fill the 
gap created from the withdrawal of state from the provision of pension income. In 
other words, financialisation plays a dual role here: first, it underlies the reform 
process by shaping the pension provision through involvement of the IFIs in 
policymaking. Second, it renders pension income to be provided through a financial 
conduit.  
Moreover, financialisation of pensions has had several impacts by being 
justified through ill-defined problems of the pension system while exacerbating the 
real problems. The main social security problems in Turkey are high employment, 
informality and low participation of women in the workforce. These problems 
originate from labour market structures and have been aggravating social security 
budgets by increasing the number of people who are benefiting from the system 
while the number of people contributing to the system decreases. None of the 
reforms of social security system has provided solutions to these problems, nor has 
the IPS. In effect, the eligibility rules are tightened in a way which excludes 
vulnerable people from the social security system Therefore, the impact of 
financialisation of pensions, as an element of social security reform and the IPS, has 
been crucial particularly for vulnerable groups.  
To sum up, social security reform and the Individual Pension System 
represent the financialisation of pension income by decreasing the pension income 
from the state PAYG system and linking elderly-income to financial market 
performance through pension funds. Financialisation of pensions refers to the 
individual saving mechanisms the state promotes as the main source of pension 
income for the better off, through which the level of pension income is determined 
by the financial market performance. At the same time, financialisation of pensions 
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resides within a bigger picture where finance increasingly integrates into social areas 
which were partially or entirely immune to finance in the past. 
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6. Financialisation and Pension Funds In Turkey 
6.1. Introduction 
The relationship between financialisation and pensions is discussed in two contexts 
in this study. In the previous chapter, we scrutinised the impact of the 
financialisation of pension provision which changes the way in which people receive 
pensions. On the other hand, now, we put forward a different side of the analysis: 
pension funds’ role in financialisation of the economy. In this chapter we argue that 
pension funds, that were established in 2003 as a component of the private pension 
scheme, namely the IPS, contribute to financialisation of the economy in Turkey. 
Pension funds’ function in terms of financialisation is visible in their impacts on the 
formation of capital markets in Turkey.  
In a nutshell, financialisation is the extensive and intensive growth of finance 
into ever more areas of the economic and social processes (Fine, 2013). In this 
regard, capital markets play a substantial role through enabling the production and 
exchange of sophisticated securities which cover assets that were out of financial 
conduits in the past. For instance, a person’s mortgage debt has become a financial 
instrument while this was not the case previously. Moreover, through securitisation, 
the relationship between the underlying asset and the security produced on the basis 
of the asset becomes weaker and ambiguous. This results in an increasingly 
speculative character of capital markets, an attribute of financialisation. Therefore, it 
can be argued that capital market formation is crucial in order to understand 
financialisation. 
 Regarding financialisation, we define two impacts of pension funds on the 
development of capital markets: first, the supply impact, which is characterised by 
rapid growth of pension funds which provide new capital inflows to financial 
markets, thus enabling the quantitative growth of capital markets; second, the 
demand impact of pension funds that stimulates the innovation of new investment 
instruments in general, and securitisation in particular. This argument that pension 
funds contribute to financialisation in Turkey, through transforming capital markets 
via supply and demand impacts, is developed in two sections. 
In the first section, we introduce the general characteristics of pension funds 
in Turkey by reviewing the relevant regulations. According to these, a person can 
join a private pension scheme by signing a contract with a pension company. The 
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pension company establishes at least three pension funds and assigns portfolio 
managers (at least one for each fund) to manage the portfolio of pension funds on the 
basis of fiduciary and risk diversification principles. A participant, on the other hand, 
chooses amongst different pension plans in which his/her contributions are invested. 
In order to clarify the risk and return features of a pension fund, the system consists 
of pension fund types. 
Since the beginning, there have been six pension types which vary according 
to investment instruments, strategies or both. These are: income, growth, money 
market, precious metals, specialised and other types of pension funds (PMC, 2016). 
After identifying each type’s peculiarity, we bring in two more pension fund types 
which have been introduced recently: state contribution type of pension funds and 
participation/alternative type of pension funds. State contribution funds were 
established after the 2013 regulation which introduced state contribution incentive of 
25% matching contributions for each participant.
75
 On the other hand, participation 
funds (also known as alternative pension funds) are interest-free pension funds 
which only invest in non-interest securities in order to attract participants with 
religion-related concerns (Islam prohibits interest income). 
Then, we review the development of figures on pension funds in Turkey. 
According to the data, the total value of pension funds’ assets have grown from 
TL42 millions in 2003 to TL37 billions in 2014 while the number of the IPS 
participants exceeded 5 million. Pension funds’ portfolio value had exceeded the 
portfolio value of mutual funds by 2014 (CMB, 2015a). We emphasise that the 
breakthrough in terms of the growth of pension funds dates from after 2013 
regulation which introduced state contribution incentives (CMB, 2014a). As a result, 
the share of pension funds’ assets in GDP has grown from 0.39% in 2003 to 4.86% 
by 2014. This absolute growth of pension funds is supported with relatively rapid 
growth of pension funds compared to other institutional investors in Turkey (OECD, 
2016).  
Moreover, across OECD countries, Turkey stands as a newcomer which has a 
very small, but also one of the most rapidly growing, pension funds’ portfolio value. 
Although having one of the smallest capital markets in the G20 countries with 
market capitalisation value of USD309 billions in 2012, Turkey has shown the most 
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 Available at: http://web2.egm.org.tr/webegm2/yeni_web/devlet_katki_main.asp Access 
date:31.05.2015 
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rapid growth in one year with a 53% increase in 2012.
76
 The most recent data 
indicate that this growth has slowed down in the last two years.  
In the third section, we deal with demand side impacts of pension funds on 
capital markets which significantly alter the qualitative character of capital markets 
in Turkey. Accordingly, the share of public securities within the total outstanding 
securities has been declining whereas the share of private sector securities has 
increased from 8.4% in 2003 to 26.9% in 2014 (CMB, 2015a). Moreover, within the 
private sector securities, the dominance of shares has decreased while other 
instruments have been introduced such as bank bills, corporate bonds, asset backed 
securities (ABSs) and warrants. The percentage of bank bills within the total 
outstanding securities has been recorded as 4.6 by 2014. Similarly, corporate bonds 
have constituted 3.3% of total outstanding securities in 2014. ABSs and warrants are 
still insignificant in terms of their shares within the capital markets (less than 1%). 
While issuing these instruments, or changing regulations in a way which enables 
these instruments to be issued, the authorities acknowledge pension funds as the 
initial source of demand for them.  
Then, we scrutinise the pension funds’ demand effects for innovation in 
capital markets in Turkey through a concrete case: lease certificates and their 
relations with participation accounts. With these, pension funds’ portfolio allocation 
has changed significantly, while the share of government debt securities has 
decreased from 80% in 2005 to 57% in 2014. Meanwhile, the share of assets 
gathered under the label of ‘other’ has increased from its initial value of less than 1% 
(in 2003) to 21% in 2014 (CMB, 2015a). We associate this shift from government 
debt securities to other assets with the proliferation of new instruments such as bank 
bills, corporate bonds, ABSs and warrants, and lease certificates in particular.  
Lease certificates, in a nutshell, are new capital market instruments which 
work on transfer-lease-take over principle which is a form of securitisation known as 
special purpose entities in the international markets (Treasury, 2015). In Turkey, 
lease certificates are packaged with Islamic references and advertised as ‘interest-
free bills’ that are appropriate for religious investors who want to avoid interest 
income. In this regard, government established interest-free state contribution 
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pension funds which had invested 93% of their portfolios in lease certificates by 
2014. In a similar vein, participation/alternative pension funds established by pension 
companies invest 63% of their portfolios in lease certificates in 2014 (PMC, 2014).  
In other words, securitisation in Turkey is packaged with religious references 
while the demand for these securities is provided by pension funds. This feature of 
intensification of finance indicates a peculiarity of financialisation in Turkey. We 
conclude with a summary of the main arguments made within the chapter and point 
out the contribution of this chapter in terms of analysing diverse impacts of 
financialisation of pensions in the context of capital markets. 
6.2. Pension funds in Turkey and supply side developments 
Pension funds in Turkey were founded in 2003 as a component of the private pension 
scheme, the IPS. In the IPS, participants get pension income according to the 
contributions made and the returns on contributions from investments in pension 
funds. The fund is managed by the portfolio managers while the participant chooses 
across different fund types those are available within the plans of the pension 
company. There are no upper or lower restrictions in terms of investment amounts 
and participants are able to check the profitability of the fund by accessing 
information through Takasbank.
77
 Pension funds invest pension contributions of the 
participant on the basis of two principles; fiduciary principle of property and 
diversification of risk. Fiduciary principle stands for the responsibility of the fund 
manager in terms of protecting the interests of the investors who gave them the right 
to decide for them. Fund expenses are covered through fee cuts on the fund while the 
total cut cannot exceed the percentage determined by rule. The total management 
fees include the operation fees. Management expense fees can be charged on the 
contributions at the maximum rate of 2%. Since 2012, in every three months, the 
company board implements a registration fee that is 1/100,000 of the fund’s asset 
value (PMC, 2016). 
The minimum number of funds that a pension company has to found is three 
and each fund needs to sign contract with at least one portfolio manager in order to 
start performing. Independent portfolio management companies undertake the 
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 Takasbank is the custodial institution mentioned in the previous chapter. The website of Takasbank 
enables participants to control their savings’ distribution across different fund groups. A participant is 
allowed to change the distribution of the accumulations in their accounts amongst different fund 
groups at most 6 times a year. 
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allocation of pension fund portfolios. If a pension company is associated with a bank, 
the bank’s fund managers undertake the management of the pension funds. 5% of the 
issued capital of the company is registered and fund portfolios are established with 
the amounts that correspond to this level (for each of three funds separately). If the 
value of shares exceeds the amount indicated within the directory of the fund, the 
number of shares is increased. Pension funds do not have a legal entity. Thus if the 
pension company goes bankruptcy, the funds and their returns cannot be 
appropriated as collateral to the company’s debt. In other words, pension funds’ 
assets cannot be hypothecated, shown as collateral to any other transaction except 
portfolio-related ones, or included in bankruptcy arrangements.  
There are some restrictions on investment decisions of pension funds: no 
more than 10% of pension funds can be invested in the same issuer’s money and 
capital market instruments. For asset leasing companies, this restriction is applied at 
25% rather than 10%. Moreover, the government debt securities both in TL and in 
foreign exchange (known as ‘Eurobonds’) are exempted from this restriction. 
Finally, the stocks issued by companies treated in BIST30 index are exempted from 
this constraint as well. Pension funds’ portfolios have to consist of assets treated in 
the stock exchange. Securities other than those on the stock exchange market can 
only be included up to 10% of the portfolio value. Deposit and participation accounts 
can be included to the portfolio maximum of 25%.
78
 However, the deposit or 
participation accounts held in one bank cannot exceed 6% of the portfolio. Debt 
securities and lease certificates issued by banks cannot exceed the 25% of the fund 
portfolio. And, share of one company cannot be invested in more than 10% of the 
portfolio. A maximum 10% of the portfolio can be invested in money market 
transactions. Maximum 20% of pension funds’ portfolios can be invested in mutual 
funds but one mutual fund’s share cannot exceed 4% of the portfolio. Warrants 
cannot be invested in more than 15% of the pension fund’s portfolio. 
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Participation account is an interest-free deposit account established in the participation banks for 
people who want to avoid interest-income which is regarded to be sinful in Islam. Return of 
participation account is based on capital participation of the bank from the investments of the 
borrowers. 
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Table 6.1 Constraints on pension funds’ portfolio investments 
Asset type Maximum % 
Deposit / Participation Bank Accounts 25 
Takasbank Money Market Transactions 10 
Mutual Fund Shares 20 
Asset backed securities 20 
Warrants 15 
There are different types of funds which are classified according to the 
dominant security in which they are mostly invested, by investment strategy or both. 
The Capital Markets Board determined six types on the 10
th
 of May 2002: income, 
growth, money market, precious metals, specialised and other funds.
79
 When a 
participant joins the system and needs to choose from different funds, the type of 
fund becomes a sort of indicator in terms of risk and return expectations. For 
instance, an ‘income type’ pension fund, with a name such as ‘Public debt securities 
income fund (TL)’, implies that the dominant share (at least 80%) of the fund’s 
portfolio consists of public domestic debt securities as well as reverse repos for 
bonds and T-bills.
80
 There are also income type pension funds which mostly consist 
of government foreign debt securities issued by the Treasury of Turkey in US$ or 
Euro, i.e. Eurobonds. Eurobond is an internationally listed investment instrument 
which is issued in the foreign exchange and suitable for long-run investment. All 
types of funds, in order to maintain the risk aversion principle, might consist of other 
assets such as gold and similar precious metals, and derivatives and other money 
market transactions such as options, forwards, warrants, future contracts.
81
  
                                                 
79
 The IPS regulation is available at the capital markets board website: 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/Mevzuat/PrinterFriendly.aspx?nid=13455&submenuheader=null Access 
date: 01.05.2015 
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 Reverse repos, in length ‘reverse repurchase agreement’, indicates the purchase of securities with 
the agreement to sell them at a higher price at a specific future date. For the party selling the security 
(and agreeing to repurchase it in the future) it is a repo; for the party on the other end of the 
transaction (buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse repurchase agreement. 
Repos are classified as a money-market instrument. They are usually used to raise short-term capital. 
Available at: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reverserepurchaseagreement.asp#ixzz3YagfOiTw 
Access date: 02.05.2015 
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 A warrant is a derivative security that gives the holder the right to purchase securities (usually 
equity) from the issuer at a specific price within a certain time frame. Warrants are often included in a 
new debt issue as a "sweetener" to entice investors. The main difference between warrants and call 
options is that warrants are issued and guaranteed by the company, whereas options are exchange 
instruments and are not issued by the company. Also, the lifetime of a warrant is often measured in 
years, while the lifetime of a typical option is measured in months. Available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/warrant.asp#ixzz3YaxI6MzW Access date: 02.05.2015 
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In comparison with the income funds, the growth type pension funds direct 
more investment in stocks of private sector companies. The most preferred stocks 
belong to the companies those are listed in the BIST 30 index.
82
 However, in the case 
of some growth funds, the portfolio mainly consists of foreign companies’ stocks. 
Money market type pension funds mostly invest in money market transactions such 
as options, forwards, warrants and future contracts. Precious metal type pension 
fund, on the other hand, mainly comprise gold and other precious metals related 
assets. Specialised type pension funds are more focused than both income and 
growth funds. For instance, a ‘developing-countries investment’ pension fund might 
consist of Brazil, China, India and Russian companies’ stocks as 80% of its portfolio. 
In a similar vein, a specialised fund might predominantly invest in stocks of one 
particular company. However, in order to stay within the investment restrictions of 
the pension funds regulations, the name of the fund has to clearly express this 
specific company. In other words, if a pension fund invests in a particular asset type 
more than 80% of the portfolio, the fund name has to indicate this. Finally, ‘other’ 
types of pension funds are those which only include standard investment instruments 
in order to give time to the new participants until they decide their investment 
strategy. Until now, we have summarized the general characteristics of income, 
growth, money-market, precious metals, specialized and other types of pension 
funds. However, after 2013, a new type of fund is established as a result of the state 
contribution incentive: the state contribution fund.  
In more detail, state contribution incentives came into effect on 1
st
 of January 
2013 in order to promote participation in the IPS. For this, the state contributes to 
participant’s account at the amount of 25% of the contribution made by the 
participant. The participant does not need to fulfil any other requirements to benefit 
from this incentive; contributing to the IPS is sufficient. Although the contributions 
to the IPS are not limited, the amount of the contribution which is subject to 
incentive is limited. The state contribution cannot be applied to amounts more than 
the annual gross minimum wage. In other words, the annual state contribution cannot 
exceed 25% of annual gross minimum wage.  
The Pension Monitoring Centre tracks the contribution amount and informs 
the state about it. Then, the state transfers 25% of that amount to the participant’s 
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 BIST stands for the abbreviation of Borsa Istanbul which is the name for stock exchange market. 
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state contribution account. There is an important nuance here: the participant’s own 
account is different and separated from the participant’s state contribution 
account. For instance, a participant who makes TL200 contributions every month 
has a state contribution of TL50 in her state contribution account. Thus, participant’s 
accumulation increases to TL250. If the participant opts out from the IPS, the state 
contribution and corresponding returns on these contributions are paid to the 
participant on the basis of time spent by participant at the IPS. In order to be entitled 
to the state contribution fund and its returns in full, a participant has to stay within 
the system until retirement, death or disability. 
“Percentage of entitlement to state contribution, based on the period of time 
spent within the system as from January 1, 2013, shall be 15% from 3 to 6 
years, 35% from 6 to 10 years, 60% for 10 years and over and 100% for 
retirement, death and disability. On the basis of the returns of the entitled 
portion of the state contribution, a withholding tax of 15% shall be imposed 
for those who pay contributions for less than 10 years, 10% for those who 
pay contributions for at least 10 years but opt out before they are entitled to 
retirement, and 5% for those who opt out due to reasons such as retirement, 
death and disability.” (PMC, 2013, p. 50)  
State Contribution Funds can invest in certain instruments, as shown in the table 
below, according to portfolio limitations introduced by law. 
Table 6.2 Investment restrictions of state contribution funds 
Instruments Minimum% Maximum% 
Government Bonds (TL), Revenue Sharing Bonds or Lease 
Certificate issued by Undersecretaries of Treasury  
75 100 
Turkish Lira Denominated; Deposit, Participation Account, 
traded in the stock market with the proviso bonds issued by 
banks or Lease Certificate issued by the bank’s subsidiary 
leasing companies  
0 15 
BIST 100 Index or BIST Participation Index Shares  0 15 
Reverse Repo and Takasbank Money Market Operations 0 1 
Source: Adapted from (PMC, 2013, p.82). 
Finally, there is one more type of pension funds which is either called 
participation or alternative type of pension fund. The portfolio of this type of funds 
consists of interest-free securities such as lease certificates, participation bank 
accounts, gold, capital markets instruments based on gold and other precious metals, 
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interest-free debt securities of private or public sector, and shares of companies listed 
in the BIST participation index. This type of funds is established for participants who 
do not want to get interest-income because of religious concerns. 
In addition to these ‘types’, pension companies label their funds with 
different names such as ‘liquid’, ‘flexible’, ‘balanced’ etc. Hence, a ‘liquid-flexible 
fund’, for instance, might mostly consist of reverse repo and short-term Takasbank 
money transactions, for which the average maturity of the portfolio does not exceed 
45 days. Lease certificates might also be heavily included within the portfolio. On 
the other hand, ‘mixed’ income type pension fund might invest in corporate bonds in 
order to provide long-term interest income. Fund type called ‘flexible-balanced’ 
might be a mixture of public debt securities, stocks and reverse repo (stocks of 
companies treated in BIST). On the other hand, there are ‘flexible-growth’ funds 
with high-risk strategies. These funds consist of government and private sector debt 
securities, national firms’ shares, USA’s and EU countries’ debt securities, 
international (foreign) companies’ shares and reverse repo of national companies are 
selected from those listed on the BIST. These examples can be proliferated but the 
reasoning is clear: pension fund title signifies the investment strategy and implies a 
certain kind of risk-return expectation.  
Table 6.3 Development of the Pension Funds in Turkey between 2003-2014 
Year 
 
Number of 
Funds 
Net Asset Value 
(Thousand TL) 
Number of Investors  
2003 68 42,779.00 15,245 
2004 81 296,124.83 314,257 
2005 96 1,219,049.10 672,696 
2006 102 2,821,384.52 1,073,650 
2007 104 4,558,886.00 1,457,704 
2008 121 6,041,612.07 1,745,354 
2009 130 9,105,097.38 1,987,940 
2010 140 12,017,953.46 2,281,478 
2011 165 14,345,204.85 6,569,933 
2012 176 20,357,692.13 3,128,130 
2013 237 26,186,322.64 4,126,956 
2014 246 37,771,442.17 5,062,659 
Source: Capital Markets Board Monthly Statistical Bulletin March 2015 (CMB, 2015a). 
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On the basis of this structure, the Turkish pension funds have grown rapidly 
in both number and portfolio value since 2003 when the IPS was founded. As can be 
seen from the table below, the initial number of pension funds was 68 in 2003 and it 
has been recorded as 246 by the end of 2014. Between 2003 and 2014, the net asset 
value of funds has increased from TL42 millions to TL37 billions. The number of 
investors has risen from 15 thousand in 2003 to 5 million in 2014. 
As the table 6.3 reveals, the most significant increase within the value of 
assets and number of investors has been recorded after 2012. The reason behind that 
is the new regulation introduced in January 2013. As mentioned before, the incentive 
of 25% of state contribution has been implemented since the beginning of 2013. In 
addition, with the same regulation change, the instruments that could be included in 
pension mutual funds’ portfolios have been diversified. In this context, gold funds, 
lease certificate funds and basket-funds are new types of funds introduced. 
Moreover, participation funds, which only include non-interest instruments, are 
founded as well. The board fee, which is taken to improve and support the individual 
pension system, is decreased by 40% for pension funds and is abolished entirely for 
participation type pension funds (CMB, 2014b, pp. 52–3). Finally, with the new 
regulation it is clarified that if the fund name refers to a certain asset or sector, the 
fund needs to deploy at least 80% of the assets into that particular asset or sector. As 
a result of this regulation, the number of investors has increased by almost 2 millions 
and reached 5 millions at the end of 2014. Thus, the net asset value of the pension 
funds has almost doubled between 2012 and 2014, and recorded as TL 37 billions in 
2014.  
It is possible to show the rapid growth of pension funds in comparison with 
other financial market players such as mutual funds. As can be seen from the table 
below, between 2004 and 2014, the development of pension funds in Turkey is much 
more rapid than the development of mutual funds. First of all, the number of mutual 
funds has grown two times in the last ten years whereas number of pension mutual 
funds has grown three times at the same period. Secondly, the portfolio value of 
mutual funds has increased from TL24 billions in 2004 to TL33 billions in 2014. The 
trend of increase has not always been consistent, i.e. it is interrupted a few times. On 
the other hand, pension funds’ portfolio value has increased from TL296 millions to 
TL37 billions in ten years. Moreover, the trend of increase in pension funds is 
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consistent and has not been interrupted except in 2011 when the portfolio value of 
pension funds decreased slightly in terms of USD. 
Table 6.4 Development of mutual funds and pension funds in Turkey between 2004-2014 
Year Number 
of 
Mutual 
funds 
Portfolio value of 
Mutual funds in 
Millions 
Number 
of 
Pension 
funds 
Portfolio value of Pension 
funds in Millions 
     TL  $    TL  $ 
2004 253 24,444 18,213 81 296 219 
2005 275 29,374 21,872 96 1,219 902 
2006 289 22,012 15,577 102 2,821 1,984 
2007 297 26,381 22,508 104 4,559 3,890 
2008 340 23,979 15,768 121 6,042 3,973 
2009 316 29,608 19,921 130 9,105 6,126 
2010 486 33,220 21,620 140 12,018 7,822 
2011 595 30,219 15,905 165 14,345 7,550 
2012 592 30,688 17,155 176 20,358 11,380 
2013 522 30,083 14,131 237 26,186 12,300 
2014 482 33,315 14,327 246 37,771 16,244 
Source: (CMB, 2015a)  
The growth of the pension funds in Turkey can be also shown through 
international comparison. For this purpose we use OECD data both in terms of 
absolute value of pension funds and the share of pension funds’ assets value as 
percentage of GDP. The OECD defines pension funds' assets as those bought with 
the contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension 
plan benefits (OECD, 2016). According to the OECD data, by 2014, the amount of 
pension funds’ assets of the United States has reached USD14 trillion. The leading 
example, United States, is followed by the United Kingdom with USD2.6 trillion 
pension funds’ assets value. And other OECD countries with high values of pension 
funds include Australia, Netherlands and Canada as shown in the table below. There 
are two other countries which have big pension funds markets compared to their 
GDPs in 2014: Iceland with a pension fund value of 146.3% of the country’s GDP 
and for Switzerland the share of pension funds is 125.6%. 
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Table 6.5 OECD countries with highest and lowest pension funds value (Millions $ and % GDP) 
COUNTRY Value of pension 
funds in millions 
USD 
Value of pension 
funds as % of GDP 
United States 14,733,958 84.6  
United Kingdom 2,685,370 96.0 
Australia 1,685,992 113.1 
Canada 1,304,264 74.7 
Netherlands 1,282,009 161.1 
Turkey 14,292 2 
Hungary 5,043 4.1 
Estonia 2,676 11.3 
Slovenia 1,912 4.2 
Luxembourg 1,813 3.2 
Source: Source: OECD, 2015
83
 
On the other hand, not all OECD countries have developed pension funds markets. 
For instance, Luxembourg has the smallest pension funds value with USD3.2 billion 
and is followed by Slovenia with USD1.9 billion of pension funds. These countries’ 
pension funds are also small in terms of share of GDP, respectively 3.2% and 4.2%.  
On the basis of this data we can posit Turkey as a newcomer but the growth 
of the pension funds is relatively rapid. The pension funds assets in Turkey increased 
from TL1.6 billion in 2004 to TL35 billion in 2013. The biggest increase is recorded 
in 2010 according to the OECD data. Moreover, we know on the basis of data 
provided by the Turkish authorities (CMB, 2015a), the jump between 2013 and 2014 
is significant as well, with the rapid growth of pension funds continuing. As a result 
of this rapid growth, the share of pension funds relative to GDP has grown from 
0.39% to 4.86% in Turkey between 2003 and 2014.
84
 This growth trend has been 
steady except between 2011 and 2012 when the share of pension funds within GDP 
has decreased from 4.12% to 3.79%. In order to explain this contraction, we need to 
go to data provided by the CMB. Accordingly, between 2012 and 2013 pension 
funds assets have only grown by 0.8% of the growth rate whereas the GDP has 
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 OECD Dataset Funded Pension Statistics OECD (2015) Available at: 
http://data.oecd.org/pension/pension-funds-assets.htm Access date: 18.04.2015  
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grown 4.2% (CMB, 2015a)(TURKSTAT, 2016). The growth of the share of pension 
funds within the GDP has continued after this temporary decline and reached the 
level of 4.86% in 2014.  
In relation with the supply-side impacts of pension funds, the capital markets 
in Turkey have developed considerably. Market capitalisation (or market cap) is the 
total market value of the shares outstanding for public trade. It is calculated through 
multiplying the price of shares with the number of shares outstanding. The market 
capitalisation value in Turkey has increased rapidly after 2004 as can be seen from 
the table above. This rapid growth is evident when we compare it with the other 
countries. For instance, the biggest increase in stock market capitalisation in one year 
was recorded in Turkey in 2012 with a 53% rise. At the same year, the increase of 
stock market capitalisation has been recorded as 19% in the USA, 5% in the UK and 
4% in Japan which are the leading countries in stock market capitalisation.   
Table 6.6 Market Capitalisation in Turkey between 2001-2012 in US$ Millions 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Market 
Capitalisation 
47,149 33,957 68,379 98,298 161,537 162,398 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Market 
Capitalisation 
266,572 117,229 225,735 306,662 201,817 308,774 
Source: The World Bank Market Capitalisation Data (WB, 2015) 
However, by 2012, Turkey still has one of the lowest stock market cap values 
amongst G20 countries. As we show in the table 6.7, Argentina has the lowest stock 
market capitalisation value with USD34 billion whereas Turkey is the second lowest 
with USD309 billion. By 2012, the highest market capitalisation value belongs to 
USA with USD18.6 trillion.
85
 The recent data indicate that the rapid growth of 
market capitalisation has slowed down in 2013 and 2014, USD 273 and USD269 
billion, respectively. Nevertheless, it can be argued that capital markets in Turkey 
have expanded significantly since 2004 (CMB, 2015b). 
To sum up, on the basis of available evidence, it can be argued that, despite 
the relatively short history of the pension funds in Turkey, they now occupy a 
significant position in the Turkish capital markets along with other investment 
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opportunities. Growth of the pension funds provides a supply of capital inflows for 
new capital market instruments.  
Figure 6.1 Pension funds' portfolio values and outstanding securities in the Turkish capital 
markets, Million TL, 2004-2015 
 
 
Source: CMB.  
Note: Right axis pension funds, left axis outstanding securities. 
The figure above can be interpreted as representing a conjunction of several 
factors which include establishment of pension funds but also other developments 
contributing to financialisation. In this regard, it does not come as a surprise that the 
moment when outstanding securities climb up drastically is also the moment when 
pension funds’ portfolio value has exploded. These two developments are not 
irrelevant as they are both related to the financialisation phenomenon. However, this 
is not to say that the only reason capital markets in Turkey accelerated growth in the 
post-2001 era is because of pension funds. Rather, it is related to general 
transformations during the financialised era of which pension funds’ establishment 
and growth is part and parcel. Moreover, privatisation of several public institutions 
and transformation of the banking sector are other factors which contribute to the 
growth of outstanding securities; in a way that resembles the US and UK experience 
where the privatisation process of the 1980s resulted in shareholder discourse in a 
way that is associated with financialisation (Langley, 2008).  
Moreover, when we make a comparison between two different periods, the first 
between 1994 and 2004, and the second period being 2005 and 2015, we see that the 
components of outstanding securities have changed as well.  
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Figure 6.2 Distribution of outstanding securities between 1994-2004 
 
Source: CMB 
These two periods are diverse in terms of the variety of investment instruments as is 
evident from the figure below which is much colourful than the figure above. In the 
first period, except for a few years between 1994 and 1998, the dominant securities 
in the Turkish capital markets are shares while mutual fund certificates exist in 
considerable levels.  
Figure 6.3 Distribution of outstanding securities between 2005-2015 
 
Source: CMB 2015  
On the other hand, the second term 2005 and 2015 is characterised by a rich colour 
range which signifies the newly-introduced investment instruments within the 
Turkish capital markets. On the basis of this information and other evidence 
collected from capital market investors’ announcements, we associate this 
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enrichment in financial instruments with the establishment of pension funds in 
relation to the expansion and deepening of the financial sphere. 
This quantitative growth has been accompanied by a qualitative 
transformation. Since 2003, the share of public securities has decreased against the 
increasing percentage of private sector securities within the total outstanding 
securities in the capital markets in Turkey. Meanwhile, within the private sector 
securities, the shares of recently introduced securities, i.e. corporate bonds, 
commercial papers and bank bills, have increased. At the same time, the asset backed 
securities and warrants have become prevalent. These impacts of pension funds on 
capital markets in Turkey are investigated in the next section. 
Table 6.7 Highest and lowest market capitalisation values in G20 Countries by 2012 (in billions 
USD) 
Highest Lowest 
Country Value Country Value 
USA 18,668 Argentina 34 
China 3,697 Turkey 309 
Japan 3,681 Indonesia 397 
Germany 1,486 Italy 480 
France 1,823 Mexico 525 
Source: Available at: https://www.quandl.com/c/economics/stock-market-capitalization-by-
country Access date: 28.05.2015 
6.3. Capital Market Innovation: Demand side developments 
As can be seen from the figure below, the structure of the Turkish capital market has 
changed as the share of the private sector has increased from 8.4% in 2003 to 26.9% 
in 2014. This increase has been interrupted in 2009 and 2013, but the figures have 
recovered rapidly afterwards.  
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Figure 6.4 Increasing share of private sector securities within the Turkish capital market 
 
Source: (CMB, 2015a) 
While private sector securities within the capital markets in Turkey have 
become more significant than before, the allocation of securities within the private 
sector has changed as well. Until 2008, shares constituted the whole private sector 
securities in the financial markets. In other words, the private sector only issued 
securities in the form of shares. However, after 2008, new forms of securities have 
been issued by the private sector. Shares are still the most dominant asset type but 
their significance has gradually decreased. The table below shows the share of 
different private sector securities amongst the overall outstanding securities traded in 
the capital market in Turkey after 2008. In 2008, the percentage of shares was 
recorded as 18.7% whereas there were two more private sector securities: corporate 
bonds (0.1%) and commercial papers (0.1%). In 2010, the percentage of shares was 
recorded as 18.5 while corporate bonds constituted 0.3% of all securities in the 
capital markets. In the same year, there was a new security in the private sector: bank 
bills, which started at 0.3% and have grown rapidly to 4.5% in 2014. Meanwhile, the 
growth of corporate bonds continued and was recorded as 3.3% in 2014. Asset 
backed securities also appeared in the financial picture in Turkey in 2011 and have 
grown to 0.4% in 2014.  
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Table 6.8 Private sector securities' shares as % of total outstanding securities 
Securities  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Shares 18.7 17.5 18.5 18.9 18.8 19.7 18.5 
Corporate 
bonds 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.9 2.7 3.3 
Commercial 
papers 
0.1 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
Asset backed 
securities 
0 0 0 0.1 0.3 0 0.4 
Bank bills 0 0 0.3 2 3.5 0.7 4.6 
Real estate 
certificates 
0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 
Total private 
sector securities 
as % of total 
outstanding 
securities 
18.9 17.6 19.2 22 24.6 23.5 26.9 
Source: (CMB, 2015a) 
As a result of these developments, the total value of shares has been recorded 
as TL105 billions by 2014, a rise from TL18 billions in 2003. Corporate bonds have 
increased rapidly after 2010 and recorded at TL18 billions by 2014. The most 
significant rise has been experienced by bank bills, which appeared in 2009 for the 
first time with the value of TL55 thousands and have increased to TL26 billions by 
2014. Finally, in 2014, the total value of asset backed securities has been TL2 
billions whereas warrants’ value has only been TL114 millions (CMB, 2015a). Thus, 
in the most recent picture of the Turkish financial markets, bank bills and corporate 
bonds follow shares as increasingly important private sector assets. We explain the 
implications of all these products in the order of their significance: bank bills, 
corporate bonds, asset backed securities and warrants. 
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Figure 6.5 Private sector securities’ shares within the Turkish capital markets between 2003-
2014 
 
Source: Capital Market Board Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March 2015
86
  
6.3.1 New capital market instruments: Evidence for innovation 
Bank bills have been issued by the development and investment banks since 1992 in 
order to raise finance through capital markets. In October 2010, the CMB has 
allowed deposit banks to issue bills (CMB, n.a.). Banks bills are very similar to T-
bills but they are generally issued with higher interest-rates. Therefore, the return on 
bank bills is higher than similar debt securities. The underlying factor of issuing bills 
is the low interest rates on deposits which leads banks to seek alternatives for raising 
finance.
87
 Without doubt, the rise of bank bills is also related to the increasing 
significance of the banking sector in the Turkish capital markets. Indeed, when we 
review the size of banks in the stock exchange market this growth is even more 
obvious. Borsa Istanbul, BIST, is founded in 2012 with the merger of the Istanbul 
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 Report has an error at the value of 2014 in annual section, we applied the correct value of 2014 
December instead. Available at: 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/apps/aylikbulten/index.aspx?submenuheader=0 Access date: 19.05.2015 
87
 Denizbank guide for bank bills. Available at: 
https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0
CE8QFjAF&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.denizbank.com%2Fkisa-
kisa%2F_pdf%2Fbono_faq.pdf&ei=i-FgVbr-MInXUaytgMAL&usg=AFQjCNGfo-
s5Ujtzk7dpGMXtvs01b_j-mA&sig2=MKNGTBv_CO0wyhfJwYRp1g&bvm=bv.93990622,d.d24 
Access date: 23.05.2015 
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Exchange Market (IMKB, Istanbul Menkul Kiymetler Borsasi in Turkish) with 
Derivatives Market (Vadeli Islem ve Opsiyon Borsasi) and Istanbul Precious Metals 
(Istanbul Altin Borsasi). The secondary exchange of stocks is performed in the BIST. 
BIST100 is the base index and includes selected stocks of 100 companies (Egilmez, 
2013). BIST 100 Index covers BIST 30 (and BIST 50) stocks.
88
 When we review the 
companies which constitute the BIST 30 index, we see that the dominance belongs to 
the banking sector. For instance, the table below shows the ten companies with the 
biggest weight in the BIST30 index. As it is clear from the table, the two most 
dominant companies are banks and four of the first ten companies are banks. 
Table 6.9 Ten most weighted companies within BIST30 index 
Company based allocation Sector Weight %  
T. GARANTI BANKASI A.S. Banking 11.90 
AKBANK T. A.S. Banking 11.46 
HACI OMER SABANCI HOLDING A.S. Holding 6.20 
TURKCELL ILETISIM HIZMETLERI A.S. Telecommunication 6.19 
BIM BIRLESIK MAGAZALAR A.S. Retail 6.13 
T. HALK BANKASI A.S. Banking 5.75 
T. IS BANKASI A.S. Banking 5.59 
EREGLI DEMIR CELIK FABRIKLARI A.S. Iron-steel 5.44 
TUPRAS-TURKIYE PETROL RAFINELERI A.S. Petro chemistry 5.34 
KOC HOLDING A.S. Holding 4.69 
Source: Calculation date: 20.05.2015 Access date: 23.05.2015 Available at: 
http://www.ist30.com/sayfa/ist30-bist-30-endeks-kapsami 
When we look at the sectoral breakdown of the BIST 30 index, it is easier to see the 
dominance of the banking sector as shown with the table 6.10. It is the most 
important sector within the BIST30 index. This is important in terms of pension 
funds’ investment decisions because they choose stocks from BIST 30 index. 
Therefore, it can be argued that pension funds contribute to financialisation of the 
economy by providing finance for the banking sector which is already a rapidly 
growing sector of the country. Moreover, when we review the characteristics of bills 
issued by banks, we see that “the most important feature of these securities is that 
they are suitable for institutional investors such as pension funds” (Bekar, 2011). 
                                                 
88
 “BIST 30 Index consists of 30 stocks selected among the stocks of companies traded on the 
National Market and the stocks of real estate investment trusts and venture capital investment trusts 
traded on the Collective Products Market”. BIST Stock Indices Ground Rules, available at: 
http://www.borsaistanbul.com/en/indices/bist-stock-indices access date: 21.04.2015 
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The reason that funds in general, pension funds in particular, prefer bank bills is that 
their maturity rests between 3-6-12 months which causes them to be considered as 
liquid assets by funds (Uras, 2011). Thus, financialisation has an internal mechanism 
that enables financial institutions (pension funds) to feed other financial institutions 
(banks) through capital market instruments (bank bills). 
Table 6.10 Sectoral breakdown of the BIST30 index 
Sector Weight (%) Sector Weight (%) 
Banking 38.95 Petro chemistry 6.19 
Holding 13.15 Real estate 
partnership 
4.07 
Telecommunication 8.50 Automotive 3.36 
Iron-steel 7.05 Food 1.75 
Transportation 7 Construction 1.69 
Retail 6.64 Durable consumer 
goods 
1.65 
Source: Calculation date: 20.05.2015 Access date: 23.05.2015 Available at: 
http://www.ist30.com/sayfa/ist30-bist-30-endeks-kapsami  
Another private sector security that has gained importance recently is 
corporate bond. In Turkey, corporate bonds are first issued in 2006 after a long time 
and have increased rapidly and reached the 3.3% of the total outstanding securities. 
Previously, corporate bonds used to be issued in the Turkish capital markets until the 
mid-1990s. However, for a long time corporate bonds were not preferred by the 
capital market investors because the interest rates of government bonds were higher 
as a consequence of the high public debt during the 1990s. With the reform in 
taxation in 2006, which equalised the tax on corporate bonds’ returns and the returns 
of government bonds, the former became popular again. Moreover, corporate bonds 
are seen as appropriate alternatives by companies seeking to diversify the debt 
instruments and create new ways of raising finance. Therefore, corporate bonds 
recorded 3.3% of the total outstanding securities by 2014 (CMB).  
In similar vein with bank bills, when corporate bonds reappeared after a long 
absence, the demand for these instruments were expected to arise from institutional 
investors, not least pension funds. This is not to say that corporate bonds are not 
suitable for individual investors. Rather, the general idea was that individual 
investors might be more hesitant initially to invest in corporate bonds (as for bank 
bills). Therefore, until the supply of corporate bonds diversify as a response to the 
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demand by the portfolio managers, the target buyer for them would remain the 
institutional investor, i.e. mutual and pension funds.
89
 To sum up, both bank bills and 
corporate bonds are introduced with the motivation of deepening financial markets 
by diversifying alternative securities while relying on the institutional investors, most 
importantly pension funds, to provide the initial demand for these securities.  
There are two more types of securities which have recently been visible in the 
Turkish capital markets: asset backed securities and warrants. Asset backed 
securities (ABSs) were regulated in 1992 as a form of securitisation based on 
liabilities (debt). ABSs, however, have only recently become one of the most 
remarkable securities in the Turkish capital markets (0.4% of total outstanding 
securities by 2014). Securitisation enables the exchange of liabilities with several 
creditors and long-term maturations by transforming them into securities. Finance-
partnerships, banks, financing companies, financial leasing institutions and real 
estate investment partnerships issue ABSs. ABSs can be issued on the basis of 
several liabilities such as banks’ consumer loans, financing firms’ loans, mortgage 
loans, financial leasing companies’ loans originating from leasing agreements, 
banks’ and private financial institutions’ export-purposed loans and other loans 
(CMB, n.a.).
90
 Warrants, on the other hand, are capital market instruments which 
give the owners the right to buy the shares of a partnership. Warrants are similar to 
options which do not give the ownership of a share but rather the right to buy or sell 
the share. There are also warrants and certificates for investment institutions which 
give the right to buy or sell an asset issued by an investment institution. Banks and 
intermediary institutions are required to have an approval from CMB or rating 
agencies in order to issue warrants. Moreover, BIST 30 index stocks, public debt 
securities, foreign exchange, precious metals can be the underlying asset for warrants 
(CMB, n.a.). Warrants still have an insignificant share in the Turkish capital markets. 
However, what is interesting about them and important for our study is the way in 
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 Available at: http://www.finansgundem.com/para-piyasa/sirketlere-kaynak-yatirimciya-enstruman-
219523.htm Access date: 28.05.2015 
90
ABSs are issued through two different financing institutions: asset financing funds and mortgage 
financing funds. These funds take over the assets and issue securities on the basis of them. Leasing 
companies and financing firms are only allowed to issue securities based on liabilities in their 
founders’ balance sheet. On the other hand, those funds established by banks are allowed to take over 
liabilities of other institutions and issue ABSs based on them. For detailed information on the ABSs 
see the communiqué announced on 09.01.2014. Available at: 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/01/20140109-11.htm Access date: 25.05.2015 
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which they are introduced by the authorities. ABSs and warrants are introduced in a 
way that emphasises they are investment instruments which are more suitable for 
institutional investors. They are complicated and sophisticated in terms of 
conditions; as a consequence, individual investors might be confused and lose their 
investments while using them.
91
 Therefore, according to the Turkish Capital Market 
Association, institutional investors such as pension funds are expected to include 
these instruments in their portfolio while providing demand for them (TCMA, 2016). 
To sum up, while the financial markets in Turkey have developed, pension 
funds have been important for two reasons: firstly, pension funds have grown rapidly 
in recent years and have become one of the most important agencies in the Turkish 
capital markets. This has meant that pension funds provide capital inflows to buy the 
newly introduced instruments. Secondly, pension funds are managed by professional 
portfolio managers who formed the initial demand for sophisticated investment 
instruments such as bank bills, corporate bonds, ABSs and warrants. The share of 
each of these instruments within the portfolio of pension funds is not clear because 
they are gathered under the label of ‘other’ instruments. However, it is still very clear 
that the significance of these instruments has increased within the pension funds’ 
investment strategies. In order to demonstrate this, we look at the other side of the 
coin: pension funds’ asset allocation. 
6.3.2 Origin of the demand for innovation: Pension funds’ asset allocation 
Although, the Turkish pension funds have been established only for a decade, we can 
already find evidence in their assets allocation that signifies the shift from traditional 
investment instruments to recently innovated securities. In this regard, the table 
below shows the development of the asset allocation of pension funds’ portfolios 
between 2003 and 2014. Since the beginning of the IPS, the majority share of assets 
has belonged to the government debt securities (TB in the table). In 2003 the 
government bonds and bills constituted the 69% of the total assets of pension funds. 
This percentage has increased until 2005 when it reached 80% and since then it has 
been declining. Although there have been recoveries from time to time, the share of 
government debt securities within the portfolio of pension funds has continued 
                                                 
91
 Turkish Capital Markets Association website introduces capital market investment instruments. 
Available at: 
https://www.tspakb.org.tr/tr/Yat%C4%B1r%C4%B1mc%C4%B1K%C3%B6%C5%9Fesi.aspx 
Access date: 28.05.2015 
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falling and it was recorded as 57% in 2014. Stocks, on the other hand, constitute 13% 
of the total assets of pension funds. This percentage was 11 in 2003 but has 
fluctuated meanwhile, as can be seen from the table. The percentage of the repos has 
decreased almost in half from 13% in 2003 to 6% in 2014. The money market 
transactions have occupied a minor percentage (less than 1%) since the establishment 
of the pension funds (0.92% in 2014). Foreign exchange securities are also another 
insignificant asset type within the portfolio of pension funds with 1.1% in 2014. 
Finally, the most impressive growth has been in the percentage of ‘other’ instruments 
within the pension funds’ portfolios. The percentage of ‘other’ assets has increased 
from 0.57% in 2003 to 21% in 2014. When we look closer, we recognise two jumps, 
one in 2007 when the percentage increases from 0.75% in 2006 to 5% by the end of 
2007. The second jump is recorded in 2010 when the 5% of 2009 share of ‘other’ 
assets reached 16% by the end of 2010. It is transparent that the 20% increase in the 
‘other’ instruments is related to the newly introduced capital market instruments, 
corporate bonds, bank bills, ABSs and warrants in general, and lease certificates in 
particular.  
Table 6.11 Asset allocation of PMFs between 2003 and 2014 (%) 
Year Stocks  T-Bills  Reverse Repo Money market 
Securities  
Foreign 
Securities  
Other 
2003 11.18 69.46 13.76 0.82 4.20 0.57 
2004 13.32 72.44 9.07 3.33 1.84 0.00 
2005 11.12 80.41 5.35 0.91 0.76 1.45 
2006 8.59 73.03 14.43 2.50 0.69 0.75 
2007 11.60 68.87 13.66 0.42 0.51 4.94 
2008 7.68 69.74 15.68 0.01 0.53 6.36 
2009 10.01 68.68 15.26 0.42 0.32 5.31 
2010 11.99 57.78 13.40 0.03 0.14 16.66 
2011 12.09 60.19 11.88 0.49 0.84 14.51 
2012 15.96 58.04 8.15 0.72 0.56 16.57 
2013 14.04 58.88 6.83 1.24 0.92 18.09 
2014 13.52 56.95 6.55 0.92 1.10 20.96 
Source: Capital Markets Board Monthly Statistical Bulletin (CMB, 2015a)  
Across ‘other’ instruments, the most remarkable development has been 
experienced with lease certificates which were introduced in 2010. Lease certificates, 
are ‘interest-free bills’ which enable companies (originator) to raise finance by using 
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the ‘transfer-lease-take over’ method through an Asset Lease Company (ALC). 
ALCs in Turkey are founded in the form of joint-stock companies.
92
 Lease 
certificates can be based on ownership, management agreement, buy-sell, 
partnership, and contract of construction those are issued by ALCs. According to 
this, ALCs take over a certain asset from the original company in order to lease the 
asset to the original company, or to third parties, in order to raise finance for the asset 
through issuing certificates based on the asset. Lease certificates are issued by the 
public and private sector. ALCs can be founded by banks, intermediary institutions 
such as portfolio, safekeeping and underwriting institutions, mortgage financing 
institutions, real estate partnerships (whose shares are traded in the stock market), 
partnerships who are graded by the ratings agencies and by the partnerships whose 
majority share is owned by the Treasury (CMB, 2013). Treasury published an 
investor guide for lease certificates and explained how the Treasury Asset Leasing 
Company (TALC) raises finance for public sector on the basis of real estates 
(Treasury, 2015). The initial interpretation has been that the CMB of Turkey 
introduces this instrument in order to attract the so-called Gulf Capital since it is 
appropriate for investors with religious concerns (Gumus, n.a.). 
Table 6.12 Lease certificates (in 000s TL) 
VALUE 
DATE 
MATURITY 
DATE 
MATURITY RENTAL 
RATE 
RENTAL 
PAYMENT 
PERIOD 
SALE 
AMOUNT 
03/10/12 01/10/14 2 Years 3.7 6 Months 1,624,483 
20/02/13 18/02/15 2 Years 2.85 6 Months 1,515,327 
21/08/13 19/08/15 2 Years 4.5 6 Months 1,817,300 
19/02/14 17/02/16 2 Years 5.3 6 Months 1,332,820 
01/10/14 28/09/16 2 Years 4.84 6 Months 1,839,964 
18/02/15 15/02/17 2 Years 3.9 6 Months 1,801,515 
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Undersecreteriat of Treasury. Available at: 
https://www.hazine.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2f1%2fDocuments%2fKamu+Finansman%c4
%b1+%c4%b0statisti%c4%9fi%2fKira+Sert.+Internet+Tablosu.xlsx Access 
date:21.05.2015 
It is clear that, despite packaging with Islamic references, the most important 
implication of the lease certificates is prevailing ‘securitisation’ across Turkish 
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 Capital markets board announcement 
http://www.spk.gov.tr/duyurugoster.aspx?aid=201041&subid=0&ct=c 
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capital markets. Lease certificates work on the same principle with ‘special purpose 
entity’ (SPE from now on). The SPE is an external company which takes over the 
assets of the originator company in a way which secures the obligations in the case 
of bankruptcy. SPEs produce derivatives on the basis of assets of the originator 
company. However, what made SPEs popular is their role in hiding debt, for which 
Enron is remembered as the source of a major scandal.
93
 What is more interesting is 
that in the Turkish context these companies are formed as joint-stock companies and 
their products, i.e. derivatives, are packaged with Islamic references.  
The main involvement of pension funds with lease certificates (interest-free 
bills) has been through foundation of participation pension funds which, in principle, 
work like interest-free deposit accounts established in participation banks (see 4.3.1). 
The interest-free pension funds can be founded in different types, such as flexible, 
stocks or precious metals. The IPS has become more convenient for interest-free 
services since 2008 when the constraint of devoting at least 30% of the fund in 
government debt securities was abolished. This made it possible to establish 
completely interest-free pension funds.
94
 Moreover, the state contribution funds, 
which were introduced in 2013, were established in two different forms: one, 
conventional fund, which invests in interest bearing securities; the other one, on the 
other hand, invests only in interest-free assets. Hence, particularly with the recent 
regulation changes, participation pension funds have stimulated a huge attraction for 
the interest-free individual pension system.
95
  
After their announcement in 2010 and subsequent progress in regulation, 
lease certificates have become substantial investment instruments for the 
participation pension funds. The Individual Pension System Progress Report 
indicates that by December 2014, there were 24 pension mutual funds formed on the 
basis of participation principle, and their portfolios are heavily invested in lease 
certificates (PMC, 2014). As can be seen from the figure 6.3, 63% of portfolios of 
these pension funds consist of lease certificates. 
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 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spv.asp#ixzz3ahyH5Im2 
94
 http://www.zaman.com.tr/yorum_bireysel-emeklilik-sistemi-ve-islam-hukuku_2066123.html 
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 In a newspaper interview, a manager from an interest-free individual pension company declares that 
they decided to enter the system as a result of the 2013 regulations. Moreover, they expect the total 
sectoral value of the IPS to be 400 billions while they hope to get 15% of sector share as participation 
pension funds. The interview is dated on 18.10.2014. Available at: 
http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/1211385-dini-kurallara-uygun-6-yeni-faizsiz-fon Access date: 
21.05.2015 
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Figure 6.6 Asset allocation of interest-free pension mutual funds 
 
Source: Adapted from Individual Pension System Progress Report (PMC, 2014, p. 63) 
The dominance of lease certificates is stronger when it comes to the state 
contribution funds. As mentioned before, the state contribution funds are established 
in the form of ‘interest-free’ pension funds as well as conventional funds. There are 
nine interest-free state contribution funds which have ‘alternative’ or ‘participation’ 
in their titles. The figure 6.4 shows the asset allocation of these funds. Accordingly, 
interest-free state contribution funds invest 93% of their portfolios in lease 
certificates.  
Figure 6.7 Asset allocation of state contribution funds formed as alternative or participation 
fund type 
 
Source: Adapted from Individual Pension System Progress Report (PMC, 2014, p. 81) 
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To sum up, the complete structure of derivatives produced by SPEs refer to 
securitisation which increases intensification of financial operations. In other words, 
lease certificates, in which participation pension funds heavily invest, associate the 
old-age additional income of participants with speculation in financial markets. 
Therefore, it can be argued that IPS provides demand for innovation in financial 
markets by establishing certain types of pension funds. In the case of participation 
pension funds, the securitisation dimension of lease certificates is concealed behind 
the argument that ‘people should be able to save for their retirement without 
involving in interest-bearing activities that are banned by their religion’.  
6.4. Conclusion 
On the basis of the theoretical framework on financialisation and pension funds, we 
demonstrate pension funds’ supply and demand effects on capital markets in the 
Turkish context. When we review all the regulations regarding funded pension 
schemes we see that, although the IPS has been founded with tight regulation in the 
beginning, the system has been re-regulated recently. In particular, the loosening of 
the investment criteria, through abolishing the rule of investing 30% of the portfolio 
in government debt securities and enabling foundation of participation pension 
funds, shows the flexibility of the authorities in terms of the function of pension 
funds. It is possible to associate the expansion of capital markets with establishment 
of the pension funds in a direct manner because the pension funds’ portfolio assets 
signify a certain increase in the capital market activity. This relation is crystallised in 
the supply-side effect of the pension funds through providing new capital resource to 
enhance capital market instruments. Note that this argument significantly differs 
from the orthodox view which attributes positive functions to pension funds in terms 
of contributing to the improvement of capital markets. On the contrary, our position 
here has its roots in heterodox financial instability approaches which show how 
pension funds’ additional inflows create speculation in capital markets (Toporowski, 
2000). The decreasing dominance of public securities and increasing significance of 
recently introduced instruments, such as bank bills, corporate bonds and ABSs, 
signify the trend from long-term less risky securities to short-term more speculative 
securities.  
The extraordinary amounts of capital inflows, which are brought by pension 
funds, stimulate a strong innovation wave. As mentioned in the theoretical 
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framework chapter on financialisation and pension funds relations, new financial 
instruments are introduced to increase returns when pension funds are mature. 
Indeed, the logic of funding approach, on which we draw our analysis, provides 
remarkable insights in terms of speculative assets’ proliferation as a result of 
changing risk-return balances as pension funds mature (Engelen, 2003). When we 
compare the recent asset allocation data with that at the beginning of the 
establishment of pension funds, we see the shift in the Turkish capital markets from 
government debt to ‘other’ securities. This shift cannot be explained only with the 
maturation of pension funds particularly because they have been founded very 
recently (in 2003). Therefore, we associate the shift in pension funds’ portfolios with 
the financial deepening motivation of the Turkish capital market authorities and the 
new investment instruments introduced in this regard (bank bills, corporate bonds 
and ABSs). This is the characteristic feature of the Turkish pension funds in terms of 
financialisation of the economy through their impacts on capital markets.  
 In this regard, what deserves most attention is the development of lease 
certificates in relation with participation pension funds. The underlying motivation 
behind lease certificates is to increase the depth of financial markets in Turkey 
through prevailing securitisation. However, the way in which they are presented is 
entirely different: they are presented with religious references while the financial 
depth agenda seems of secondary importance, if not hidden. Lease certificate is a 
breakthrough in terms of securitisation in Turkey for the reason that they introduce a 
certainly different level of financial depth which did not exist in the Turkish financial 
markets before. However, what is more interesting is that this securitisation is 
packaged with Islamic references of interest-free finance. Participation pension 
funds, which are established to attract religiously sensitive people to the IPS, invest 
heavily in lease certificates. Thus, pension funds’ role is clearly observed in the case 
of lease certificates and participation pension funds. Moreover, this implies the 
prevailing securitisation, speculation and financialisation in the Turkish capital 
markets supported by the pension funds through creating demand for these 
instruments. Therefore, we clearly see the role of pension funds in financialisation in 
Turkey by examining the capital market’s transformation in the last decade. 
To sum up, this chapter fulfils a key role by revealing the multi-fold relations 
between pension funds, capital markets and financialisation. Pension funds’ 
establishment itself is a part of financial growth agenda of the Turkish authorities. 
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We mentioned this while reviewing the institutionalisation of financialisation in 
Turkey as well as reform process which attributed economic growth missions to the 
private pension scheme. Therefore, we emphasise that the pension funds’ relation to 
capital market growth is more than the absolute contribution of their portfolio assets. 
Rather, they have an internal and mutual association with each other in relation to the 
financialisation of the economy.  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
In this thesis, our main argument is to associate the way in which pensions are 
restructured in Turkey with the phenomenal spread and condensation of financial 
relations, namely financialisation (Fine, 2013). What is distinctive about pensions 
under financialisation is that they are restructured, reformed and reorganised with 
financial motives of creating pension funds especially in those countries lack depth 
in capital markets. Encouraged by varieties of international pressures and 
inducements, pension funds contribute to financialisation through accumulating 
massive amounts of money capital which create both supply-side and demand-side 
effects on capital markets, resulting in increasing speculation that manifests itself in 
the corresponding spread and sophistication of financial instruments.  
Our position is significant for pointing to financialisation as the main 
underlying tendency behind pension reforms across the world, while also associating 
the phenomenon with neoliberalism and acknowledging the roles of globalisation 
and post-industrialisation in this regard. As discussed in our literature review, 
globalisation and political and economic factors of the post-industrial era have been 
effective in the process of transformation of pensions as well as in the peculiarities of 
different countries’ “welfare regimes”. We should bear in mind that all countries’ 
social policies are established on the basis of country-specific social reproduction 
relations which depend on global developments within capitalism, and state and class 
relations.  
On this basis, we suggest that it is not appropriate to draw clear-cut 
conclusions such as ‘race to the bottom’ or other sorts of convergence (or 
divergence) in social provisions whether for pensions or otherwise. Thus, detection 
of financialisation as the trend shaping social reproduction in varying places, and its 
implications, require a more in-depth analysis than simply looking at the level of 
social expenditure or budget deficits due to pension payments. It is not sufficient to 
point at demographic trajectory, employment or wage levels, as the underlying 
factors behind the pension reforms.  
Indeed, financialised pension schemes have spread around developing 
countries from the time of the involvement of agencies such as the Chicago Boys in 
Chile and, in the case of Turkey, through the role of the WB and the IMF. Indeed, 
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the increasing power of IFIs in social policy making is crucial in this regard, but this 
is not to say that national governments are passive and ineffective in terms of 
deciding or implementing social policy. Rather, IFIs desperately need state power to 
fulfil their targets of financialising the pensions for the bulk of the population while 
providing safety nets for those who cannot be covered by such financial schemes. 
What is different with financialisation is the motivation of the national authorities 
behind the reforms: pension income is perceived as a way to feed capital markets 
rather than the elderly. Moreover, pension systems are structured in the financial 
sphere as opposed to targeting social rights as previously. Hence, pension income is 
related to financial market returns rather than mechanisms established between the 
state, workers and employers.  
With the purpose of analysing the pension reforms in Turkey in this context, 
we draw a theoretical framework through a discussion on the interrelations across 
finance, social reproduction and pensions. The main theoretical conclusions we draw 
can be summarised as follows. 
 Financialisation is the distinctive feature of neoliberalism, i.e. current 
mode of capitalism, which demonstrates itself in the increasing 
integration of finance into economic and social reproduction alongside 
the rising sophistication of financial operations.  
 Financialisation of pensions perfectly illustrates the capability of finance 
to enter several areas of social reproduction of labour power through 
involvement of IFIs in policymaking processes while attaching old-age 
income provision to fictitious capital and extending finance’s profit-
making domain. 
 An essential nexus of financialisation and pension reforms is found in the 
key role played by pension funds in terms of sophistication of financial 
operations through supply- and demand-side effects of the money capital 
accumulated by these funds on capital markets. 
In more detail, our initial motivation for building our theoretical framework 
on the basis of Marxist finance theory arose from the idea that Marx’s approach had 
the advantage of positing finance in relation with economic and social reproduction. 
Thus, as we demonstrate by the analysis of money capital as a moment within the 
industrial circuit, finance is inevitable for surplus value production. Moreover, 
specialisation in financial activities grows in parallel with the development of surplus 
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value production as is obvious from discussion of money-dealing capital’s 
emergence. As suggested from our overview of IBC, financial income has its roots in 
produced/appropriated surplus value and, due to its fictitious character, can develop 
an increasingly “distant” dependence on the underlying production of surplus value. 
This increasing distance between financial operations and surplus value production 
creates a systemic aspect of financialised capitalism. 
While the transformation of the financial sphere and its influence on “real” 
sectors places new relations on the forms taken by capital accumulation, finance also 
influences the value of labour power through its interaction with the social 
reproduction processes, mostly clearly captured in the literature by its reference  to 
household indebtedness. Financialisation of social reproduction processes goes 
beyond (consumer credit) indebtedness and signifies a more substantial economic 
and social transformation of which pensions is a part in relation to the reproduction 
of labour power. The value of labour power (as the wage in concrete form) is 
attached to a more general standard of living that includes the reproduction of the 
elderly as part of the means of consumption that is funded from the total social 
product.  
A straightforward conclusion to draw in this context would be that 
financialisation’s impact is one of decreasing the value of labour power through 
changing structures of pensions. This point deserves closer scrutiny. From an 
abstract point of view, financialisation of pensions might not make any difference to 
the value of labour power as long as the material standard of living is preserved. This 
is so because the value of labour power cannot permanently fall below a certain level 
that is determined under the circumstances of contemporary capitalist relations. Marx 
explains in detail the tendencies and countertendencies that keep the value of labour 
power at a certain level. In this regard, the main countertendency would be class 
struggle of workers who would not sacrifice their ‘given’ living conditions. On the 
other hand, capitalists would always pursue efforts for suppressing labour costs even 
though this might harm their profits in the long run.  
On the basis of this understanding, it can be argued that the transformation in 
the pension systems can indeed be posited as in part the result of the capitalists’ 
motivation of decreasing the value of labour power by squeezing the funds devoted 
for social reproduction, not least elderly income, especially in times of crisis and 
recession when the balance of class struggle can favour capital. However, the 
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suppression of class struggle might facilitate a backlash in material standards of 
living from certain groups of people within the working class. That is why our 
position here is more nuanced than simply arriving at the conclusion that 
financialisation of pensions signifies reduction in the value of labour power. Rather, 
the potential impacts of this development in pension systems needs to be illuminated 
through investigation of historical evidence in light of class struggle for better living 
conditions during old age, and how such provision is made. 
Our investigation of the case study on the basis of this framework starts with 
a macro analysis of the Turkish economy in order to show how financialisation has 
changed the production and reproduction relations in Turkey in the post-2001 era. 
Although financialisation is mostly perceived as a developed country phenomenon, 
we pursued the idea that financialisation is contagious and experienced in developing 
countries with certain peculiarities that divorce their experiences from those of 
developed countries. In this context, the conclusions we draw from Turkey’s 
experience are as follows: 
 Financialisation in Turkey is mainly driven by the IFIs with the argument 
of solving the economic problems of high public indebtedness, high 
inflation and financial fragility through implementing policies such as 
inflation targeting, fiscal discipline and banking reforms. 
 These structural transformations resulted in acceleration of privatisation, 
socialised costs such as international reserves accumulation and low 
employment levels despite the volatile economic growth that is driven by 
the massive capital inflows to the country. 
 It is possible to observe the transformation brought forward by 
financialisation in the post-2001 era through investigating the expansion 
and restructuring of the financial sector, altering relations of the non-
financial sector with financial activities – with limited contribution to 
production levels, and banks’ concentration on consumer lending which 
gives rise to the household indebtedness. 
Our inquiry into the Turkish economy supports our theoretical approach which posits 
financialisation as involving the reconfiguration of finance in several aspects of 
economic and social life. In this sense, pension reforms are not independent from the 
rest of Turkish fiscal policy in seeking a contraction in state expenditure, not least in 
social provision. Moreover, the introduction of the IPS is not discrete from other 
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privatisations that accelerated with the motivation of freeing markets by abolishing 
state involvement. This is why the decrease in public indebtedness and changed 
relations of financial agencies with government borrowing fit with the plan for 
withdrawing the state from the market, including financial markets. However, 
expectations concerning “crowding out” have not held. Even though public 
securities’ weight diminished within the financial markets, not least banks’ 
portfolios, the private sector did not benefit from this development in a growth of 
productive capital. 
Therefore, our analysis of IBC and fictitious capital, which demonstrates that 
finance does not necessarily serve capitalists’ interests in the sense of boosting 
production, proves apposite possibly more so than at any other time. As long as 
finance finds its way to profit, which it does in the Turkish context either through 
consumer lending to households or generating relations with big corporations or 
certain sectors (such as construction) while using external debt in foreign currency to 
finance these loans, the more progressive role of contributing to real investment is 
not fulfilled.  
In this light, it comes as no surprise that the pension system in Turkey, which 
was advised by the WB in 1994, has been altered to open more space for finance. We 
investigate the historical development of the reform process and the corresponding 
institutional transformation of the pension systems and draw the following 
conclusions: 
 The implementation of the pension reform, as with other developing 
countries, is closely related to efforts to access capital which 
demonstrates itself in the Turkish case with the conditionality of pension 
reform for the loan and standby agreements with the WB and the IMF, 
respectively. 
 During the reform process, the budgetary constraints of the Turkish 
social security system are wrongly explained by appeal to an ageing 
population whereas the deficits of the social security system of this 
youth-populated country originated from labour market characteristics of 
high unemployment, low wages and informality in addition to the 
chronic low labour force participation, in particular amongst women. 
 Although undertaken as a multi-staged process, the Turkish pension 
reform serves and is underpinned by financialisation of the economy 
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which is evident in the rising significance of financial conduits in 
pension provision via the IPS and tightening eligibility conditions and 
lowering pension benefits from the public PAYG scheme. 
 The scrutinised investigation of data confirms the weakness of pension 
reform advocates’ suggestions of ageing population, unsustainable 
budget deficits and so on while it is also evident that none of the 
measures in reformed pension schemes is capable of satisfactorily 
meeting the correctly observed shortcomings of the pension system, such 
as coverage.  
There is some room for clarification on the role of the IFIs in implementation 
of pension reforms in Turkey – that is whether or not they pushed financialisation 
while the Turkish authorities and society resisted the process. First and foremost, it 
has to be admitted that it was not an easy financialisation process in Turkey as both 
in general economic restructuring measures and in particular pension system 
transformation, the WB and IMF had to use some carrot and stick methods for 
pushing implementation of its advice. However, it would be an overstatement to 
argue that these efforts were due to strong opposition of local parties as the spread of 
financialisation was mostly consented to, if not very welcome as in the case of the 
housing boom and abrupt increased demand for mortgage loans. Rather, what we 
could make out of this endeavour is that the Turkish economy with very preliminary 
financial markets required a direct intervention by local and global forces to enable 
the emergence of financialisation.  
The best hinge for this interpretation is the 25% matching contributions for 
participation in the IPS. This incentive originates from the fact that the majority of 
the society had very little familiarity with funds and capital markets as an investment 
option. Therefore, they were sceptical about joining the IPS. In addition to this well-
known obstacle, the authorities were aware of potential participants with Islamic 
reservations. Further, a middle-income country like Turkey necessitates much more 
encouragement than higher-income countries when it comes to saving due to low 
earning levels. On top of all of these, when it is also considered that the IPS is not the 
best available investment option, an endorsement becomes vital. Therefore, the 
whole process of IFIs’ intervention and local governments’ excessive diligence for 
promoting the private funded scheme can be understood as a facilitator for 
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financialisation in a relatively less convenient context, i.e. Turkey, rather than 
struggle against an organised and mobilised defiance.  
Further implications of the pension reform process are traced in the potential 
impacts of financialised pension provision on vulnerable groups of the population. 
One might think that, as those unemployed and informally employed do not have a 
pension either from the PAYG or the IPS, they would be no better nor worse off after 
the reforms. Yet, this is only formally so. Before the reforms, there were alternative 
eligibility opportunities thanks to the redistributive mechanisms of the PAYG 
scheme. These and other sources of modest pension income were abolished 
alongside tightening rules of the pension system in response to budgetary concerns. 
The IPS, on the other hand, does not allow for this kind of mitigating mechanisms 
with the only return from a pension pot being determined by financial market 
performance. Therefore, the position of disadvantaged groups in the labour market is 
aggravated by the reforms. What is especially problematic is the case of women as 
they are expected to participate in the labour force in lieu of state-funded pension 
benefits which constitute their main income source in old age, with the “neutral” IPS 
discriminating against women given their multiple disadvantages in labour markets. 
Another interesting point to stress is the approach of the IFIs to Turkey’s middle-
class in a slightly different way than other developing countries as, in the former 
case, the middle class (with upper classes) is seen as an object of saving (through 
retirement funds) whereas in the latter, such as Asian countries, China in particular, a 
rising middle class is expected to contribute to consumption, i.e. ‘the consumer class’ 
(OECD, 2010, p. 10). 
As a final false point on the WB’s ageing population arguments and its far-
reaching implications, it has been 22 years since the WB first presented living longer 
as a curse rather than a celebration (WB, 1994). Since then, many things have 
changed in the world and most of the WB’s projections have proven to be wrong. 
Despite that, the WB has not modified this argument in a way that shows us the only 
thing that does not get old is the argument of ageing. Moreover, with the underlying 
fear of losing the window of opportunity in terms of being the youngest population in 
Europe, the Turkish authorities have recently accelerated religious references 
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towards abolishing use of contraception.
96
 By all means, the political transformation 
in the country is not directly the result of, nor response to, WB reports. However, 
demographic arguments should be discussed more carefully by considering women’s 
rights for contraception rather than positing them as disordered fertility machines of 
the neoliberal era. None of the economic arguments can and should be more 
powerful than women’s prolonged fights for the right to choose giving birth or not. 
This is especially so given the impact of pension funds interactions with 
capital markets. As we show in the theoretical framework on intensification of 
finance in relation with pension funds, three conduits highlight the function of 
pension funds in financialisation: their institutional investor role in terms of 
prevailing shareholder value and influencing corporate governance; asset market 
inflation and other supply side-effects of massive capital accumulated in pension 
funds; and the logic of funding and other demand-side effects of pension funds 
which stimulate innovation in new capital market instruments. The review of 
financialisation literature sheds light on the first conduit of pension funds serving as 
an institutional transformation favouring the ascendance of financial motives in big 
corporations’ investment decisions in Anglo-Saxon countries where pension funds 
have a long history. However, this sort of function of pension funds in 
financialisation in Turkey is weak as they are recent and their relations to the real 
sector is still limited and indirect. Nevertheless, the other two conduits of pension 
funds’ in relation to financialisation are observable in Turkey which enable us to 
present the following findings: 
 Capital markets in Turkey, despite being one of the smallest across 
OECD countries, have shown a rapid transformation as the structure of 
capital markets has changed with the increasing role of private sector 
securities as opposed to diminishing public sector’s financial 
instruments. At the same time, private sector securities’ composition has 
changed while shares of conventional instruments, such as stocks, remain 
stable and recent innovations gain more weight as a result of the 
introduction of novel financial instruments such as bank bills, corporate 
bonds, ABSs and warrants. 
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 The organic relation between pension funds’ supply-side impacts and 
capital markets’ development is evident in the growth of pension funds 
which have been accelerated with the state contribution incentives and 
loosening of investment criteria to enable pension funds to be the most 
important institutional investors on the Turkish capital markets, recently 
exceeding mutual funds. 
 The significance of pension funds in issuing novel financial instruments 
is clear in the approaches of capital market authorities and players 
towards pension funds, as pension funds have been the origin of the 
demand for unconventional financial instruments such as bank bills and 
corporate bonds, alongside the increasing presence of lease certificates in 
participation funds that signifies securitisation is prevalent in Turkey 
through instrumentalising religious concerns. 
Further, in order to avoid companies founding pension funds to invest in their 
own securities, there are restrictions on pension fund portfolios as they cannot 
include more than 10% of their portfolios in the same sort of shares. However, this 
restriction does not apply to big corporations that have stocks listed on the BIST30. 
Moreover, stocks of the companies that are not listed on the stock exchange are not 
permitted to be included in the portfolio above a certain amount, 10%. Thus, the idea 
behind this is to prevent small companies using pension funds as a self-financing 
accumulation mechanism. This might be justified by the risk of default while, at the 
same time, it results in pension funds not contributing into development of the real 
sector mostly consisting mainly of small-scale companies.  
In a similar vein, banks’ involvement with pension funds is aimed to be 
restricted through constraints on allocation of pension funds’ investments in deposit 
and participation accounts. Despite that, however, banks benefited from the IPS and 
pension funds significantly both in terms of supply for new funds and resources for 
profits, as well as demand for new financial instruments established by banks, i.e. 
bank bills. They approached pension funds as a new profit-making domain while 
many banks established their own pension companies. Moreover, this is a costless 
and comparatively less risky business especially considering banks’ portfolio 
managers control pension funds’ portfolios. Thus, the winner in terms of pension 
funds in the Turkish financialisation process is the banking system too. This 
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character of pension funds’ development in Turkey originates from the fact that 
banks are the most powerful organisations in the Turkish financial sphere.  
Thus, the developments in Turkey fit with the financialisation literature that 
suggests the key function of pension funds is in the emergence of capital market 
movements associated with financialisation. Although it is too early to observe asset 
market inflation impacts and institutional investor effects of pension funds in Turkey, 
their key function in capital markets is crystal clear. The important point is that 
pension funds’ performance contributes to financialisation with an increasingly 
fictitious character attached to capital market instruments, not least in the form of 
securitisation. Interestingly, the securitisation process in Turkey is packaged with 
Islamic references in a way that conceals its financialisation-related functions. This 
can be seen as a peculiarity of financialisation and pension funds in Turkey. 
In the next section, we discuss the contributions of this study and its 
limitations. We also address areas of future research which can potentially draw on 
our analysis. The significance of this study is enhanced as the Turkish government 
has been preparing legislation that requires all workers to be registered in the IPS 
automatically, with the possibility of opting out after a certain time. We conclude 
with final remarks on the potential implications of IPS especially in case it becomes 
mandatory starting from 2017.  
7.2. Contributions, limitations and further research 
Not surprisingly each social provision, education, health or housing, has its own 
characteristics in relation to their function within economic and social reproduction. 
Unsurprisingly, pensions have been differentiated by finance in the era of 
financialisation and, in this light, this thesis contributes to social policy literature 
(Fine, 2014).  In doing so, the theoretical framework of this thesis draws on existing 
literature on Marxist understanding of financialisation as the extensive and intensive 
accumulation of finance (Fine, 2013). In terms of the expansion of finance in 
pensions, we highlight the relation between finance and social reproduction. This 
aspect of our study is significant for engaging with value of labour power and social 
wage discussions (Fine & Harris, 1976; Gough, 1975, 1982). In more detail, if value 
of labour power is seen as an individual relation rather than as underpinned by 
standards determined through class relation, any loss in social provisions is seen as a 
way of increasing exploitation at the individual level (Gough, 1975). We disagree 
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with this approach and follow the argument that the value of labour power is a living 
standard determined in relation with broader processes of social reproduction (Fine, 
2009). Thus, changes in social provision, such as pensions, affect the value of labour 
to the extent they affect the standards of living for the working class. Therefore, 
rather than drawing shallow conclusions regarding exploitation (up or down with 
what is provided as opposed to whom and how), we focus on differentiating the 
impacts of financialisation on social reproduction through varying processes, with 
uneven effects across different layers of the proletariat.   
The other half of our theoretical framework, the intensive growth of finance 
and pension funds, on the other hand, addresses a different gap within the Marxist 
literature. Although having a substantial foundation, Marxist theory of finance lacks 
analyses that explain the practical implications of fictitious capital. In other words, 
the surplus value related functions of different forms of fictitious capital are 
highlighted whereas the way in which capital markets undertake these functions is 
neglected. Therefore, we benefited from critical approaches that highlight capital 
markets’ workings (Toporowski, 2000) and pension funds’ function in this regard 
(Engelen, 2003). This is an attempt to combine the abstract understanding of finance 
in capitalist relations to observable mechanisms of the modern financial sphere and 
pension funds.  
The contribution of this thesis in terms of our case study is threefold. First, 
we uncover the role of the IFIs, not least the WB, in Turkish pension reforms by 
tracing back the evidence from more than two decades ago. It is wrong to say that 
pointing to the inaccuracy of pension reform advocates’ arguments is an original 
contribution here as this aspect of pension reforms is stressed many times before 
(Guzel, 2005; Turcan Ozsuca, 2006). Nevertheless, revealing the financial motives 
behind the pension reforms is novel in the Turkish context where these tend to be 
analysed simply as privatisation of pensions. However, as we demonstrate with a 
detailed analysis of capital markets since the establishment of pension funds, we are 
able to emphasise the financial implications of pension reforms which go beyond 
privatisation to indicate financialisation of pensions. 
Second, investigating the IPS in detail is a fundamental contribution 
considering that it is becoming mandatory for all workers (Boyacioglu, 2016). 
According to the legislation currently in progress, all workers starting a new job will 
be automatically registered within the IPS for six months. After this period, the 
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worker will have the choice of opting out. Nonetheless, this implementation can be 
seen as a transition period to render the IPS completely mandatory. Thus, by 
addressing the potential negative impacts of the IPS on vulnerable groups of the 
population, those unemployed, informally employed, low waged, and, last but not 
least women, we highlight a crucial consequence of the financial pension schemes: 
exacerbating the inequality within the labour market and across the elderly.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the IPS and pension funds’ capital 
markets-related effects from a critical point of view. Most of the analysis of IPS 
serves as a tribute to capital market development while neglecting the enhanced 
speculative character of such activities in this regard (Avci, 2011). On the other 
hand, we analyse the macroeconomic variables in the era of financialisation and 
draw the conclusion that not all kinds of expansion in financial activities contribute 
to surplus value production. Rather, increasingly fictitious activities detach finance 
from a functional relation to production. Therefore, capital market development itself 
is not inevitably beneficial for economic growth. Indeed, in the Turkish case, the 
increasing securitisation with Islamic packaging shows that pension funds might only 
contribute to rising speculation.  
One limitation of our study stems from its exclusive preoccupation with 
pensions and Turkey. In this regard, financialisation of pensions is not only a 
transnational project run by the WB with an explicit target (Orenstein, 2008), it is 
also a reflection of underlying tendencies of financialisation in the global context as 
countries reform their pensions systems. Such financialisation (of pensions) is not 
necessarily going to be common across different countries. Moreover, it is beyond 
the scope of this study to discuss other aspects of financialisation of social 
reproduction, such as health (Sumaria, 2010).  
Another limitation of this thesis stems from pension reforms in Turkey being 
too recent to confirm our longer-term theoretical insights. For instance, it is hard to 
show how pension funds’ institutional investors function in the Turkish capital 
markets regarding their influence on corporate governance. Rather, their character as 
institutional investor is only observable as a source of more skilled dealing, due to 
reliance upon expert portfolio managers. In a similar vein, their impact on asset 
market inflation or shift in management activities due to logic of funding (Engelen, 
2003) is not as yet well-supported due to their immature nature. Finally, because of 
the absence of data, we are not able to provide a detailed review of the internal 
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workings of pension funds in Turkey in terms of investigating extensive versus 
intensive management strategies. The only information we have is that every pension 
fund has to sign a contract with a portfolio manager. In this sense, pension funds 
seem to have an external management. However, it is also known that pension funds, 
which are mostly established by banks, generally appeal to banks’ portfolio 
investors. In this regard, pension funds’ management seems to be not only internal to 
pension funds themselves but also integrated into the banking system. This peculiar 
character of pension funds in Turkey requires more research. 
What, then, can be contributed to further research is to suggest a mapping of 
financialisation across different areas by bringing out common and peculiar 
characters of each sector. In other words, what is similar between financialisation of 
food (Salerno, 2014; Williams, 2014) and financialisation of water provision 
(Bayliss, 2014)? Or, what can be used from the research on carbon derivatives 
(Layfield, 2013) to analyse the securities based on mortgages (Walks, 2014)? 
Another question might seek to analyse whether or not financialisation shapes 
development policy (Carroll & Jarvis, 2014; Weber, 2014) in a way that prioritises 
financial motives within social policies (Fine, 2014)? Hence, a broad sketch of 
financialisation of almost everything highlights the main spines of financialisation 
and the relations across different examples of financialised domains instead of 
drawing independent analyses of financialisation often based on varying conceptual 
framings. Inspired by Leyshon and Thrift (Leyshon & Thrift, 2007) who suggested 
“the capitalization of almost everything”, we call this process ‘financialisation of 
almost everything’. With agreement on the point that some of the research on 
financialisation is not conceptually justified (Christophers, 2015), we support 
proliferation of analyses of  financialisation is the means to gauge the variety of 
domains with which it has exhibited different degrees and characteristics.  
The second domain that has potential for research is the IPS. If this funded 
scheme becomes mandatory for millions of workers in Turkey, as planned, nothing 
will be remain the same for the Turkish social security system and capital markets. 
Prospective research might focus on vulnerable income groups within the labour 
market in a way that develops the insights provided here. This can be a more 
qualitative research that is based on interviews as well as macro data that shows how 
unemployed, informally employed, the low-waged and women will be affected. 
Already, , there are studies that project outcomes for women of the IPS when it 
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becomes mandatory (Bozkus & Elveren, 2008; A. Y. Elveren, 2008; A. Elveren Y. & 
Hsu, 2007).  
On the other hand, those employed temporarily are liable to be affected 
severely from the planned policy on the IPS. This is because for those who 
occasionally work with a very low wage, joining the IPS will directly decrease the 
wage level and claiming it back will require extra effort and time with every job 
change. This can be seen as an implicit financial premium and, as in the case of a 
high social security premium, workers and employers might go for the informality 
option. However, what is even more dramatic is that in the case of social security 
premiums, those not claimed back due to impossibility of retirement, are included in 
the redistributive social security budget. In the case of the IPS, on the other hand, 
what will happen to these small amounts of contributions is ambiguous. Will the 
unclaimed contributions remain in the pension funds? If so, is this not a direct 
support for financial actors while aggravating the existing informality problem?  
Moreover, if this regulation does not meet with any opposition and the IPS 
becomes mandatory, the development of pension funds will be even faster and 
enable future researchers to investigate their impacts on capital markets. In this 
regard, a close analysis of pension funds, possibly on the basis of primary data 
collection from funds themselves, can enable observing the shift in their asset 
allocation as well as investment strategies. Thus, our insights on the logic of funding, 
and pension funds’ contribution in increasing the speculative character of capital 
markets, will likely to be able to be examined with more data.   
7.3. Concluding remarks 
To sum up, the IPS is not a simple saving mechanism for additional retirement 
income as suggested by the authorities. Rather, it represents a substantial 
restructuring in pension provision in terms of integration of pension income into the 
financial sphere, while old age income provision becomes a field for financial 
activity and actors. Funded pension schemes have traditionally been common in 
Anglo-Saxon countries with developed capitalist relations alongside sophisticated 
financial sectors. However, the reason behind this sort of pension financing to 
become more prevalent across the developing world is the pension reform campaign 
run by the WB since the 1994 Averting the Old Age Crisis report (WB, 1994). 
Presenting ageing population as a challenge that could be confronted only by 
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financialised pension provision is a reflection of the ascendance of power and 
significance of finance which extends its reach across varying moments of economy 
and society.  
More immediately, jumping to Turkey in the contemporary period, there are 
two strands of conclusions to draw about the potential implementation of the 
proposal for rendering the IPS mandatory for every worker below 45 years old with 
an opt-out option after six months. The first implication regards the pension funds 
and the second concerns this policy’s impact on living standards of workers. 
Four of eighteen millions workers have already joined the IPS. Within the 
rest, twelve million who are below 45 years old will join the IPS automatically 
through paying TL100 per month for six months starting from January 2017. Thus, 
in the first half of 2017, the IPS will have TL7.2 billion additional funds. If nobody 
opts out at the end of the first year, the pension funds will increase by TL14.4 billion 
and this amount will be TL10.8 billion even if only half of the participants remain in 
the system.
97
 In this regard, several issues are open to discussion.  
The first thing is whether or not pension fund management fees, entrance fees 
and operational costs will be refunded to the participants who choose to opt out after 
the obligatory period. This is important because the Turkish pension funds’ total 
operational management-related fees are already criticised for being above average 
due to lack of competition and the short history of the sector. While this is the case, 
expecting low-income workers to pay for these fees mandatorily for six months will 
cause a transfer of income from workers’ wages to pension funds, particularly if the 
return of funds is deducts management fees.  
The second issue is whether or not employers will contribute to the system. In 
the case of absence of employer contribution, the burden of pension income will be 
only on employees’ shoulders which signals the individualised nature of pension 
provision. On the other hand, there is an option of introducing employer 
contributions with a tax incentive for the employer. However, according to the pilot 
scheme that started recently, the employee has to work for a certain number of years 
in order to benefit from employer’s contribution to the IPS. What will happen to this 
contribution in the case of changing jobs or temporary breaks to career seems to be 
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urgent questions to answer as, in the case of rendering the IPS participation 
mandatory, this kind of scheme will put additional constraints on workers’ job 
contracts. In other words, worker will have to choose between current earnings and 
potential future income for old age in the case of a wage dispute with an employer.  
The third issue is whether or not a state contribution will be granted to these 
twelve million workers. As mentioned before, the state contribution incentive is 25% 
and, according to the official announcement, the cost of this incentive is already 
around one billion Turkish liras. This aspect of the IPS is severely criticised for 
subsidising those who are already middle- or high-income earners. If this is 
abolished for those who join to the system mandatorily, there will be loss of support 
for those who are most in need as half of these twelve million workers earn only the 
minimum wage. In case this incentive is preserved and granted to the new 
participants, the total cost for the first six months will be TL1.8 billion for the 
Turkish Treasury. However, we should note that this is a fictitious cost as they will 
only be paid to the worker in the future and if staying in the system for a certain time 
period before retiring. Then, the question is, what will happen to those state 
contribution incentives not claimed by the participants but invested in funds of the 
IPS? According to the regulation, state contribution incentives are paid back to the 
Treasury in a way that it is noted down as general budget income.
98
 This is important 
because the government invests in capital markets and acts like a financial market 
investor that seeks financial returns. The neoliberal ideology of taking the state out of 
market is upside down in the case of the IPS and financial markets. Finally, the IPS 
is still not the best investment option in Turkey while precious metals (gold) and the 
stock exchange offer higher returns. Therefore, pushing the IPS as the additional and 
mandatory saving mechanism is not the best option for workers. 
However, the previous paragraph operates at a superficial and polemical 
level, looking distributionally at what the worker receives and is taken away again. 
Real take home wages are determined by a host of factors as are the benefits and 
costs in monetary and kind forms that accompany them. By the same token, the 
actual pension to be received in the future, in light of contributions now to the IPS, 
will be determined in ways that at most loosely reflect those contributions. This 
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points to the need to discuss the details of such schemes in a broader theoretical and 
historical framing.  
By way of illustration, consider the implications of the making of the IPS 
mandatory in light of discussion of the value of labour power. In more detail, by 
2016, the minimum wage in Turkey after taxes has been increased by 30% from 
TL1000 to TL1300. This policy has previously been debated across  several aspects 
but recently two new points for discussion have emerged. According to the tax law, 
the minimum wage earner will be grouped in higher tax group and will pay 20% 
income tax rather than the previous 15% starting from October 2016. As a result of 
this development, the substantial amount of the wage increase will be repaid to the 
state as income tax. In addition to this development, the IPS contribution will be 
perceived by the minimum wage earner as a further cut from the wage increase. 
Thus, most of the TL300 wage increase will be taken back in the form of tax and 
finance premium. This point is important because it confirms our approach on value 
of labour power which is a living standard rather than welfare payments or cuts for 
social security. It shows that whatever the amount paid to workers, the living 
standard of workers only increases in relation to broader processes of social 
reproduction. This demonstrates the significance of class struggle for workers to 
increase their living conditions. In the absence of that, the value of labour power will 
be altered explicitly or implicitly by financial or non-financial interventions as in the 
case of the IPS. 
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